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PER Mini-course: Coalitional Games and Farsightedness

PER Mini-course: Coalitional Games and Farsightedness

This course, taught by Professor Rajiv Vohra, will explore recent developments that incorporate farsighted behavior in coalitional games, which are designed to model rational behavior when groups have the ability to make binding agreements.

Vincent P. Crawford Will Deliver PER Distinguished Lecture

Vincent P. Crawford Will Deliver PER Distinguished Lecture

Professor Vincent P. Crawford revisits Roger Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite’s (1983; “MS”) analysis of mechanism design for bilateral trading, replacing equilibrium with a non-equilibrium “level-k” model that predicts initial responses to games, and focusing on direct mechanisms.

1022 International Affairs Building (IAB)
Mail Code 3308  
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
Ph: (212) 854-3680
Fax: (212) 854-0749
Business Hours:
Mon–Fri, 9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m.

1022 International Affairs Building (IAB)

Mail Code 3308

420 West 118th Street

New York, NY 10027

Ph: (212) 854-3680
Fax: (212) 854-0749
Business Hours:
Mon–Fri, 9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m.