Abstract

This paper studies the trade-offs associated with income redistribution in an overlapping generations model in which savings rates increase with permanent income. By transferring resources from high savers to low savers, redistribution lowers aggregate savings, and depresses investment. I derive sufficient conditions under which this non-homothetic savings behavior generates a welfare trade-off between permanent income redistribution and capital accumulation in the short and long run. I quantify the size of this trade-off in two ways. First, I derive a sufficient statistic formula for the impact of this channel on welfare, and estimate the formula using U.S. household panel data. When redistribution is done with a labor income tax, the welfare costs associated with my channel are around 1/3 the size of those associated with labor supply distortions. Second, I solve a quantitative overlapping generations model with un-insurable idiosyncratic earnings risk and non-homothetic savings behavior calibrated to the U.S. in 2019. In this setting, I find that around 1/5 of the trade-off between permanent income redistribution and average consumption can be attributed to my channel.

Keywords: Redistribution, Non-Homothetic Preferences, Optimal Capital Accumulation, Sufficient Statistics

JEL codes: E21, E22, H21, D63
1 Introduction

What is the optimal amount of income redistribution? The existing literature has answered this question primarily by focusing on trade-offs between greater equity and inefficiencies introduced by distortionary taxation (Mirrlees 1971, Piketty and Saez 2013a, Werning, 2007). At the same time, empirical evidence suggests that savings rates are increasing in permanent income (Dynan et al., 2004, De Nardi and Fella, 2017, Straub, 2019), which implies that redistribution may have additional effects on welfare by changing the permanent income distribution and lowering aggregate savings. In this paper, I explore the consequences of this non-homothetic savings behavior for the trade-offs associated with income redistribution in overlapping generations (OLG) models. In particular, I show that non-homothetic savings implies an additional trade-off between redistribution and investment.

Intuitively, if lifetime savings increases with permanent income, all permanent redistributive policies — including non-distortionary lump-sum redistribution — will result in a transfer from households with a high marginal propensity to save to households with a lower marginal propensity, lowering aggregate savings and putting upward pressure on interest rates in a closed or large open economy (Straub, 2019, Mian et al., 2020).\(^1\) This increase in borrowing costs will curb firms’ capital investment, reducing the long-run productive capacity of the economy. It is this potential trade-off between permanent income redistribution and optimal capital accumulation that will be the focus of this paper.\(^2\)

I make several contributions towards better understanding this trade-off. The first is theoretical. In a simple OLG model, I present sufficient conditions for a welfare trade-off between non-distortionary (lump-sum) permanent income redistribution and capital accumulation in both the short and long run. I show that whether such a trade-off exists depends both on whether savings behavior is non-homothetic and on the desirability of additional investment.\(^3\) Intuitively, for there to be a trade-off, it must both be the case that redistribution dampens investment and that boosting investment is welfare improving. I explore how these conditions change when the government is given the ability to tax/subsidize capital, transfer from the young to the old and issue debt, policies which are well known to alter the savings level.

I then show that the size of the welfare trade-off between permanent income redistribution

\(^1\)As long as the economy is not a small open economy and the domestic savings supply has some impact on interest rates. In Straub (2019) and Mian et al. (2021), an increase in inequality lowers interest rates when savings behavior is non-homothetic.

\(^2\)As noted in Piketty and Saez (2013b) and Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), this trade-off is conceptually orthogonal to inefficiency concerns.

\(^3\)Importantly, the presence of a trade-off does not depend on why high income households have greater marginal propensities to save.
and investment is large relative to other channels. Using a redistributive labor income tax as an illustrative case, I decompose the steady state (long run) welfare impact of a small increase in the tax into the benefits of greater equality, the standard efficiency costs of distorted labor supply, and the costs associated with my new channel. This decomposition facilitates a back-of-the-envelope comparison between the welfare impact of labor supply distortions, which depend on the long run aggregate labor supply elasticity, and my channel, which depends on the elasticity of capital to the permanent income distribution. I present a sufficient statistic formula for this elasticity, and estimate its terms using U.S. household panel data. I show that the size of my channel is between 1/5 and 1/2 that of labor supply distortions, depending on the estimated degree of non-homothetic savings, as well as the elasticity of firm investment and household savings to increased borrowing costs. These results suggest that this channel may be large enough to matter when determining optimal policy.

While illustrative of the relative importance of the non-homothetic savings channel for small policy changes in the long run, the sufficient statistic exercise cannot speak to the channel’s importance for large policy changes in the short run or quantify the fraction of the total costs of redistribution that can be attributed to this channel. To answer these questions, I solve a quantitative OLG model with un-insurable idiosyncratic labor income risk and non-homothetic savings behavior, and calibrate it to the United States in 2019. I consider the effect of funding a universal lump-sum transfer by increasing average labor income taxes. In particular, I solve for the trade-off between greater redistribution and average consumption. I isolate the effects of my channel, and find that it can account for around 1/5 of the overall trade-off in the long run. I am currently in the process of quantifying the role my channel plays in the short run by examining the trade-off between redistribution and consumption along the transition path.

**Framework and Methodology.** I begin by studying a simple closed-economy OLG model with a possible motive for bequests and two labor productivity types. The model nests several prominent micro-foundations for non-homothetic savings behavior. In particular both bequests and consumption later in life can be considered luxury goods (De Nardi, 2004, Mian et al., 2021, Straub, 2019), and high-productivity households may discount the future less than low-productivity households (De Nardi and Fella, 2017).\textsuperscript{4} I first consider the impact of lump-sum permanent income redistribution from the high-productivity households to the low-productivity households on steady state welfare, defined as the Pareto weighted sum of

\textsuperscript{4}The simple model does not take into account earnings risk or heterogeneous rates of return. I consider earnings risk in the quantitative model.
each type’s lifetime utility. An *unconstrained* planner who could choose any feasible allocation would redistribute resources until the Pareto-weighted marginal utility of consumption was equal across households — the *first best* level of inequality. A welfare trade-off exists whenever the optimal redistribution policy for a fiscal policy maker *constrained* to using the lump-sum tax results in more inequality than first best.

I find that a long-run trade-off exists whenever savings behavior is non-homothetic *and* when the steady state with the first-best level of inequality is dynamically efficient. Intuitively, suppose the fiscal authority sets redistribution policy to implement the optimal level of inequality. If savings behavior is non-homothetic and this steady state is dynamically efficient, reducing the amount of redistribution slightly will improve welfare by boosting savings, investment, and ultimately aggregate consumption.

I then consider the entire transition path, such that welfare is defined as the Pareto weighted *discounted* sum of the lifetime utility of all present and future generations. Now, the planner cares about both the short and long-run. In this case, the presence of a trade-off depends not only on the sufficient conditions for a long-run (steady state) trade-off, but also on the rate at which the planner discounts future generations. For a welfare trade-off to exist, the planner must put sufficiently high weight on future generations for the benefit of greater future capital to outweigh the costs of more inequality *and* less consumption today. Finally, I show that these sufficient conditions extend to a setting in which the the government has access to a broader set of fiscal policy tools, including debt, inter-generational transfers, and capital subsidies.\(^5\)

Assuming the sufficient conditions derived above are satisfied, a natural question is whether the redistribution-investment trade-off is large relative to the standard equity-efficiency trade-off. To answer this question, I consider a simple redistribution scheme in which a lump-sum transfer is funded through a distortionary linear tax on labor income. I decompose the effect of a small increase in redistribution on steady state welfare into the effect of greater equality, the costs associated with distorted labor supply, and the costs associated with my non-homothetic savings. The costs of distortions depend on the long run (steady state) elasticity of labor supply with respect to the tax rate, and I rely on a meta-analysis in Chetty et al. (2011) for an estimate of this term.\(^6\) The redistribution-investment trade-off meanwhile, depends on the elasticity of the capital stock to changes in the permanent income distribution. I derive and estimate a sufficient statistic formula for this elasticity.

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\(^5\)These tools can be used to alter the savings supply in life cycle models, and could possibly be employed to offset the effect of changing the permanent income distribution (Diamond, 1965).

\(^6\)Chetty et al. (2011) show that while considerable disagreement exists regarding the Frisch (inter-temporal) labor supply elasticity, more consensus exists between micro and macro economists regarding the steady state elasticity.
My formula shows that the size of this elasticity depends first on how marginal propensi-
ties to save (MPS) out of permanent income change over the income distribution. Intuitively,
the greater the difference between the MPS of high and low-income households, the larger
the impact of redistribution on aggregate savings. I estimate the MPS over the perma-
nent income distribution using longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The sufficient statistic formula also depends on the interest rate elasticity of firm
investment relative to the interest rate elasticity of household savings. Intuitively, whether
a decline in savings increases savings (reduces household debt) or reduces investment more
depends on whether households or firms are more sensitive to increased borrowing costs. I
draw on a range of estimates from the literature of these elasticities. I then consider a set
of extensions to the baseline formula. I find that the costs associated with my channel are
between 1/5 and 1/2 of the size of those associated with distorted labor supply.

Finally, I solve a richer version of the simple non-homothetic savings model with idiosyn-
cratic income risk calibrated to United States economy in 2019. To calibrate the degree of
non-homothetic savings, I target my estimates of savings rates by permanent income quin-
tile and age in the PSID. I calculate the impact on average steady state consumption of a
lump-sum transfer funded by an increase in average labor income taxes. To isolate the effect
of my channel, I solve for the direct effect of the redistribution on the permanent income
distribution, and calculate the impact of just these changes on average consumption holding
household labor supply constant at the original steady state level. In this case, the tax acts
like a lump-sum permanent income transfer, and any change in capital – and consumption
– can be attributed entirely to the direct effect of non-homothetic savings behavior. I find
that my channel can account for around 1/4 of the overall trade-off in the steady state. My
next step will be to consider the relative importance of my channel over the transition path.

Related Literature This paper is related to the substantial literature on redistributive
taxation. In their review of the optimal labor income tax literature, Piketty and Saez (2013a)
note that researchers typically focus on ‘the classical trade-off between equity and efficiency
which is at the core of the optimal labor income tax problem.’ Similarly, Piketty and Saez
(2013b) analyze the optimal inheritance tax through the lens of an equity-efficiency trade-
off, noting that their results are orthogonal to concerns over optimal capital accumulation.
Werning (2007) considers the equity-efficiency trade-off in a dynamic economy subject to

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7In particular, I isolate the effects of permanent income changes from the effects of insurance, inter-
generational transfers, and labor supply distortions.

8Note that if the economy is dynamically efficient, less capital may be sub-optimal for a given set of
Pareto weights, but is not inefficient. That is, one can find Pareto weights such that a lower level of capital
is optimal, namely by weighting current generations more.
aggregate shocks.

Golosov et al. (2016) focuses on the trade-offs between efficiency and both equity and insurance in a model with idiosyncratic household labor income shocks. Heathcote et al. (2017) focus on the trade-off of between the benefits of equity and insurance and the costs of labor supply distortions and disincentives to invest in skills. Imrohoroglu et al. (2018) study the trade-off between greater equity through taxing top earners and entrepreneurial activity. I depart from much of the literature in considering the non-distortionary effects of redistribution of permanent income on optimal capital accumulation.

This paper is certainly not the first to consider a trade-off between capital accumulation and taxation (Atkinson and Sandmo 1980; Hamada 1972, Pizzo 2023). However, this paper is one of only a few that analyze a trade-off between redistribution and capital accumulation while abstracting away from inefficiency concerns (notably Pestieau and Possen (1978) and Okuno and Yakita (1981)).

A small literature studies the effect of redistributing from those with a high lifetime propensity to save to those with a low propensity on optimal tax policy in various settings. Golosov et al. (2013) solve a static model with preference heterogeneity. Pestieau and Possen (1978) and Judd (1985) consider a ‘two-class’ model with capitalists and workers. Sheshinski (1976) considers a model with infinitely lived agents. This paper breaks with this literature by studying optimal redistribution with non-homothetic preferences in an OLG model and by quantifying the impact of non-homothetic savings behavior on the welfare effects of redistribution using a sufficient statistics approach as well as a quantitative model.

This paper also contributes to the empirical literature studying the relationship between permanent household income and savings. In order to estimate my sufficient statistic formula, I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate marginal propensities to save (MPS) by permanent income type, and find significantly higher MPS for high income households. These findings echo those of Dynan et al. (2004), who use the PSID in combination with several other data sets to estimate both average and marginal savings rates by permanent income group. Relative to this study, I take advantage of the fact that the PSID added consumption data in 1999 in order to generate a more straightforward measure of ‘active’ savings. Straub (2019) uses the same data set to estimate a related statistic: the elasticity of consumption with respect to permanent income. Using the elasticity of savings implied by his findings in conjunction with estimates of savings rates by income group, I can generate additional estimates of the MPS and find that they are very similar to my direct estimates.

Finally, this paper contributes to a small recent literature on non-homothetic preferences and their macroeconomic effects. Straub (2019) shows that non-homothetic savings behavior
and increased inequality can explain falling interest rates. Blanco and Diz (2021) study the effects of non-homothetic preferences on optimal monetary policy. Mian et al. (2021) show how non-homothetic preferences have contributed to increased indebtedness and dampened aggregate demand in the long run.

**Layout.** The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I lay out the baseline overlapping generations model and establish its key properties. I derive sufficient conditions under which non-homothetic savings behavior generates a welfare trade-off between redistribution and capital accumulation. In Section 3, I present and calibrate the sufficient statistics formula to estimate the size of my channel relative to the size of labor supply distortions. In Section 4, I present the quantitative model and results. Section 5 concludes.

## 2 The Redistribution-Investment Trade-off

In this section I derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a welfare trade-off between non-distortionary redistribution and capital accumulation in a simple overlapping generations model. The model nests several leading sources of non-homothetic savings behavior. To derive the conditions, I consider the problem of a planner who aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the Pareto weighted sum of household utility. I begin by considering welfare in the long-run steady state. A planner free to choose any feasible steady state allocation would allocate resources between households to generate an ideal (first best) level of equality.

On the other hand, a constrained fiscal planner faces a trade-off between lump-sum redistribution and capital accumulation whenever it is optimal for fiscal policy to tolerate more inequality than the ideal level. I show how the conditions for such a trade-off change when social welfare is defined as the discounted sum of household utility along the transition path. In this case, the planner must weigh the benefits of greater equality and greater consumption now against the cost of less capital for future generations, making the rate at which the planner discounts future generations a key determinant of ideal policy. Finally, I consider how the sufficient conditions change when the government can alter the savings supply using a wider set of policy tools.

### 2.1 Environment

I begin with a variant of the canonical 2-generation overlapping generations closed-economy model with fixed exogenous labor supply. Time is discrete. Agents have perfect foresight
over future variables and there is no uncertainty.

**Households.** There is a unit mass of households who each live for 2 periods, \( h \in \{y, o\} \) and have heterogeneous labor productivity types, \( \theta_i \) for \( i \in \{L, H\} \) where \( \theta_L < \theta_H \). There is a constant fraction, \( \pi_i \) of each productivity type with an equal share of each generation (no population growth). While young, households supply a single unit of labor to firms and receive \( w_t \theta_i \) in labor income. The weighted sum of labor productivity is normalized to 1. Households can borrow and save at gross rate of return \( R_t \) and may leave bequests \( a_{i,t}^o \) to households with the same productivity type in the next period. Households born at time \( t \) receive \( R_t a_{i,t-1}^o \) in inheritance when they are young. Capital depreciates at rate \( \delta \). Households also receive a type-specific lump-sum tax(transfer) \( T_{it} \). A type-\( i \) household born in year \( t \) has lifetime utility given by equation (1).

\[
U(c^y_{it}, c^o_{i,t+1}, a^o_{i,t+1}) = \left( \frac{(c^y_{it})^{1-\sigma_y}}{1-\sigma_y} \right) + \beta_i \left( \frac{(c^o_{i,t+1})^{1-\sigma_o}}{1-\sigma_o} + \psi_a \frac{(a^o_{i,t+1})^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} \right)
\]

(1)

Note that the discount factor, \( \beta_i \) may be type-specific and that the parameters \( \sigma_y, \sigma_o, \) and \( \eta \), which govern the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution and bequests, may differ from one another. Households choose consumption when young and old and bequests to maximize (1) subject to their lifetime budget constraint:

\[
c^y_{it} + \frac{c^o_{i,t+1} + a^o_{i,t+1}}{R_{t+1}} = R_t a_{i,t-1}^o + w_t \theta_i + T_i = PI_{it}
\]

(2)

I define the right hand side of equation (2) as the household’s permanent income, \( PI_i \). Let a household’s change in assets, \( a^h_i - a^{h-1}_{it} = s^h_i \), their savings at age \( h \). Note that when \( \psi_a = 0 \) households do not leave bequests and \( s^y_t = a^o_t \).

**Firms.** There is a continuum of perfectly competitive firms who rent capital and labor from households and produce output subject to a Cobb-Douglas production function, \( F(K_t, L_t) = K^\alpha_t L^{1-\alpha}_t \). The firm’s first order conditions are standard and are given by

\[
R_t = F_K(K_t, L_t) + 1 - \delta \quad \text{and} \quad w_t = F_L(K_t, L_t)
\]

(3)

**Government.** The government runs a balanced budget each period. The transfer \( T_{it} \) is defined in terms of each generation’s lifetime income. The government cannot make net transfers between living generations, and can only transfer resources between household types in the same generation. I consider the case of a government with access to inter-generational
transfers and debt policy in the next section. The government budget constraint is given by the following expression.

\[ \sum_{i \in I} \pi_i T_{it} = 0 \]

**Equilibrium.** I define an allocation \( x \equiv \{\{c_{it}^y, c_{it}^o\}_{i \in I}, K_t, L_t\}_{t \geq 0} \). An equilibrium is an allocation, a sequences of financial positions, \( \{a_{it}^y, a_{it}^o\}_{i \in I, t \geq 0} \) a sequence of prices, \( \{R_t, w_t\}_{t \geq 0} \), and policies \( T \equiv \{T_{Lt}, T_{Ht}\}_{t \geq 0} \) such that the household first order conditions and budget constraint, the firms’ first order conditions, and the government’s budget constraint are satisfied, the labor market clears \( (L_t = 1) \), and the resource constraint (4) and asset market clearing condition (5) are satisfied.

\[
\frac{1}{2} \sum_i \pi_i (c_{it}^y + c_{it}^o) K_{t+1} = F(K_t, 1) + (1 - \delta)K_t \\
K_{t+1} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_i \pi_i (a_{it}^y + a_{it}^o)
\]

I define the set of all feasible allocations, \( \mathcal{X} \) as the set of allocations that satisfy the resource constraint. I define the set of all implementable allocations, \( \mathcal{X}^I \) as the set of allocations for which prices and policies exist that implement all \( x \in \mathcal{X}^I \) as an equilibrium. Note that when policy is held constant, the economy converges monotonically to the unique steady state (see Appendix 1 for a proof). Let \( \chi_s \) denote the set of all feasible steady state allocations and \( \chi_s^I \) be the set of all implementable steady state allocations.

**Discussion of preferences.** The parameters \( \sigma_y, \sigma_o, \) and \( \eta \) govern the elasticity of substitution between consumption over the life-cycle and bequests. I make the following assumption about these parameters and the discount factor, \( \beta_i \).

**Assumption.** I assume that \( \sigma_y \geq \sigma_o \geq \eta \) and that \( \beta_H \geq \beta_L \).

The above assumption allows for the possibility that households with higher incomes have a higher propensity to save out of their lifetime income.\(^9\) When any of the above inequalities are strict, the marginal propensity to save out of permanent income when young for high-productivity type households, \( \frac{\partial a_{it}^y}{\partial PI} \) is greater than for low-productivity households. The same is true for the derivative of bequests with respect to permanent income when \( \sigma_o > \eta \).

\(^9\)In the Appendix, I consider an alternative model in which the high-productivity types have higher rates of return than the lower productivity types.
When all elasticity parameters are equal and discount factors are uniform across types, the marginal propensity to save out of permanent income is constant over types. In this case, any lump-sum transfer from the high-types to the low-types has no affect on aggregate savings or the interest rate. Therefore, the steady state capital stock is unaffected by fiscal policy. When savings behavior is non-homothetic, and the marginal propensity to save is higher for high-permanent-income households, a greater lump-sum transfer to the low types, $T_L$ reduces aggregate savings. This puts upward pressure on the steady state interest rate $R$ and reduces steady state capital, $K$. These results are summarized in the following Lemma.

**Lemma 1 (Non-Homothetic Savings and Steady State Capital)** Let $K$ be the steady state level of capital.

**Case 1:** ($\psi_a = 0$). When either $\sigma_y > \sigma_o$ or $\beta_H > \beta_L$, the marginal propensity to save out of permanent income is higher for high-productivity types, $\frac{\partial s^y_t}{\partial PI_H} > \frac{\partial s^y_t}{\partial PI_L}$, and $\frac{\partial K}{\partial T_L} < 0$.

**Case 2:** ($\psi_a > 0$). When $\sigma_y > \sigma_o$ or $\beta_H > \beta_L$ or $\sigma_o > \eta$, the marginal propensity to save out of permanent income when young is higher for high-productivity types, $\frac{\partial s^o_t}{\partial PI_H} > \frac{\partial s^o_t}{\partial PI_L}$, the sensitivity of bequests to permanent income is higher for high income types, $\frac{\partial a^o_t}{\partial PI_H} > \frac{\partial a^o_t}{\partial PI_L}$, and $\frac{\partial K}{\partial T_L} < 0$.

For a proof, see Appendix A.1.

Lemma 1 shows that this simple life-cycle model nests several major explanations for non-homothetic savings behavior. When $\sigma_y > \sigma_o$, consumption later in life is considered a luxury, and households consume a greater share in the second period as their lifetime income increases Straub (2019).\(^{10}\) Whenever $\sigma_o > \eta$, leaving bequests is a luxury good, and households leave larger bequests as their lifetime income increases (De Nardi, 2004, Straub, 2019, Mian et al., 2021). Finally, I allow for the possibility that high-productivity households are simply more patient, which may explain some of the observed differences in savings rates over the income distribution (De Nardi and Fella, 2017).

Lemma 1 states that steady state capital, $K$ is unaffected by lump-sum permanent income redistribution when savings behavior is homothetic, but is decreasing in the degree of redistribution when savings behavior is non-homothetic. Intuitively, non-homothetic savings implies that redistribution takes permanent income from households with high MPS and gives it to households with lower MPS. This reduces aggregate savings, lowering the supply of loanable funds, pushing up borrowing costs, and ultimately decreasing the capital stock.

\(^{10}\)For example, more lavish retirements, private school for children, and out-of-pocket medical expenses are all luxury goods purchased later in life.
2.2 Redistribution and Steady State Welfare

I begin by considering the effect of an incremental change in steady state transfers to the low-productivity households, $T_L$ on steady state social welfare. Consider a social planner with Pareto weights $\lambda_i$ for each household type. Define steady state social welfare as in equation (6).

$$SW_s = \sum_I \lambda_i \pi_i \left( \frac{(c_y^i)^{1-\sigma_y}}{1-\sigma_y} + \beta_i (c_o^i)^{1-\sigma_o} + \beta_i \psi_o \left( a_o^i \right)^{1-\eta} \right)$$

(6)

I define the steady state welfare weight of type-$i$ households, $\omega_i \equiv \lambda_i (c_y^i)^{-\sigma_y}$. These weights are the product of the value of type-$i$ utility to the planner and type-$i$ households’ marginal utility of consumption. Therefore, they reflect the marginal value from the planner’s perspective of giving additional resources to a type-$i$ household.\(^{11}\) For a given set of Pareto weights, as the consumption of type-$i$ households falls, their marginal utility of consumption, and therefore their welfare weight increases. For a given allocation therefore, the ratio between the welfare weights of the two household types characterizes the degree of inequality. I make the following assumption about the Pareto weights.

**Assumption.** I assume that $\lambda_H \geq \lambda_L$.

By assuming that the Pareto weights assigned to the high-productivity households are always higher, I ensure that the planner will never prefer allocations in which the low-productivity types consume *more* than the high-productivity types. I define the first-best steady state allocation, $x^*_s$ and the optimal constrained steady state allocation, $x^{c_s}$, as well as their corresponding welfare weights, in the following way.

**Definition.** Define the optimal unconstrained steady state allocation, $x^*_s \equiv \arg\max_{x \in \chi_s} SW_s$. Let $\omega^*_i \equiv \lambda_i (c_y^i)^{-\sigma_y}$ for $i \in I$ be the welfare weights corresponding to this allocation. Define the optimal constrained allocation, $x^{c_s} \equiv \arg\max_{x \in \chi^{c_s}} SW_s$. Let $\omega^{c}_i \equiv \lambda_i (c_y^{c})^{-\sigma_y}$ for $i \in I$ be the corresponding welfare weights.

The optimal unconstrained allocation is the allocation that maximizes steady state social welfare subject only to feasibility. The ratio of the welfare weights characterizes the first-
best *ideal* level of inequality. If the ratio of welfare weights for a given allocation is *higher* than this ratio, the marginal utility of the low types is higher, implying a greater level of inequality. At the unconstrained optimum allocation, the welfare weights are equal (see Appendix A.2 for a proof). Intuitively, suppose $\omega_i > \omega_j$. Then the cost to the planner of redistributing resources away from type-$j$ households would be outweighed by the benefit of redistributing towards type-$i$ households, implying this allocation is not optimal.

How does the constrained optimum differ from this allocation? To build intuition, it is helpful to first examine how a small increase in the lump-sum transfer from high-types to low types affect steady state welfare. First, the transfer affects welfare directly by shifting resources between households with different welfare weights. If $\omega_L > \omega_H$, this direct effect of the policy will be positive. Second, if $\psi_a > 0$ and households have a bequest motive, the redistribution will equalize the bequest distribution as well, further increasing the lifetime resources of the low-productivity households. Finally, the policy may change the steady state level of aggregate capital, which in turn would affect welfare by increasing the total level of bequests, and through general equilibrium effects on household income. These results are summarized in Lemma 2.

**Lemma 2 (Welfare impact of redistribution)** Denote $K_{PI}$ as the semi-elasticity of the steady state capital stock to the amount of lump-sum redistribution, $\frac{dK}{dT_L} \frac{1}{K}$.

The steady state change in social welfare, $dSW_s$, from a small increase in $T_L$ is:

\[
    dSW_s = \sum I \pi_i \omega_i dT_i + RK \frac{1}{2} \sum I \pi_i \omega_i \Gamma^b_i + \left( \frac{1}{2} \sum I \pi_i \omega_i \theta_i \right) K_{PI} \tag{11}
\]

Here, $\Theta \equiv \sum_i \omega_i \pi_i \left( \frac{\pi_i \theta_i l}{L} - \left( \frac{a^0_i y}{KR} + \frac{a^i_0}{K} \right) \right)$, and $\Gamma^b_i$ denotes type-$i$ household bequest’s share of total capital.

For a proof, see Appendix A.3.

Lemma 2 says that the total effect of the transfer can be decomposed into the direct effect, the effect on the distribution of bequests, and the effect of changing the aggregate level of capital. The change in steady state capital affects welfare in two ways. First, through the effect of a change in capital on factor prices, and second, whenever $\psi_a > 0$, through changes...
in aggregate bequests left. The welfare impact of the change in factor prices is summarized by the term $\Theta$. What the total effect of these changes are on aggregate welfare depends on whether $\Theta$ is positive, which in turn depends both on the rate of return, $R$ at the current steady state and on the current steady state distribution of capital and labor income.

When the steady state gross rate of return, $R > 1$, the steady state is dynamically efficient, and more capital increases average consumption. Furthermore, when savings rates are increasing in permanent income, high-productivity households have a greater share of aggregate capital income than aggregate labor income. Therefore, if the welfare weight of the low-productivity households is higher than that of the high productivity households, when $R > 1$ and savings rates increase with permanent income, an increase in capital improves welfare ($\Theta > 0$) by both increasing average consumption and by increasing wage income relative to capital income, disproportionately benefiting low-income households.

Whether the planner faces a redistribution-investment trade-off depends on the welfare impact of additional capital at the steady state associated with the first best level of inequality. At this steady state, the direct benefit of redistributing resources from the high to the low types has been exhausted. That is, the economy is at the ideal level of equality. A small reduction in the amount of redistribution would therefore have no direct effect on steady state social welfare. If savings behavior is non-homothetic and additional capital at this steady state would increase welfare ($\Theta > 0$), the planner could improve welfare by reducing the degree of redistribution and tolerating a slightly higher level of inequality. Proposition 1 summarizes this result.

**Proposition 1** (Redistribution-Investment Trade-off) Let $\bar{K}$ be the steady state level of capital associated with the first-best level of inequality such that $\omega_L = \omega_H$

1. If $\frac{\partial a_h}{\partial PI_H} = \frac{\partial a_h}{\partial PI_L}$ for $h \in \{y, o\}$, then at the constrained optimal steady state, $\omega^c_L = \omega^c_H$.

2. If $\frac{\partial a_h}{\partial PI_H} > \frac{\partial a_h}{\partial PI_L}$ for $h \in \{y, o\}$ and $F_K(\bar{K}) > \delta$, then at the constrained optimal steady state $\omega^c_L > \omega^c_H$.

For a proof, see Appendix A.4.

Proposition 1 states that when savings behavior is homothetic, the degree of inequality in the constrained optimal allocation is identical to first-best. Intuitively, redistribution has no effect on aggregate capital in this case, and the planner faces no trade-off between additional redistribution and capital accumulation. However, when savings is non-homothetic and the
steady state corresponding to the first best level of inequality is dynamically efficient, the constrained optimal level of inequality is greater than first best.

To see why, suppose that the government were to use $T_L$ to implement the first-best level of inequality. Because the choice of redistribution policy pins down the level of steady state capital, it may be the case that the marginal product of this level of capital, $F_K(\bar{K})$ is higher than the depreciation rate.¹³ In this case, reducing $T_L$ would boost the capital stock and increase average consumption. At the same time, the resulting small increase in inequality would have no direct impact on welfare, as the economy is currently optimizing with respect to the inequality level. Therefore, implementing the first-best level of inequality is not optimal, and the planner should reduce $T_L$ until the costs of greater inequality equal the benefit of additional capital.

### 2.3 Redistribution and Welfare Along the Transition

To see how taking into account short run welfare affects the trade-off, I consider the problem of a social planner who weights each household type with Pareto weights, $\lambda_i$ and discounts generations at constant rate, $\gamma$. Here, social welfare is defined as the infinite Pareto-weighted discounted sum of the lifetime utility of all households as in equation (7).

$$SW(x) = \sum_i \pi_i \lambda_i \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t \left( \frac{(c^y_{it})^{1-\sigma_y}}{1-\sigma_y} + \gamma^{-1} \beta_i \frac{(c^o_{it})^{1-\sigma_o}}{1-\sigma_o} + \beta_i \gamma^{-1} \psi_o \frac{(a^o_{it})^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \right)$$ (7)

I characterize a second set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a redistribution-investment trade-off analogous to the one presented the previous section. That is, I outline conditions under which the optimal redistribution policy results in a level of intra-generational inequality that is greater than first best. As in the previous section, whether it is optimal for fiscal policy to implement the first best level of intra-generational inequality depends on whether savings behavior is non-homothetic, and on whether the steady state associated with the first-best level of inequality is dynamically efficient. However, now the existence of a trade-off also depends on the rate at which the planner discounts the future. These results are summarized in Proposition 2.

**Proposition 2** Again, let $\bar{K}$ be the steady state level of capital associated with the first-best level of inequality such that $\omega_L = \omega_H$.

1. When $\frac{\partial a^h_{Lt}}{\partial P^h_{Lt}} = \frac{\partial a^h_{Ht}}{\partial P^h_{Ht}}$ for $h \in \{y, o\}$, then in the constrained optimal allocation, $\omega^c_{Lt} = \omega^c_{Ht}$ = the first-best level of inequality for all $t \geq 0$.

¹³Note that unconstrained the first-best level is the Golden Rule capital stock, in which $F_K(K) = \delta$. 

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(2) When \( \frac{\partial a_h}{\partial P_{HL_t}} > \frac{\partial a_h}{\partial P_{HL_t}} \) for \( h \in \{y, o\} \) and \( F_K(\bar{K}) > \delta \), then there exists a \( \hat{\gamma} \in (0, 1) \) such that if \( \gamma > \hat{\gamma} \), \( \omega_{Lt} > \omega_{Ht} \) for all \( t \geq 0 \).

For a proof, see Appendix A.5

Proposition 2 states that when savings is homothetic, the optimal allocation features the first-best level of inequality at every time horizon. Intuitively, because redistribution has no effect on capital accumulation, the planner faces no trade-off between redistribution and investment, and therefore it is optimal to simply use redistribution to achieve the first-best level of equality. However, when savings behavior is non-homothetic and the steady state corresponding to the first best level of inequality is dynamically efficient, then as long as the planner puts sufficiently high weight on future generations, a trade-off exists between permanent income redistribution and investment, and the first best level of inequality is not optimal.

To see why, again consider a government who sets \( T_{Lt} \) every period in order to achieve the first-best path of inequality such that \( \omega_{Lt} = \omega_{Ht} \) for all \( t \geq 0 \). Such a policy pins down a particular path for capital, \( \{K_t\}_{t \geq 1} \). No matter the level of initial capital, \( K_0 \), by setting such a policy, the planner ensures that \( K_t \) will eventually converge to \( \bar{K} \), the steady state level of capital associated with the first best level of equality. If this level of capital is dynamically efficient, then as \( K_t \) approaches \( \bar{K} \), \( K_t \) will eventually become dynamically efficient for all \( t \geq \tau \). \( T_{Lt} \) has been set to achieve optimal equality at time \( t \), but because savings behavior is non-homothetic, reducing \( T_{Lt} \) today will increase the entire future path of capital, and increase average consumption, \( C_t \) for all \( t \geq \tau \). So long as the planner does not discount the future too heavily, the marginal benefit of additional future capital will outweigh the costs of higher inequality and lower aggregate consumption today, and the first-best level of inequality is not optimal at any horizon.

Intuitively, the planner can use redistribution policy in order to target a future path for capital. When deciding whether to increase savings to boost the future capital stock, they must weigh the benefits against the costs both of less average consumption today and greater inequality today. As long as capital is guaranteed to produce greater aggregate consumption in the future and the weight put on future generations is sufficiently large, a trade-off emerges and optimal policy will implement higher-than-first best levels of inequality in order to boost the future capital stock.
2.4 Redistribution with More Fiscal Policy Tools

In the previous 2 subsections, when savings behavior was non-homothetic, a trade-off emerged between redistribution and capital accumulation because the income distribution was the single tool available that allowed policy makers to alter the savings level. In reality, governments have many fiscal tools available that allow them to alter the level of savings, including debt management, inter-generational transfers, and capital taxes/subsidies. In this section, I show how the sufficient conditions needed for an equality-investment trade-off along the transition change when the government has access to a larger set of policy tools.

**Government.** Suppose the government can now issue age-specific lump-sum taxes/transfers, $T_{ht}$ in addition to type-specific lump-sum taxes/transfers, $T_{it}$. The government can also tax or subsidize capital directly, $\tau_K$ and borrow at the prevailing interest rate. The government’s per-period budget constraint is given by Equation (8).

$$\sum_i \pi_i T_{it} + \sum_h \pi_h T_{ht} + \tau_{Kt-1} R_t K_t = R_t B_{t-1} - B_t$$ (8)

Crucially, the government also faces a set of political constraints. Equation (9) implies that the government cannot redistribute lump-sum from the current old to the current young. Equation (10) says that the government can issue debt but cannot invest directly.

$$T_{yt} \geq 0 \geq T_{ot}$$ (9)

$$0 \geq B_t$$ (10)

I adopt these assumptions for their realism. To my knowledge no scheme to redistribute from the current old to the current young exists. The few permanent government surpluses we observe in the data tend to be the result of state-owned natural resources rather than fiscal policy. If these restrictions were relaxed and the government had a complete set of policy tools, they could implement the first best allocation and there would be no trade-off.

**Households.** Households are identical to those in the previous section. For simplicity, we begin by considering the case without bequests in which $\psi_a = 0$.\textsuperscript{14} Household utility is still given by equation (1), however given the new fiscal policy, the type-i households’ lifetime

\textsuperscript{14}The case with bequests will be considered in an extension in the Appendix.
budget constraint is now given by the following.

\[ c_{it}^0 + \frac{c_{i,t+1}^0}{R_{t+1}(1 - \tau_K)} = w_t \theta_i + \frac{T_{ot+1}}{R_{t+1}(1 - \tau_K)} + T_{it} + T_{yt} \]

**Equilibrium.** An equilibrium is again defined as an allocation, a sequence of prices, \( \{R_t, w_t\}_{t \geq 0} \), and policies \( \kappa \equiv \{T_L, T_H, T_{yt}, T_{ot}, B_t\}_{t \geq 0} \) such that the household first order conditions, the firms’ first order conditions, and the government’s budget constraint (8) are satisfied, the labor market clears \( (L_t = 1) \), and the resource constraint (4) and asset market clearing condition (5) are satisfied. I again define the set of all feasible allocations, \( \mathcal{X} \) and the set of all implementable allocations, \( \mathcal{X}^I \) as before.

As in the previous section, when savings behavior is non-homothetic, redistribution decreases steady state capital, as resources are transferred from those with a high propensity to save to those with a lower propensity. However, now the fiscal planner has additional tools to influence the savings rate. A well known feature of over-lapping generations models is the ability of fiscal policy that transfers resources from the current young to the current old to change the savings supply (Diamond 1965; Samuelson 1975). When \( \psi_a = 0 \) and households do not leave bequests, both social security schemes and debt transfer resources from the saving young to the non-saving old, resulting in a lower capital stock. These results are presented in Lemma 3.

**Lemma 3 (Debt and Social Security Lower Savings)**

When \( \psi_a = 0 \), for a given set of policies, \( T_H, T_L, \tau_K, \) steady state capital, \( K \) is decreasing in steady state inter-generational transfers, \( T_{yt} - T_{ot} \) and steady state debt, \( B_t \).

A proof of 3 can be found in Appendix A.6.1.

Lemma 3 implies that once the fiscal planner’s political constraints bind, they can no longer rely on debt management or inter-generational transfers to increase the capital stock, and must trade-off the benefits of equality against the cost of lower future capital accumulation and distortions associated with a capital tax/subsidy. However, when the political constraints do not bind the planner has all the tools needed to achieve the optimal amount of capital accumulation while also achieving the first best level of inequality. Therefore, the presence of a redistribution-capital accumulation trade-off now depends on whether savings behavior is non-homothetic and on whether the steady state with the first best level of inequality, no capital tax, and binding political constraints is dynamically efficient. If so, then for sufficiently high \( \gamma \), the optimal redistribution policy will result in a higher than first-best level of inequality. These results are summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Assume $\psi_a = 0$ and let $\bar{K}$ be the level of capital associated with the first-best level of inequality, $\tau_{Kt} = 0$, and binding political constraints ($T_{ot} = T_{yt} = 0$, and $B_t = \bar{B}$ for all $t$).

(1) When $\frac{\partial a_h}{\partial P_t^{Ht}} = \frac{\partial a_h}{\partial P_t^{Lt}}$ for $h \in \{y, o\}$, then in the constrained optimal allocation, $\omega_c^{Lt} = \omega_c^{Ht}$; the first-best level of inequality for all $t \geq 0$.

(2) When $\frac{\partial a_h}{\partial P_t^{Ht}} > \frac{\partial a_h}{\partial P_t^{Lt}}$ for $h \in \{y, o\}$ and $F_K(\bar{K}) > \delta$, then there exists a $\hat{\gamma} \in (0, 1)$ such that if $\gamma > \hat{\gamma}$, $\omega_c^{Lt} > \omega_c^{Ht}$ for all $t \geq 0$.

For a proof, see Appendix A.7.

To see why, consider a hypothetical steady state in which $\tau_{Kt} = 0$, $T_{Lt}$ and $T_{Ht}$ are set to implement the first-best level of intra-generational equality, and both political constraints bind. That is, $T_{yt} = T_{ot} = 0$ and $B_t = \bar{B}$ for all $t \geq 0$. This set of policies is associated with a unique steady state level of capital, $\bar{K}$. If $\bar{K}$ is greater than or equal to the modified golden rule (first-best) level of capital, then the planner can use debt or transfers from the young to the old to lower the capital stock, while using $T_{Lt}$ and $T_{Ht}$ to achieve the first-best level of inequality.

If instead $F_K(\bar{K}) > \delta$ and the steady state is dynamically efficient, then if debt, inter-generational transfers, and $\tau_{Kt}$ remain unchanged, $K_t$ will eventually converge to $\bar{K}$ and the economy will eventually become dynamically efficient. That is, there exists some future period $\tau$ such that for all $t \geq \tau$, increasing capital increases aggregate consumption. If future generations are given sufficient weight – as $\gamma \to 1$, the welfare impact of this additional capital outweighs the costs of reduced consumption and greater inequality today. In this case, the planner will choose to keep inter-generational transfers and debt at their constrained level, so as to not further reduce the investment rate. They will set intra-generational redistribution policy and capital subsidies so that the benefits of capital to future generations equals the cost of deviating from the first best level of equality and the distortions created by the capital tax.

3 Is the Redistribution-Investment Trade-off Large?

The previous section presented sufficient conditions for a welfare trade-off between capital accumulation and the redistribution of permanent income. In this section, I explore whether this trade-off is relevant for real-world policy makers by asking how its size compares to other
channels. While the derivations in Section 2 relied on type-specific lump-sum redistribution, I show that the welfare impact of my channel is large relative to other channels in the context of a more realistic redistribution policy. To do this, I present a slightly modified version of the previous section’s model and consider the welfare effect of a uniform lump-sum transfer funded by a simple proportional labor income tax as in Werning (2007). In particular, I allow household labor supply to be endogenously determined, allowing for a direct comparison of the size of the welfare impact of my channel relative to the effect of labor supply distortions.

To facilitate this comparison, I derive a formula for the size of my channel in terms of estimable sufficient statistics. My formula shows that the effect of redistribution on capital accumulation depends not only on the degree to which MPS differ over the income distribution, but also on the relative interest rate elasticities of investment and household savings. I use PSID data to estimate households’ marginal propensities to save out of permanent income, relying on estimates in the literature for the formula’s other terms. I present a range of values for the size of my channel and show that even the lower-end estimates imply that the channel is large relative to labor supply distortions.

Households. Consider a variant of the overlapping generations economy presented in Section 2. Households’ labor supply is now endogenous and supplied only in the first period of life. Type-i households choose $\ell_{it}$ and receive $(1 - \tau_{t})w_{t}\ell_{it}\theta_{i}$ in after-tax labor income while young and are retired when old. As in the previous section, households can borrow or save each period with gross rate of return $R_{t+1}$. For simplicity, I consider the version of the model without bequests ($\psi_{a} = 0$), however none of the results presented below depend on this assumption. Household lifetime utility is now given by equation (11).

$$u(c_{yt}, c_{o_{it}}, \ell_{it}) = \left(\frac{(c_{yt})^{1-\sigma_{y}}}{1-\sigma_{y}} + \beta_{y} \frac{(c_{o_{it}})^{1-\sigma_{o}}}{1-\sigma_{o}} - \frac{(c^{h}_{it})^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma}\right)$$

(11)

In addition to paying labor income taxes, households receive a uniform lump-sum transfer, $T$. The type-i households’ lifetime budget constraint is given equation (12).

$$c_{yt} + \frac{c_{o_{it}+1}}{R_{t+1}} = (1 - \tau_{yt})w_{t}\theta_{i}\ell_{it} + T = PI_{it}$$

(12)

Firms. There are a continuum of perfectly competitive firms who produce output according to the constant-returns-to-scale production function (13).

$$F(K_{t}, L_{t}) = \left(\alpha K_{t}^{\sigma - 1} + (1 - \alpha) L_{t}^{\sigma - 1}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{\sigma - 1}}$$

(13)
Government. The government runs a balanced budget each period and can fund lump-sum transfers using linear taxes on labor income, $\tau_\ell$.

$$\sum_{i \in I} \pi_i T_i = \sum_{i \in I} \pi_i \left( w_t \ell_{it} \theta_i \tau_\ell \right)$$

Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a sequence of quantities, \{${c}_{ht}^h, {a}_{ht}^h$\}_{i \in I, h \in H, K_t, \ell_t} \geq 0$, prices, \{${R}_t, w_t$\}, and policies \{${T}, \tau_\ell$\} such that the household first order conditions, the firms’ first order conditions and the government’s budget constraint are satisfied, the labor market clears, and the goods and asset markets clear.

Again defining steady state social welfare as the Pareto weighted sum of household utility, I consider the incremental impact on steady state welfare of a small budget-balancing increasing in the uniform lump-sum transfer, $dT$, funded by a small increase in the labor income tax, $d\tau_\ell$. I show that the welfare effect this change in fiscal policy can be decomposed into the direct effects of redistributing labor income from those with higher-than-average labor income to those with lower-than average, the effects of distorted labor supply, and the non-homothetic savings channel. This decomposition is presented in Proposition 4.

**Proposition 4** (Effect of labor income redistribution on steady state welfare) Define $\Theta, w_K$ as in Lemma 3, and let $w_L$ be the labor elasticity of the wage. Define $K_{PI}$ as the semi-elasticity of capital to the direct effects of the tax and $dL_L$ is the labor supply semi-elasticity with respect to $\tau_\ell$. Then the impact of an incremental increase in $\tau_\ell$ on social welfare is:

$$dSW = \sum_{i} \omega_i \pi_i (w_L - w_\theta \ell_i) d\tau_\ell + wL(\Theta + \tau_\ell) w_K K_{PI}$$

\[ \text{Direct Effect of Redistribution} \]

$$wL(\Theta + \tau_\ell) \left( w_L + \frac{\tau_\ell}{\Theta + \tau_\ell} \right) \frac{dL}{L} + wL(\Theta + \tau_\ell) (w_K L + C)$$

\[ \text{Direct Effect of Labor Distortion Feedback Effects} \]

Here $L$ is the general equilibrium elasticity of capital with respect to aggregate labor while $C \equiv Cov\left( \frac{\partial a_i}{\partial PI}, (1 - \tau_\ell) w_\theta \ell_i \right)$

For a proof, see Appendix A.8.

Like lump-sum redistribution, the labor income tax affects social welfare directly by transferring lifetime income between households with potentially different social welfare weights, $\omega_i$. Now however, because labor is endogenous, the redistribution policy also distorts the
aggregate labor supply, which lowers taxable labor income directly and indirectly through changes in the equilibrium wage. When savings is non-homothetic and $\frac{\partial \hat{h}_t}{\partial P_t}$ co-varies with labor productivity, an additional welfare channel emerges that is proportional to $K_{PÎ}$, the semi-elasticity of steady state capital to the direct effect of the redistribution on the permanent income distribution. Intuitively, when savings behavior is non-homothetic, the policy lowers aggregate savings and capital by redistributing from high labor-income households with a high propensity to save to low labor income households.

Finally, the policy impacts welfare through interaction between the latter two channels. A decline in aggregate labor supply impacts firms’ incentives to invest in capital. At the same time, the covariance between a household’s marginal propensity to save and their endogenous labor income response will also change the policy’s impact. Intuitively, if labor supply distortions are particularly severe for high-saving types, this will amplify the effect of the tax on aggregate savings and investment. In this section, I focus on comparing the direct effects of labor distortions and non-homothetic savings, and consider the impact of these feedback effects in the quantitative model.

Using the results from Proposition 4, it is straightforward to compare the size of non-homothetic savings channel relative to the direct effects of labor distortions. Doing so requires a suitable estimate of the semi-elasticity of labor supply with respect to taxes. In a meta-analysis of the existing empirical literature, Chetty et al. (2011) report an average total steady state (Hicksian) elasticity of labor supply to labor income taxes of around .5. This estimate is the sum of both the extensive and intensive margins. Using an estimate of the average income tax rate of around .35 (Piketty and Saez, 2013a) would imply a semi-elasticity of around 1.4.

Assuming a positive $\Theta$, the ratio $\frac{\tau}{\Theta + \gamma}$ is bounded between 0 and 1. Therefore, setting the ratio equal to 1 generates a lower bound estimate of the importance of my channel. The elasticity of the wage with respect to capital and labor are directly determined by the substitution elasticity between labor and capital, $\rho$ and the labor share, $\alpha_L$. Finally, comparing the two channels requires an estimate of the semi-elasticity of capital to the direct effects of the tax, $K_{PÎ}$. In the following section, I present a sufficient statistic formula for this term.

$^{15}$See Section X for details.
3.1 A Sufficient Statistic Formula.

The term $K_{PI}$ can be written as function of sufficient statistics. Let $\alpha_L$ be the labor share and $\frac{Y}{K}$ be the inverse capital-output ratio. Then $K_{PI}$ is defined as in equation (14).

$$K_{PI} = \sum_I \pi_i \frac{\partial s_i}{\partial PI_i} \left( \frac{wL - \theta_i \ell_i w}{wL} \right) d\tau_i \frac{K_R}{K_R(1 - A_w w_K) - A_R} \frac{wL}{K}$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

As before, $w_K$ is the wage elasticity with respect to capital, while $A_w$ is defined as the wage elasticity of aggregate household savings, $K_R$ is the interest rate elasticity of firm investment in capital, and $A_R$ is the interest rate elasticity of household savings (debt). If the interest rate elasticity of investment increases, the size of the channel increases. As the the interest rate elasticity of household savings increases, the denominator becomes larger in absolute value and the size of the channel shrinks. Intuitively, if firm investment is very responsive to the interest rate, then as the supply of savings contracts and borrowing costs rise, the impact on capital will be substantial. If however households are very responsive to interest rates, then as the supply of savings contracts and the interest rate increases, households increase their savings supply (decrease the debt), providing more loanable funds to firms, and dampening the effect of the redistribution on capital.

How large of an effect the policy will have on aggregate savings depends on the degree of non-homothetic savings behavior. This term is summarized by $\Delta_{NH}$. The term $\frac{\partial s_i}{\partial PI_i}$ is a type-i household’s marginal propensity to save out of permanent income. The term $\frac{wL - \theta_i \ell_i w}{wL}$ is a type-i household’s net tax burden relative to average labor income, as high labor income households are net payers of the tax and low labor income households are net recipients. Therefore, the term $\Delta_{NH}$ represents the sum of each household’s change in savings as a result of their change in permanent income.

3.2 Estimating Marginal Propensities to Save

In this subsection, I estimate the components of the $\Delta_{NH}$ statistic directly using data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). This term requires estimates of the lifetime average marginal propensity to save (MPS) out of annual permanent income flow for each labor-productivity type, as well as the difference between average annual labor income and annual labor income for each age-productivity group. Estimating the latter is straightforward using labor income data.

Both Straub (2019) and Dynan et al. (2004) (henceforth DSZ) use the PSID to explore the relationship between savings behavior and permanent income. Straub (2019) uses con-
umption data beginning in 1999 to estimate the elasticity of consumption to permanent income. These estimates can be used to generate an implied savings elasticity. While this is not the statistic in my formula, in principle, these implied savings elasticities could be combined with savings rates out of permanent income by permanent income type to generate marginal propensities to save. I report the results of combining this implied savings elasticity with my own estimates of savings out of permanent income.

DSZ use the PSID to estimate the marginal propensity to save out of permanent income by permanent income type in 2 ways. First, they use variation in the cross section and simply divide the change in median savings rates between income quintiles by the change in median income to trace out a marginal savings schedule. Second, they use time-series variation and regress the change in average individual household savings between an earlier and later sample on the change in household income. Their cross sectional MPS estimates use a change-of-wealth savings measure, which includes capital gains and therefore may not accurately reflect the supply of loanable funds available to firms (Gale and Potter, 2002). They provide time-series estimates for both the change-of-wealth measure and an ‘active’ savings measure corresponding to the change in wealth minus capital gains, corrected for inflation and reporting error.

I follow DSZ and exploit cross-sectional differences in permanent income. However, my approach differs from theirs in that I use variation in permanent income within a permanent income quintile rather than across permanent income quintiles, as my formula calls for the within-group MPS. Furthermore, I use a more direct measure of active savings: income less consumption ($Y_{it} - C_{it}$). The reason they were unable to consider a more straightforward income less consumption measure of active savings is that consumption data did not appear in the PSID until 1999. Thankfully, the introduction of a set of consumption questions into the survey in 1999, and an additional set in 2005, means that it is possible to observe both many years of a household’s active savings – measured simply as income less consumption – as well as many years of past and future income.

**Empirical Strategy.** To estimate $\frac{\partial s_{ij}}{\partial P_{it}}$ and $\frac{wL-w\theta L}{wL}$, I first define productivity types as permanent labor income quintiles. I do not observe permanent labor income in the data, and therefore must estimate it. I provide detail on this estimation procedure below. I measure the savings of household j at time t (who is type-i, age-h), $S_{hijt}$ as current total income less consumption and taxes. This measures so called ‘active’ savings – as opposed to changes in total wealth – which is the closest analog to $s_i$ in the model and captures the change in

\footnote{For example, a consumption elasticity of .7 implies an approximate savings elasticity of 1.3.}
loanable funds available to firms. With an estimate for permanent income, \( \hat{PI}_{ij} \) in hand, I estimate a quintile’s average MPS using the following equation for each quintile.

\[
S_{hijt} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{1i} \hat{PI}_{ij} + X_{hijt} + \epsilon_{hijt}
\]  

(15)

Here, \( X_{hijt} \) is a vector of controls, \( \epsilon_{hijt} \) is an error term, and \( \beta_{0i} \) is a constant. The estimated coefficient \( \hat{\beta}_{1i} \) can be used as the estimate of \( \frac{\partial s_{hi}}{\partial PI_{hi}} \).

This strategy identifies MPS out of permanent income using within quintile cross-sectional variation. For this specification to be valid, it must be the case that there is no third factor driving both household permanent income and savings behavior. An obvious candidate of such a factor would be age, and I include the age of the household’s reference person in the set of controls \( X_{hijt} \). Similarly, general macroeconomic conditions over a household’s sample would affect both my estimate of their permanent income as well as their savings behavior. To address this I also include average annual labor income at year \( t \).

Other factors such as lifestyle or innate preferences could also impact both savings and permanent income. In a second set of regressions I add additional household level controls for the reference person’s education, marital status, and family size to attempt to capture these factors.

In the data, I only observe a household’s total annual labor income flow, and cannot directly observe what fraction of their current income reflects permanent rather than transitory income. Furthermore, because current income is used to construct my measure of current savings, any measurement error in current income will bias my estimate of the marginal propensity to save. To deal with these issues, I follow both Straub (2019) and DSZ and use various proxies for the permanent component of income. The first is a simple symmetric income average, \( Y_{hijt} \) defined in the following way.

\[
\bar{Y}_{hijt} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{k=-(T-1)/2}^{(T-1)/2} Y_{h+k,ij,t+k}
\]

As noted in Straub (2019), as \( T \to \infty \), the symmetric income average measures average annual permanent income without noise, as the effects of the transitory income process are averaged away.

I also follow DSZ and use lagged labor income as a proxy. Let \( Y_{pij} \) be the average labor income of household \( j \) for a sample of four years prior to the start of their sample. For

\(^{17}\)Measuring savings as changes in total wealth include capital gains. If the value of a household’s assets, in particular their house, appreciates, this would increase total wealth but would not reflect new resources available for investment.

\(^{18}\)For example, if I observe a household starting in 2001, I begin that household’s sample in 2005 and set
a sample sufficiently far in the past and for a sufficiently low persistence transitory income process, \( Y_{pij} \) should be correlated only with the permanent component of \( Y_{hijt} \). I regress current labor income on lagged income and an age group dummy variable as in equation (16), and use the fitted values \( \hat{\beta}_1 \) and \( \hat{\beta}_2 \) to predict \( \hat{PI}_{hijt} \).

\[
\hat{Y}_{hijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Y_{pij} + \beta_2 1_{Age Group} + \epsilon_{hijt}
\]

(16)

Because the dataset is not balanced across age, for both measures of permanent income I calculate the permanent income quintile for each age separately. That is, household j is put in quintile i if their estimated permanent income is in the ith quintile for their age group. All regressions control for age group and average annual labor income in year t. I run an additional set with controls for household characteristics including marital status, family size, and education of the response person. PSID sample weights are used in all regressions and summary statistics, and robust standard errors are used to correct for heteroskedasticity.

The Data. The PSID is a longitudinal household survey which began in 1968. The survey was conducted annually until 1997, at which point it became bi-annual. In 1999, the survey added a large group of questions about household consumption, covering about 70% of the categories in the Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX). In 2005, an additional set of categories was included. Because the ‘active’ saving concept I use is income less consumption, I will only be able to measure savings starting in 1999. However, I use income data starting in 1995 to construct my lagged income proxy for permanent income.

To construct my consumption measures, I simply add up all consumption categories together using the 1999 and 2005 set of categories respectively. The PSID total family income measure includes all taxable income of both the respondent and their spouse, as well as all transfer income and social security income. Savings is then simply calculated as total family income less taxes and consumption. I exclude households with missing data or with unrealistically high levels of any individual consumption category.\(^{19}\) All variables are then put in terms of 2019 dollars. I drop households with missing income data, households younger than 25, households with fewer than 5 years of responses, and households with less than $1,000 of total family income. I split the sample into 4 equally sized age groups, g.

The PSID reports only pre-tax income, however I need post-tax income in order to properly measure household active saving. To estimate each household’s annual total tax payment, I use the NBER TAXSIM program.

\( Y_{pij} \) to be their average labor income in the years prior to 2005.

\(^{19}\)Specifically, any household that spends more than a million dollars on any category.
Table 1: PSID Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quintile 1</th>
<th>Quintile 2</th>
<th>Quintile 3</th>
<th>Quintile 4</th>
<th>Quintile 5</th>
<th>All Ages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>34,147</td>
<td>50,644</td>
<td>70,193</td>
<td>103,175</td>
<td>174,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving Rate ('99)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving Rate ('05)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ages 20-35

| Median Income | 22,238 | 29,178 | 45,502 | 75,098 | 121,959 |
| Saving Rate ('99) | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.31 |
| Saving Rate ('05) | -0.14 | -0.09 | -0.04 | 0.06 | 0.18 |

Ages 35-50

| Median Income | 33,923 | 55,640 | 80,221 | 111,767 | 181,068 |
| Saving Rate ('99) | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.26 | 0.35 |
| Saving Rate ('05) | -0.07 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.12 | 0.22 |

Ages 50-65

| Median Income | 36,973 | 62,369 | 87,852 | 121,391 | 200,100 |
| Saving Rate ('99) | 0.16 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.33 | 0.41 |
| Saving Rate ('05) | 0.05 | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.28 |

Observations ('99) | 7,966 | 8,943 | 9,249 | 8,021 | 6,789 |
Observations ('05) | 5,989 | 7,164 | 7,500 | 6,367 | 5,321 |

This table reports summary statistics for the PSID data by age group and permanent income quintile. Saving is calculated as annual total post-tax income less consumption. The Savings rate is equal to savings over current total income. Saving Rate ('99) is the average savings rate using only the 1999 consumption measures. Saving ('05) uses the 2005 consumption measures.

Results. Table 2 reports the results from the estimation procedure outlined above. Columns labeled ‘1999’ and ‘2005’ report estimates using the 1999 and 2005 measures of consumption respectively. Columns with household controls control for education, marital status, and family size in addition to age group and average annual labor income in year t. The left four columns report the estimated MPS for each income quintile when the symmetric income average is used to construct the proxy for permanent income. A clear pattern emerges. Household in higher income quintiles tend to have higher marginal propensities to save out of permanent income. The differences are especially pronounced between the top quintile and the 3rd and 4th quintile, and between the 3rd and 4th quintile, and the bottom 2 quintiles. The panels on the right report estimates using lagged labor income to construct the proxy for permanent income. The results are largely similar.

The final column takes average savings rates out of current income for each permanent income quintile and multiplies them by 1.3 – the permanent income elasticity of savings implied by Straub (2019). Multiplying a rate by an elasticity generates the derivative required by the formula. The estimated MPS implied by this procedure are very similar to the direct estimates.
Table 2: Marginal Propensity to Save Out of Permanent Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symmetric Average</th>
<th>Lagged Income</th>
<th>Implied by Straub (2019)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quintile 1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintile 2</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintile 3</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintile 4</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintile 5</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implied $\Delta_{NH}$ - .85 -.82 -.86 -.83 -.96 -.92 -1.01 -.86 -.77

Note. This table reports estimated marginal propensities to consume out of permanent income by permanent income quintile using PSID data. All regressions control for average age group and average labor income for a given year. All regressions use PSID sample weights and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Columns marked 1999 or 2005 use the 1999 or 2005 consumption data respectively. Household controls include marital status, family size, and education. The final columns multiplies the savings elasticity implied by Straub (2019) by average savings rates. Implied $\Delta_{NH}$ multiplies each quintile’s MPS by the difference between each households labor income and average labor income, normalized by average labor income.

The final row of the table reports the value of $\Delta_{NH}$ implied by the MPS estimates. In particular, I take the estimated MPS for each income quintile and multiply it by the difference between that quintile’s average labor income and the average labor income for the whole sample. These values ultimately become the inputs into the sufficient statistics formula.

### 3.3 Estimates from the literature

The remaining terms in the formula, namely the interest rate elasticity of savings, the interest rate elasticity of investment, and the wage elasticity of capital, have each been studied in the existing literature. I briefly review the range of estimates for each of these terms.

**Interest Rate Elasticity of Capital.** The determinants of firm investment are the subject of a large empirical and theoretical literature, much of it exploring the short-run effect of either user-costs or Tobin’s q on investment. My sufficient statistic formula characterizes a steady-state relationship, and therefore requires an estimate of the long-run effect of interest
rates on firm investment.

Recall that I assumed that \( F(K_t, L_t) \) is a constant elasticity of substitution production function with elasticity parameter \( \rho \).

\[
Y = \left( \alpha K^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\rho}} + (1 - \alpha)L^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\rho}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho - 1}}
\]

Assume that \( \delta = 0 \). The firm’s first order condition is:

\[
\alpha \left( \frac{K}{Y} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} = R - 1 + \delta = r
\]

Therefore the interest rate elasticity of the ratio of capital to output, \( \frac{\partial \log(K/Y)}{\partial r} = -\rho \). For a Cobb-Douglas production function (\( \rho = 1 \)), the elasticity of the capital-output ratio is -1. Caballero et al. (1995) estimate the long run elasticity of capital to user costs and find values ranging from close to 0 to -2 percent depending on the industry. In their handbook chapter, Caballero (1999) estimate between -.4 and -1 percent. I will consider estimates for \( \rho \) between -.8 and 1.1.

The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, \( \rho \) along with the labor share pins down \( K_R \). (see Appendix X for derivation). I use a labor share of .7 along with a range of estimates of \( \rho \) to generate values for \( K_R \). For example, a Cobb-Douglas production function with \( \rho = 1 \) implies that a 1 percent increase in \( r \) generates around a 1.4 percent decrease in aggregate capital.20

**Interest Rate Elasticity of Household Saving.** Estimates of the elasticity of household saving with respect to the interest rate generally fall into one of two categories. The first is structural. Instead of estimating the interest rate elasticity of \textit{savings}, researchers estimate - or use existing estimates of - the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) - on which the interest rate elasticity of household savings closely depends. These studies then use a structural model to show how estimates of the EIS translate into savings elasticities depending on the values chosen for the other parameters.

Examples of this approach include Attanasio and Wakefield (2010) who consider estimates of the EIS from .25 to 1. Using their preferred set of assumptions in a detailed life cycle model, they find that a half percentage point increase in \( r \) results in a 10 percent increase in new savings, or an implied \( A_R \) of .2. Using a similar procedure, Evans (1983) finds a range of estimates of \( A_R \) between .1 and 3.55, with most estimates falling between .1 and 1

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20In forthcoming work, Gomez and Gouin-Bonenfant estimate an elasticity around -1.
depending on assumptions made about household discount rates, growth rates, and the EIS itself.

The second category includes reduced form estimates. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2007) find that changes in after-tax interest rates had no effect on demand for mortgage debt. DeFusco and Paciorek (2017) find that a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate reduced mortgage debt by between 1.5 and 2 percent. On the larger end of the range, Best et al. (2020) estimate a reduced borrowing elasticity of .5, while Dunsky and Follain (2000) estimate an elasticity of 1. For the numerical exercises, I consider values between .1 and 1.

Wage elasticity with respect to capital. For a CES production function with elasticity parameter $\rho$, the elasticity of the marginal product of labor with respect to capital is not constant, but is pinned down by $\rho$ and the labor share, $\sigma_L$ (see Appendix X for details). In the numerical exercises, I use the value for $w_K$ that corresponds with the the value chosen for $K_R$.

3.4 Estimates of $K_{PI}$

Given a range of estimates for each of the formula’s terms along with an estimate of $\Delta_{NH}$, it’s now possible to solve for a range of possible estimates of $K_{PI}$. This range is reported in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta_{NH}$</th>
<th>$A_R$: 0.1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>$\Delta_{NH}$</th>
<th>$A_R$: 0.1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>$\Delta_{NH}$</th>
<th>$A_R$: 0.1</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-.93</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.86</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.77</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. This table presents estimates of semi-elasticity of the steady state capital stock to the change in the permanent income distribution associated with a percentage point change in the labor income tax. The parameter $\rho$ denotes the substitution elasticity between capital and labor while $A_R$ is the elasticity of household savings to the interest rate. See text for description of $\Delta_{NH}$.

The first 3 columns of Table 3 report the estimates of $K_{PI}$ using values of $\Delta_{NH}$ within the range of those estimated in the previous section. As the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor grows, the interest rate elasticity of capital increases, while the elasticity of the wage with respect to capital decreases. These forces have opposite effects on the size
of $K_{PI}$. Intuitively, a greater $K_R$ means firms are more responsive to the increase in interest rates when savings decline, pushing the elasticity up. However, when $w_K$ decreases, a lower capital stock has less of an effect on wages and income, and therefore a smaller feedback effect on savings. Quantitatively, the latter dominates the former channel, and an increase in $\rho$ results in a decrease in $K_{PI}$.

Meanwhile, an increase in the interest rate elasticity of household savings dampens $K_{PI}$. Intuitively, if households are very responsive to interest rate changes, then as aggregate savings contracts, and interest rates rise, households’ will response by increasing their savings, dampening the overall effect of the redistribution. Finally, the magnitude of $K_{PI}$ is straightforwardly increasing in the absolute value of $\Delta_{NH}$.

With a range of estimates of $K_{PI}$ in hand, I can now compare the size of the redistribution-investment trade-off to the impact of labor supply distortions. The ratio of the two channels is reported in Table 4.

Table 4: Non-homothetic savings relative to labor distortions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Delta_{NH}$</th>
<th>$\Delta_{NH} = -.93$</th>
<th>$\Delta_{NH} = -.66$</th>
<th>$\Delta_{NH} = -.76$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A_R$:</td>
<td>0.1 0.5 1</td>
<td>0.1 0.5 1</td>
<td>0.1 0.5 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = .80$</td>
<td>0.26 0.22 0.17</td>
<td>0.24 0.20 0.15</td>
<td>0.21 0.18 0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = .9$</td>
<td>0.31 0.26 0.21</td>
<td>0.29 0.24 0.20</td>
<td>0.25 0.22 0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = 1.0$</td>
<td>0.37 0.33 0.27</td>
<td>0.35 0.30 0.25</td>
<td>0.31 0.27 0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho = 1.1$</td>
<td>0.46 0.41 0.34</td>
<td>0.43 0.38 0.32</td>
<td>0.38 0.33 0.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. This table presents estimates of the ratio between the welfare effects of the non-homothetic savings channel and the labor supply distortion channel. The parameter $\rho$ denotes the substitution elasticity between capital and labor while $A_R$ is the elasticity of household savings to the interest rate. See text for description of $\Delta_{NH}$.

The estimated ratio ranges between .14 on the low end to .46 on the high end. Using the mid-range estimates of both the interest rate elasticity of household saving, $A_R$ and of the degree of non-homotheticity, $\Delta_{NH}$, as well as Cobb-Douglas production ($\rho = 1$), the non-homothetic savings channel is just under 1/3 of the size of labor supply distortions. These results suggest that while the inefficiencies may still generate the majority of the costs associated with redistribution, the effects of non-homothetic savings behavior on capital accumulation are likely large enough to warrant attention from researchers and policy makers.
3.5 Extensions

In order to derive the sufficient statistic formula for $K_{PI}$ a number of simplifying assumptions were made including a closed economy, no life-cycle earnings dynamics, and no growth. In the following section, I relax each of these assumptions and see how doing so changes the sufficient statistic formula.

**Large Open Economy.** An important simplifying assumption employed in the derivation of $K_{PI}$ was a closed economy. In this case, $K = A$ in the steady state. Consider instead the case of a large open economy in which households can lend to and borrow from abroad, but that the domestic savings supply is large enough in comparison with international capital flows that the domestic savings supply partially determines the domestic interest rate.\(^{21}\) In this case, the steady state asset market clearing condition is $K = A + NFA$. In this case, the sufficient statistic formula becomes the following. See Appendix A.9 for a derivation.

$$\hat{K}_{PI} = \Delta_{NH} K_R \left( K_R (1 - A_{w} w_R) - \frac{A}{K} A_R - \frac{NFA}{K} NFA_R \right)^{-1}$$

Note that now, the interest rate elasticity of net foreign assets appears in the denominator. Intuitively, if foreign savings grow substantially as the domestic interest rate increases in response to redistribution, the general equilibrium effect on the interest rate will be muted, and the domestic capital stock will be less effected. Note also that the importance of the domestic interest rate elasticity and the foreign interest rate elasticity depends on their respective share of total assets. If foreign savings are less responsive to the domestic interest rate than domestic savings, then the larger the net foreign asset share of total assets, the smaller the denominator and the larger the overall effect.

**Arbitrary life-cycle horizon, $H$.** Consider a variant of the overlapping generations economy presented in Section 2, now with $H$ overlapping generations who each live for $H$ periods. As in the baseline formula, there are $I$ productivity types, and mass $\pi_{ih}$ of each type and age. Households earn labor income in multiple periods, and have age-varying labor productivity $\theta_{ih}$. In this case, the sufficient statistic formula becomes the following.

$$\hat{K}_{PI} = \frac{K_R}{K_R(1 - A_{w} w_K) - A_R} \sum_{t,H} \frac{\partial a_i^h}{\partial PI_i} \left( \frac{1}{\int_0^{H-1} d\tau_l} \right)$$

See Appendix A.10 for a derivation. Now, the degree of non-homotheticity depends on how

\(^{21}\)This is likely the case in the United States.
the labor income tax changes permanent income over the life-cycle. If households tend to earn more income later in life, the labor income tax will have a smaller effect on permanent income for all households, as it will disproportionately decrease labor earnings later in life. This will dampen the total effect of the policy on savings and aggregate capital.

**Balanced Growth.** Suppose that the production function was now given by the following function, where \( Z_t \) is the level of labor-augmenting productivity.

\[
Y_t = \left( \alpha K_t^{\rho-1} + (1 - \alpha)(L_t Z_t)^{\rho-1} \right) \frac{\rho}{\rho - 1}
\]

Suppose that \( Z_t \) grows at constant rate, \( g \). To allow for the possibility of a balanced growth path, household preferences are augmented in the following way.

\[
u(c^y_{it}, c^o_{it}, \ell_{it}) = \frac{(c^y_{it}/Z_t)^{1-\sigma_y}}{1 - \sigma_y} + \beta_i \frac{(c^o_{it}/Z_{t+1})^{1-\sigma_o}}{1 - \sigma_o} - \frac{(\ell_{it})^{1+\gamma}}{1 + \gamma}
\]

Note that now, households get utility from consumption, normalized by aggregate labor productivity. This ensures that as the economy grows and per-capita income increases, households do not continuously increase their savings levels. Intuitively, as average income grows, so too do households’ desire for additional consumption. With this normalization, a balanced growth path is possible. See Appendix X for details. In this case, the sufficient statistic formula is identical to equation (14).

### 4 Quantitative Model

The previous section provided a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the impact of the redistribution-investment channel on welfare relative to the impact of labor supply distortions. While illustrative, this evidence can only speak to the relative importance of my channel for small policy changes in the long run. Furthermore, the decomposition in the previous section could not speak to the relative importance of my channel in the overall trade-off. Finally, the sufficient statistic formula can’t speak to the impact of my channel along the transition path (in the short run).

In order to address these points, I solve a quantitative over-lapping generations model that incorporates all of the sources of non-homothetic savings behavior present in the simple model, while adding idiosyncratic risk and a realistic earnings life cycle. I calibrate the model to the US in 2019 and choose parameters governing savings behavior in order to most closely
match the savings patterns I estimated in the previous section. In this setting, I calculate the trade-off between labor income redistribution and average consumption. In particular, I study the effects of increasing the average labor income tax to fund a budget-balancing lump-sum transfer.

Relative to the simple model in the previous section, additional labor income redistribution impacts average consumption through several additional channels. In addition to distorting labor supply, increasing the level of labor income tax to fund a uniform transfer plays an insurance role, as it increases net-of-tax income for households experiencing negative labor productivity shocks. In addition, the tax leaves younger households, who earn relatively less, with relatively more after-tax income than high-earning older households. This shift of resources boosts the savings supply and capital stock (Atkinson and Sandmo, 1980).

In order to isolate the effect of the pure change in permanent income, I solve a supplementary model, in which labor supply is fixed at the steady state level in the baseline model. I then solve for the direct effect of an increase in the labor income tax and uniform transfer on each household type’s expected permanent income, and solve for the effect of this hypothetical tax change on average consumption in the model with fixed labor. This exercise isolates the effect of the change in the permanent income distribution on capital.

### 4.1 Environment.

**Households.** There is a mass of households indexed by $j \in [0, 1]$ who each live for $H$ periods. Households supply labor to firms in all but the final retirement period, in which they receive type-specific social security income $SS_i$. There are $I$ permanent labor productivity types. A household $j$ born in year $t$ who is age $h$ and is type-$i$ has labor productivity, $\theta^h_{ij,t}$, where $\theta^h_i$ is the permanent component of labor income for type-$i$ age-$h$ households and $e_{ji,t+h}$ is that household’s idiosyncratic labor shock that evolves according to an AR(1) process with persistence $\rho_e$ and standard deviation $\sigma_e$. Households receive $(1 - \tau_{\ell ij ht}(w_t \ell e_{ij,t+h}^h \theta^h_{ij,t+h})) w_t \ell e_{ij,t+h}^h \theta^h_{ij,t+h}$ in after-tax labor income each period. Here, $\tau_{\ell ij ht}(w_t \ell e_{ij,t+h}^h \theta^h_{ij,t+h})$ is a progressive labor income tax following Bénabou (2002) and Heathcote et al. (2017), given by equation (17). Here, $\bar{\tau}_\ell$ parameterizes the average level of the labor income tax, while $\gamma$ determines the degree of progressivity.

$$\tau_{\ell i j h t}(w_t \ell e_{ij,t+h}^h \theta^h_{ij,t+h}) = 1 - \bar{\tau}_\ell (w_t \ell e_{ij,t+h}^h \theta^h_{ij,t+h})^{-\gamma\ell}$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

Households can save or borrow in a one-period bond, $a_{ij,t+h}^h$, buy government bonds, $B_t$ or capital $K_{t+1}$ at gross after-tax interest rate $R_{t+1} = 1 + (1 - \tau_K)r_{t+1}$. Households face a
borrowing constraint \( a < a^h_{ijt+h} \). Type-i household receive share \( \sigma^i_h \) of profit flows each period, as well as \( R_t a^h_{it} (1 - \tau_b) \) in after-tax bequest income when they are born. Note that all type-i households receive the same bequest transfer equal to the average type-i bequest the year before they are born, \( a^0_{it} = a^H_{it-1} \). Finally, households may receive a lump-sum transfer, \( T_t \). Lifetime utility for a household born at time \( t \) is given by (18).

\[
u(c^h_{ijt+h}, \ell^h_{ijt+h}, a^H_{ijt+h}) = \sum_{h=1}^{H} \beta^{h-1} \left( \frac{(c^h_{ijt+h})^{1-\sigma_h}}{1 - \sigma_h} - \psi_t \frac{(\ell^h_{ijt+h})^{1+\gamma}}{1 + \gamma} \right) + \beta^H \psi_a \frac{(a^h_{ijt+h} + \bar{a})^{1-\eta}}{1 - \eta}
\]

(18)

Note that this model nests the same three sources of non-homothetic savings behavior as the simple model presented in Section 2. I follow Straub (2019) and include the term \( \bar{a} \) in households’ bequest motive in order to generate a mass of households who give no bequests. Let \( R^h_{t+h} = \prod_{k=0}^{h} R_{t+k} \). A type-i household born at time \( t \) has the following lifetime budget constraint, given by equation (19).

\[
a^H_{ijt+h} + \sum_{H} \frac{c^h_{ijt+h}}{R^h_{t+h}} = R_t a^0_{it} (1 - \tau_b) + \sum_{H} (1 - \tau_{\ell_{ijt+h}}) w_{t+h} \ell^h_{ijt+h} \frac{c^h_{ijt+h}}{R^h_{t+h}} + T_{t+h} + SS_t \]

(19)

**Firms.** There is unit mass of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms indexed by \( m \in [0, 1] \) who rent labor and capital from households and produce a differentiated intermediate good, \( y^m_t \) according to a CES production function (20). A competitive final goods firm aggregates the intermediate goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregator (21). This specification generates standard expression for demand for each intermediate good (22). Because there are no nominal rigidities, intermediate goods firms all produce the same level of output, employ the same labor and capital, and charge the same markup \( \mu = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \) over marginal cost.

\[
y^m_t = Z_t \left( \alpha k^m_{it}^{\rho - 1} + (1 - \alpha) \ell^m_{it}^{\rho - 1} \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho - 1}}
\]

(20)

\[
Y_t = \left( \int_{0}^{1} y^m_{it}^{\frac{\rho - 1}{\rho - 1}} dm \right)^{\frac{\rho}{\rho - 1}}
\]

(21)

\[
y^m_{it} = Y_t \left( \frac{p^m_{it}}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon}
\]

(22)

\[\text{I make this simplifying assumption to avoid having to keep track of the history of idiosyncratic shocks across generations.}\]
**Government.** The government taxes returns on capital, bequests, and labor income, and issues debt, $B_t$, pays social security, issues uniform lump-sum transfers, $T_t$. The government’s per-period budget constraint is given by (23).

\[
B_t + w_t \int J \tau_{ijht} \theta_h e_{ijht} \ell_{ijht} dj + A_t r_t \tau_K + \sum_i \pi_{Hi} a_{it-1}^H \tau_b = T_t + R_t B_{t-1} + \sum_i \pi_{Ht} SS_i
\]  

(23)

**Equilibrium.** An equilibrium defined as a sequence of prices, $\{R_t, w_t\}_{t \geq 0}$, individual and aggregate financial positions, $\{\{a_{jit}^h\}_{j \in J, i \in I, h \in H}, A_t\}_{t \geq 0}$, policies, $\{\tau_{lt}, \tau_b, \tau_K, B_t, G_t, T_t\}$, individual household and firm allocations, $\{\{c_{ijt}^h, \ell_{ijt}^h\}_{i \in I, j \in J, h \in H}, \{y_m^t, n_m^t, k_m^t\}_{m \in [0, 1]}\}_{t \geq 0}$, and aggregate allocation, $\{K_t, L_t, C_t\}_{t \geq 0}$ such that the following conditions hold. Households’ first order conditions and budget constraints hold for each productivity type, generation, and history of shocks. The intermediate goods firms’ first order conditions (24) and (25), production function and demand hold. The competitive goods firm’s technology constraint holds. Finally, the government budget constraint, labor market clearing, asset market clearing, and resource constraint hold. See Appendix X for a complete description of the equilibrium conditions.

\[w_t \mu = \left(\frac{y_m^t}{\ell_t^m}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (1 - \alpha) Z_t\]  

(24)

\[(r_t + \delta) \mu = \left(\frac{y_m^t}{k_t^m}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (1 - \alpha) Z_t\]  

(25)

**4.2 Calibration**

**Macroeconomic targets.** I set the depreciation rate, $\delta$ to target an investment share of 18%. I set the markup, $\mu$ to target a 7.5% profit share, and $\alpha$ to target a labor share of .67. In the baseline model I assume $\rho = 1$ and therefore the production function in Cobb-Douglas. I normalize the supply of labor to 1, set $K$ so that the capital-output share is 2.5, and set $Z$ to normalize aggregate output to 1. Net foreign assets are set to clear asset markets, which in the calibration results in a value of $NFA/Y = 2.85$. The net rate of return is $r = .03$.

**Government Policy.** I set average labor income taxes, $\bar{\tau}_t\ell$ to .35 and $\gamma_t\ell$ to .15 following Heathcote et al. (2017). I follow De Nardi (2004) and Straub (2019) and set the bequest tax equal to .1. I set the capital tax to .4. I follow Huggett and Ventura (2000), De Nardi and Yang (2014), Straub (2019) in setting social security payments by income quintile (see
Appendix X for details). Lump-sum transfers are initially set to 0. Government debt relative to GDP, B/Y are set to 0.7. G is set to satisfy the government’s budget constraint, which in the calibration results in a value of government spending to output, G/Y = .27.

**Household Income.** Labor productivity by permanent income type and age, θ_i^h are set so that \( \sum \pi_i \theta_i^h = 1 \) and so that relative labor productivity matches relative income by type and age in the data. The parameters \( \rho_e \) and \( \sigma_e \) are set as in Straub (2019) and the AR(1) process is discretized into a Markov process with 2 states. I set the equity shares to match the 2019 wealth Lorenz curve (Aladangady and Forde (2021)). Follow the empirical analysis in the previous section, I assume I = 5 and H = 4.

**Household Preferences.** I set the inverse Frisch elasticity, γ to 1/0.82 following Chetty et al. (2011), and the inverse elasticity of inter-temporal substitution for the median age, \( \hat{\sigma} \) to 2.5 following the literature. The weight on the disutility of labor, \( \psi_\ell \) and the weight on the bequest motive, \( \psi_a \) are set to clear labor markets and target bequests as 5% of GDP respectively. The remaining parameters, \( \{\beta_i\}_{i \in I}, \eta, \bar{a}, \) and \( \sigma_{nh} \), where \( \sigma_h = \sigma_{nh} \sigma_{h+1} \), are all jointly calibrated so that the savings rates by age and labor productivity type in the model target their counterparts in the data. Table 5 reports the savings rates by age and permanent income type in the data and the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group: Young</th>
<th>Quintile 1</th>
<th>Quintile 2</th>
<th>Quintile 3</th>
<th>Quintile 4</th>
<th>Quintile 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group: Middle</th>
<th>Quintile 1</th>
<th>Quintile 2</th>
<th>Quintile 3</th>
<th>Quintile 4</th>
<th>Quintile 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group: Old</th>
<th>Quintile 1</th>
<th>Quintile 2</th>
<th>Quintile 3</th>
<th>Quintile 4</th>
<th>Quintile 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table reports savings rates out of current income by permanent income quintile and age in the baseline calibrated model alongside their analogous estimates in the PSID. See Section 3 for details on the estimation procedure.
### Table 6: Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source or Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distribution of Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Age Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Income Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${\theta_{iy}}_{i \in I}$</td>
<td>Labor productivity (young)</td>
<td>${.35, .46, .72, 1.18, 1.92}$</td>
<td>PSID data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${\theta_{im}}_{i \in I}$</td>
<td>Labor productivity (middle)</td>
<td>${.53, .88, 1.26, 1.76, 2.85}$</td>
<td>PSID data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${\theta_{io}}_{i \in I}$</td>
<td>Labor productivity (old)</td>
<td>${.58, .98, 1.38, 1.91, 3.15}$</td>
<td>PSID data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_{e}$</td>
<td>Persistence $e$</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>Straub (2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{e}$</td>
<td>Standard deviation $e$</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>Straub (2019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${\pi_{i}}_{i \in I}$</td>
<td>Distribution of profit income</td>
<td>${0, .05, .1, .15, .7}$</td>
<td>US Wealth Lorenz Curve 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macro Parameters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>Markup</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>Profit share of 7.5% (BEA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>Capital share after profits</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>Labor share of .67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>Capital depreciation</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>Investment share of .1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Aggregate Productivity</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>Set $Y=1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFA</td>
<td>Net Foreign Assets</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endogenously Calibrated Micro parameters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{a}$</td>
<td>Bequest utility when $a_{it}=0$</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_{a}$</td>
<td>Bequest utility parameter</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>Bequests/GDP of .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_{\ell}$</td>
<td>Labor disutility weight</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>L=1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${\beta_{h}}_{h \in H}$</td>
<td>Discount factor</td>
<td>${.87, .90, .93, .95, .98}$</td>
<td>See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{a}$</td>
<td>Borrowing limit</td>
<td>-.2</td>
<td>10% constrained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>1/elasticity of bequests</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiscal Policy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_{K}$</td>
<td>Capital tax</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{\tau}_{l}$</td>
<td>Average Labor Tax</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>PSZ. See text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_{b}$</td>
<td>Bequest tax</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>De Nardi (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Government debt</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>Debt held by public/GDP in 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Social security transfers</td>
<td>${.06, .13, .21, .33, .41}$</td>
<td>See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Government Spending</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>Labor tax progressivity</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>CEX (see text)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. This table contains the model parameters, their values, and their source or target in the data. Details on how the endogenously calibrated were calculated can be found in the text.

I then solve a supplementary version of the baseline model with exogenous fixed labor supply. All parameters and macro moments are the same, and the labor supply of households at a given age, productivity type, and history of income shocks is set at the corresponding level in the baseline model.

### 4.3 Policy Experiment

Suppose the fiscal authority increased the average labor income tax rate, $\bar{\tau}_{l}$, keeping the degree of progressivity $\gamma$ constant, in order to fund a budget-balancing uniform lump-sum transfer, $T$. How does this policy affect average consumption? To answer this question, I solve for the steady state of the baseline model for a range of policies, $\{\bar{\tau}_{l}, T\}$.
Figure 1: Effect of $\tau_\ell$ on $T$ and consumption distribution

Note. The left panel of this figure plots the set of budget balancing policies, $\{\tau_\ell, T\}$. On the x-axis is the average level of labor income taxes, $\tau_\ell$ while the y-axis plots the lump-sum transfer as a share of average income in the baseline calibration. The right panel plots the change in consumption share by income quintile as a result of the change in $\tau_\ell$.

Figure 1 reports the effect of increasing $\tau_\ell$ on the size of the lump sum transfer, $T$ relative to the average income level and on the distribution of consumption. To fund a universal income transfer equal to 8 percent of average income, the average labor income tax would need to increase by 7 percentage points.

How much of this trade-off can be attributed to the direct effect of non-homothetic savings behavior? To isolate this channel, I solve for the direct effect of a percentage point increase in $\tau_\ell$ – and the associated budget balancing transfer – on each household type’s expected permanent income. For details on this calculation, see Appendix A.12. Given the change in permanent income for each type, $\Delta PI_i$ I define the age specific hypothetical lump-sum taxes, $\{T_{ih}\}_{h \in H}$ so that the following conditions hold.

$$ \sum_{H} \frac{T_{ih}}{(1 + r_0)^h} = \Delta PI_i $$

$$ T_i = \frac{T_{ih}}{(1 + r)^h} \text{ for all } h \in H $$

The first condition states that the present value of the lump-sum tax equals the present value of the change in permanent income from the direct effect of the labor income tax. The second condition states that the present value of the lump-sum tax at each age must all be equal, ensuring that the lump-sum tax does not alter the savings rate by shifting resources over the life-cycle.

I consider the effect of this hypothetical tax on average consumption, holding labor income constant at the baseline steady state level. Because I impose this tax in all idiosyncratic
states, I remove the insurance role of the labor income redistribution. Therefore, the only way the hypothetical tax affects average consumption is through shifting permanent income from households with different MPS.

The left panel of Figure 2 plots the decline in steady state capital as the degree of redistribution increases. In the model with fixed labor, this decline in capital can be entirely attributed to the effect of non-homothetic savings behavior. From the figure, we can see that the direct effect of non-homothetic savings behavior can account for over half of the decline in steady state capital as the labor income redistribution increases. A 5 percentage point increase in average labor income taxes results in a 1 percent drop in steady state capital, .6 percent of which can be attributed to the direct effect of redistributing from households with a high MPS to households with a low MPS.

![Figure 2: Effect of \( \bar{\tau}_\ell \) on Investment and Labor Supply](image)

Note. This left panel of this figure plots the percent change in the steady state capital stock as a function of the percentage point change in steady state average labor income taxes. The right panel plots the analogous decline in steady state labor supply. The dark blue line plots the change in the baseline model, while the light blue line plots the isolated affect of the non-homothetic savings channel.

The redistribution policy generates a sizeable labor supply distortion. In the baseline model, a 5 percentage point increase in the labor income tax generates over a 3 percent decline in the steady state labor supply. Because the decline in capital is around 75% larger in the baseline model, it is clear that the decline in labor supply amplifies the decline in aggregate capital. By construction, aggregate labor does not decline in the fixed labor model.

Next, I examine the impact of the redistribution policy on average consumption. Ultimately, policy makers care about the impact of the redistribution policy on welfare. As shown in the right hand side of Figure 1, increasing the degree of redistribution makes the after-tax income distribution — and therefore the distribution of consumption — more equal. All else equal, this effect will be welfare improving for a sufficiently egalitarian social welfare
function. However, by decreasing the long-run labor supply and capital stock, the policy de-
creases the productive capacity of the economy, lowering average consumption. This effect is
plotted in Figure 3. Because the decline in average consumption can be entirely attributed
to the effect of non-homothetic savings behavior when labor supply is held fixed, the decline
in average consumption can as well.

From Figure 3 we see that a 10 percentage point increase in the average labor income tax
rate – which funds a budget balancing transfer – causes average steady state consumption to
decline by 2.8 percent. From the figure, we can see that .5 percent or about 18 percent of the
total decline in average consumption can be attributed to the direct effect on non-homothetic
savings behavior alone. While this does not constitute the majority of the trade-off, these
results suggest that the redistribution-investment trade-off may be large enough to influence
optimal fiscal policy calculations.

![Figure 3: Effect of $\tau_\ell$ on Consumption](image)

Note. This figure plots the percent change in steady state average consumption as a function of steady state
average labor income taxes, $\tau_\ell$. The dark blue line plots the change in the baseline model, while the light
blue line plots the isolated affect of the non-homothetic savings channel.

4.4 Comparative Statics

The sufficient statistic formula pointed to several key determinants of the size of the redistribution-
investment channel. In particular, the relative importance of this channel was shown to be
increasing in the interest rate elasticity of firm investment and decreasing in both the interest
rate elasticity of household savings and the capital elasticity of aggregate wages. How do
the results in Figure 3 change when the primitives governing these parameters change?
**Average Elasticity of Inter-temporal Substitution.** The elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) governs households’ interest rate elasticity of savings. In the baseline model, the average $\sigma_h$ was set to 2.75, implying an average EIS of .36. How does the relative importance of non-homothetic savings change when the EIS, and therefore the interest rate elasticity of household savings decreases?

To see these effects, I re-calibrate the baseline model with increasing average values of $\sigma_h$ (decreasing average EIS). All parameters governing the distribution of income and profits, the macroeconomic parameters, and fiscal policy are kept identical to the baseline model, with the exception of NFA and G which are again adjusted to clear asset markets and the government budget constraint. The parameters governing the relative degree of non-homotheticity, in particular the ratio of $\sigma_h/\sigma_H$, the discount rates, $\{\beta_i\}_{i \in I}$, and the ratio of $\eta$ to $\sigma_H$, are all kept at their baseline values, as are $\bar{a}$ and $a$. The only parameters that adjust are the weights on the disutility of labor, $\psi_\ell$ and the utility of bequests, $\psi_a$ in order to clear markets and retain the same bequest share of GDP.

For each average EIS, I repeat the same exercise as in the baseline case and consider the effect on average consumption of a 10 percentage point increase in the average rate of labor income tax, $\bar{\tau}_\ell$ alongside a budget-balancing lump-sum transfer. Figure 4 plots the share of the decline in consumption that can be attributed to the non-homothetic savings channel for increasing values of the EIS.

![Figure 4: To be added](image)

### 4.5 The short run trade-off.

To be added.

### 5 Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to study the effect of non-homothetic savings behavior on the trade-offs associated with income redistribution in OLG models. When high permanent income households have larger marginal propensities to save out of permanent income than lower income households, all permanent redistribution policies transfer resources from high savers to low savers, lowering both the aggregate savings level and investment. I show that this non-homothetic savings behavior generates a novel welfare trade-off between redistribution and capital accumulation that is present for all forms of redistribution policy.
I show that the existence of such a trade-off depends both on whether the rich do indeed have higher marginal propensities to save out of permanent income, and on whether achieving the first-best level of inequality would result in a savings level and aggregate capital stock below the golden-rule level. I present empirical evidence confirming the former condition. If one assumes that the United States is currently well above the ideal level of inequality, the latter condition is likely to hold as well.

Using labor income redistribution as an illustrative case, I show that the channel I highlight changes the impact of labor income redistribution policy on welfare in the long run. I derive a sufficient statistic formula for the size of my channel and show that it is substantial relative to the effect of labor supply distortions. This back-of-the-envelope analysis suggests that considering non-homothetic savings behavior is important for determining optimal redistribution policy.

The next step in this project is to use the quantitative model to study the importance of this channel in the short run. Redistribution affects long run capital by lowering the savings supply and pushing up interest rates. If firms are slow to respond to these increases, due to capital adjustment costs for example, the long run costs associated with my channel may take many years to materialize. In this case, the weight placed on future generations in the welfare calculus would become a more important ingredient in determining optimal redistribution.
References


Ayse Imrohoroglu, Cagri S. Kumru, and Arm Nakornthab. Revisiting Tax on Top Income. Anu working papers in economics and econometrics, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics, February 2018.


Appendix 1

A.1 Proof of Lemma 1.

Non-homothetic savings behavior when $\sigma_y > \sigma_o$ or $\sigma_o > \eta$ or $\beta_H > \beta_L$.

The household’s problem is the following:

$$\max_{\{c^y_{i,t}, c^o_{i,t+1}, a^o_{i,t+1}\}_{h \in \{0,1\}}} \frac{(c^y_{i,t})^{1-\sigma_y}}{1-\sigma_y} + \beta_i \left( \frac{(c^o_{i,t+1})^{1-\sigma_o}}{1-\sigma_o} + \psi_a \frac{(a^o_{i,t+1})^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} \right)$$

subject to

$$c^y_{i,t} + \frac{c^o_{i,t+1} + a^o_{i,t+1}}{R_{i,t+1}} = R_{it} a^o_{i,t-1} + w_i \theta_i + T_{it}$$

If $\psi_a = 0$, the households’ first order condition is:

$$(c^0_{it})^{1-\sigma_y} = \beta_i R_{it} (c^1_{i,t+1})^{-\sigma_o}$$

If $\psi_a = 1$, the household’s first order condition is:

$$(c^0_{it})^{1-\sigma_y} = \beta_i R_{it} (c^1_{i,t+1})^{-\sigma_o}$$

$$(c^1_{i,t+1})^{-\sigma_o} = \psi_a (a^1_{i,t+1})^{-\eta}$$

Permanent income, $PI_i$ is defined as:

$$PI_i = R_{it} a^o_{i,t-1} + w_i \theta_i + T_{it}$$

For each household type, the derivative of steady state savings to permanent income is given by the following expressions:

Case 1 ($\psi_a = 0$):

$$c^y_{it} + R^\frac{1}{\sigma_o} R_{i,t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma_o}} \frac{1}{\beta_i} \frac{1}{\sigma_y} (c^y_{it})^\frac{\sigma_y}{\sigma_o} = PI_{it}$$

$$\frac{\partial c^y_{it}}{\partial PI_{it}} = \left(1 + \frac{\sigma_y}{\sigma_o} (c^y_{it})^\frac{\sigma_y}{\sigma_o} - R^\frac{1}{\sigma_o} R_{i,t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\sigma_o}} \frac{1}{\beta_i} \frac{1}{\sigma_o} \right)^{-1}$$

(A.1)

This term is positive, meaning consumption increases with permanent income. When permanent income increases, $c^y_{it}$ increases. From A.1 we can see then that $\frac{\partial c^y_{it}}{\partial PI_{it}}$ is straightforwardly decreasing in $PI_i$ whenever $\sigma_y > \sigma_o$. This derivative is also decreasing in $\beta_i$. This implies that $\frac{\partial a^y_{it}}{\partial PI_{it}}$ is increasing in $\beta_i$ and increasing in $PI_{it}$ whenever $\sigma_y > \sigma_o$. 

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Case 2 ($\psi > 0$):

$$\frac{\partial c^y_{it}}{\partial P_{it}} = \left(1 + \frac{\sigma_y}{\sigma_o} (c^y_{it})^{\frac{1}{\sigma_o}} - \frac{1}{\beta_i} + \frac{\sigma_y}{\eta} (c^y_{it})^{\frac{1}{\sigma_o}} - 1 \frac{1}{\beta_i} \frac{1}{R_{it+1}} (\psi \beta_i)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}\right)^{-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.2)

Again, this term is positive, meaning the derivative is decreasing in permanent income whenever $\sigma_y > \sigma_o$ or $\sigma_o > \eta$. It is also straightforwardly decreasing in $\beta_i$. The derivative of bequests, $a^o_{it+1}$ with respect to permanent income is:

$$\frac{\partial a^o_{it+1}}{\partial P_{it}} = \left(\frac{\eta}{\sigma_y} (\psi \beta_i R_{it+1})^{-1/\sigma_y} (a^o_{it+1})^{\frac{1}{\sigma_y}} - 1 + \frac{\eta}{\sigma_o} (\psi^{-1/\sigma_o} R_{it+1}) (a^o_{it+1})^{\frac{1}{\sigma_o}} - 1 \frac{1}{R}\right)^{-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.3)

Because this derivative is positive, bequests increase with permanent income. Therefore, whenever permanent income increases and $\eta < \sigma_y$ or $\eta < \sigma_o$, the denominator in A.3 decreases and $\frac{\partial a^o_{it+1}}{\partial P_{it}}$ increases. Therefore, the derivative of bequests

Because the derivative of consumption with respect to PI is decreasing in PI, $\frac{\partial a^y_{it}}{\partial P_{it}} = \frac{\partial a^y_{it}}{\partial P_{it}}$ is increasing in $P_{it}$.

**Derivatives of K with respect to T.** Lemma 1 stated that when $\frac{\partial a^y_{it}}{\partial T_{it}}$ and $\frac{\partial a^o_{it}}{\partial T_{it}}$ are constant over types, $K_{t+1}$ is unaffected by fiscal policy and therefore is pinned down by $K_t$. Instead, when $\frac{\partial a^y_{it}}{\partial T_{it}}$ and $\frac{\partial a^o_{it}}{\partial T_{it}}$ are higher for high productivity types, $K_{t+1}$ can be written as a function of $K_t$ and $\{T_{it}\}_{i \in I}$.

**Case 1 ($\psi = 0$):** Use the firms’ FOC to write $R_{t+1} = (1 + F_K(K_{t+1}) - \delta)$ and $w_t(K_t) = F_L(K_t)$. Then use the households’ Euler equations and budget constraints to write $a^o_{it}$ as a function of $w_t(K_t), w_{t+1}(K_{t+1}), T_{it}$, and $R_{t+1}(K_{t+1})$.

Use the government budget constraint to write $T_{Ht}(T_{Lt})$ and the asset market clearing condition to write the entire system in terms of $K_{t+1}, K_t,$ and $T_{it}$.

$$K_{t+1} = \sum_I \pi_i a^y_{it} \left( T_{it}(T_{Lt}), w_t(K_t), w_{t+1}(K_{t+1}), R_{t+1}(K_{t+1}) \right)$$
Finally, note that for a given $\{T_i\}$ policy, as long as $K_0 > 0$, $K_{t+1}$ converges to a unique steady state associated with $T_i, K_{ss}(\{T_i\})$. To see this, note that the law of motion for capital

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is:

$$\frac{K_{t+1} - K_t}{K_t} = \frac{F(K_t, 1)}{K_t} - \delta - \frac{C_t(K_{t+1}, K_t, K_{t-1})}{K_t}$$

If I can show that \(\frac{F(K_t, 1)}{K_t} - \frac{C_t}{K_t}\) is monotonically decreasing, then that is sufficient to prove there is a unique non-zero steady-state level of capital \(\bar{K}\) where this term \(\delta\). Then for \(K_t > \bar{K}\), \(K_{t+1} - K_t < 0\).

Note that \(\frac{F(K_t, 1)}{K_t} - \frac{C_t}{K_t} = \frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} - 1 + \delta\), so it is sufficient to show that \(\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t}\) is decreasing in \(K_t\). By the quotient rule, \(\frac{\partial(K_{t+1}/K_t)}{\partial K_t} = \frac{K_t \partial K_{t+1}/\partial K_t - K_{t+1} \partial K_t}{K_t K_{t+1}} = \frac{\partial K_{t+1}/\partial K_t}{K_{t+1}/K_t}\). Therefore, as long as \(\partial K_{t+1}/\partial K_t < K_{t+1}/K_t\) for all \(K_t > 0\), this term is negative and the result is established.

The term \(\frac{\partial K_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} - \frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t}\) is:

$$\frac{\sum_I \pi_i \frac{\partial a_{it}}{\partial w_t} \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial K_t}}{1 - \sum_I \pi_i \left(\frac{\partial a_{it}}{\partial R_{t+1}} \frac{\partial R_{t+1}}{\partial K_{t+1}}\right)} - \frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t}$$

Note that because \(\frac{\partial R_{t+1}}{\partial K_{t+1}} < 0\), the denominator of the first term is positive, meaning \(\frac{\partial K_{t+1}}{\partial K_t} > 0\). Multiplying the above by \(\frac{K_t}{K_{t+1}}:$$

$$\frac{\sum_I \pi_i \frac{\partial a_{it}}{\partial w_t} \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial K_t}}{K_{t+1} - \sum_I \pi_i \left(\frac{\partial a_{it}}{\partial R_{t+1}} \frac{\partial R_{t+1}}{\partial K_{t+1}}\right) K_t} - 1$$

Multiplying the first term by \(\frac{A_t}{A_t}\) and \(\frac{w_t}{w_{t+1}}\) or \(\frac{w_{t+1}}{w_{t+1}}\) in the numerator and denominator respectively.

$$\frac{w_K \sum_I \pi_i a_{it} \frac{\partial \log a_{it}}{\partial \log w_t}}{K_{t+1} - \sum_I \pi_i a_{it} \left(\frac{\partial \log a_{it}}{\partial \log R_{t+1}}\right) R_K} - 1$$

Using the fact that \(K_{t+1} = A_t\), this can be written as,

$$\frac{w_K \sum_I \pi_i a_{it} \frac{\partial \log a_{it}}{\partial \log w_t}}{1 - \frac{R_K \sum_I \pi_i a_{it} \left(\frac{\partial \log a_{it}}{\partial \log R_{t+1}}\right)}{R_K} - 1}$$

Using the Cobb-Douglas assumption, \(w_K = (1 - \alpha_L)\) and \(R_K = -\alpha_L\) (see Appendix X),
where $\alpha_L$ is the labor share.

\[
\frac{(1 - \alpha_L) \sum_I \pi_i \frac{\partial \log a_i}{\partial \log w_i}}{1 + \alpha_L \sum_I \pi_i \frac{\partial \log a_i}{\partial \log R_{t+1}}} - 1
\]

Solve for $\frac{\partial \log a_i}{\partial \log w_i}$ and $\frac{\partial \log a_i}{\partial \log R_t}$ using household’s first order conditions to show that denominator $>\text{numerator}$, and that full term is negative. To be added.

**Steady state.** In this case, the steady state version of the asset market clearing condition can be written as:

\[
2K = \sum_I \pi_i \left( a^y_i((w(K), R(K))_{j \in (0,1)}, a_o^i, T_i) + a_o^i((w(K), R(K))_{j \in (-1,0)}, T_i) \right)
\]

Again, taking the total derivative,

\[
\frac{d\bar{K}}{dT_L} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_I \pi_i \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial T_i} \left( \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial T_i} + \frac{\partial a^o_i}{\partial T_i} + 1 \right) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_I \pi_i \left( \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial w} + \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial a^o_i} + 1 \right) \frac{\partial a^o_i}{\partial w} \right) \frac{\partial w}{\partial K} - \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial R} + \frac{\partial a^o_i}{\partial a^o_i} + 1 \right) \frac{\partial a^o_i}{\partial R} \right) \frac{\partial R}{\partial K} \right)^{-1}
\]

Which can be written as:

\[
\frac{d\bar{K}}{dT_L} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_I \pi_i \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial T_i} \left( \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial T_i} + \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial a^o_i} + 1 \right) \frac{\partial a^o_i}{\partial T_i} \right) \left( 1 - A_w w_K - A_r r_K \right)^{-1}
\]

Because I’ve assumed Cobb-Douglas production, $w_K = wL/Y < 1$. As long as $A_w < wK^{-1}$, because $A_r > 0$ and $r_K < 0$, the denominator is guaranteed to be positive. Therefore, when the high types have higher MPS (in both periods if $\psi_a > 0$), the numerator is negative and therefore $\frac{d\bar{K}}{dT_L} < 0$. 

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A.2 Proof that $\omega_H^* = \omega_L^*$

The unconstrained planner’s problem is to maximize social welfare, given by:

$$SW_s = \sum_i \pi_{ih} \lambda_i \left( \frac{(c_y^i)^{1-\sigma_y}}{1-\sigma_y} + \beta_i \gamma \frac{(c_o^i)^{1-\sigma_o}}{1-\sigma_o} + \beta_i \gamma \psi \left( a_o^i \right)^{-\eta} \right)$$

subject only to the resource constraint (4) in steady state.

Let $\mu$ be the lagrange multiplier on the The first order conditions with respect to $c_y^i$ are:

$$\pi_{iy} \lambda_i (c_y^i)^{-\sigma_y} = \pi_{iy} \mu$$

This implies that $\lambda_L (c_y^L)^{-\sigma_y} = \omega_L = \lambda_H (c_y^H)^{-\sigma_y}$.

A.3 Proof of Lemma 2

Again, social welfare in the steady state is defined as:

$$SW_s = \sum_i \pi_{ih} \lambda_i \left( \frac{(c_y^i)^{1-\sigma_y}}{1-\sigma_y} + \beta_i \gamma \frac{(c_o^i)^{1-\sigma_o}}{1-\sigma_o} + \beta_i \gamma \psi \left( a_o^i \right)^{-\eta} \right)$$

The lifetime budget constraint is given by:

$$c_y^i + \frac{c_o^i + a_o^i}{R} = Ra_o^i + w \theta_i + T_i$$

I can express a change in $SW_s$ following a change in $T_i$ as:

$$dSW_s = \sum_i \pi_{ih} \lambda_i \left( (c_y^i)^{-\sigma_y} dc_y^i + \beta_i \gamma (c_o^i)^{-\sigma_o} dc_o^i + \beta_i \gamma \psi \left( a_o^i \right)^{-\eta} da_o^i \right)$$

Using the household’s budget constraint:

$$dc_y^i = Rda_o^i + a_o^i dR + \theta_i dw + dT_i - da_y^i$$

$$dc_o^i = Rda_o^i + a_o^i dR - da_o^i$$

The household’s optimality condition for bequests is $(c_o^i)^{-\sigma_o} = \psi (a_o^i)^{-\eta}$ and Euler equation is: $(c_y^i)^{-\sigma_y} = \beta_i R (c_o^i)^{-\sigma_o}$. Defining $\omega_i$ as in the text, setting $\gamma = 1$, and subbing in the
bequest condition and Euler equation, this change can be written as:

\[
dSW_s = \sum_l \pi_{ih} \omega_i \left( R \alpha_i^o + \alpha_i^o dR + \theta_i dw + dT_i^y \right) + \pi_{ih} \omega_i \left( \alpha_i^o dR + dT_i^o \right)
\]

Note that \( R \omega_{io} = \lambda_i R \beta (c_i^o)^{-\sigma_o} = \omega_i \). Therefore, \( \omega_{io} = \omega_i / R \). Because \( RT_i^y = T_i^o \), this is equivalent to:

\[
dSW_s = \sum_l \pi_{ih} \omega_i dT_i^y + \sum_l \pi_{ih} \omega_i \left( R \alpha_i^o + \alpha_i^o dR + \theta_i dw + (\alpha_i^y \frac{dR}{R}) \right)
\]

Let \( \Gamma_i^b \) be type-i households’ bequests as a share of total capital. Then the above can be written:

\[
dSW_s = \sum_l \pi_{ih} \omega_i dT_i^y + \sum_l \pi_{ih} \omega_i R K \Gamma_i^b + \sum_l \pi_{ih} \omega_i \Gamma_i^b dK + \sum_l \omega_i \pi_{ih} \left( (a_i^o + \frac{a_i^y}{R}) dR + \theta_i dw \right)
\]

Note that for CES production functions, \( dR/dw = -L/K \). Therefore, the above can be written as:

\[
dSW_s = \sum_l \pi_{ih} \omega_i dT_i^y + \sum_l \pi_{ih} \omega_i R K \Gamma_i^b + \sum_l \pi_{ih} \omega_i \Gamma_i^b dK + \frac{1}{2} \sum_l \omega_i \pi_{ih} \left( -\frac{a_i^o}{K} + \frac{a_i^y}{KR} + \frac{\theta_i}{L} \right) dw L
\]

Defining \( \Theta \) and \( K_{PI} \) as in the text,

\[
\Theta = \frac{1}{2} \sum_l \omega_i \pi_i \left( \frac{\theta_i}{L} - \left( \frac{a_i^o}{K} + \frac{a_i^y}{KR} \right) \right)
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A.4)

Finally, multiply \( R \frac{1}{2} \sum_l \pi_i (\omega_i \Gamma_i^b) dK \) by \( K/K \), and note that \( \Gamma_i^b K = a_i^o \) to get:

\[
dSW_s = \sum_l \omega_{iy} dT_i^y + \frac{1}{2} \sum_l \omega_i R K \Gamma_i^b + \left( R \frac{1}{2} \sum_l (\omega_i a_i^o) + w L \Theta w_K \right) K_{PI}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (A.5)
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1:

When \( \omega_L > \omega_H \), \( \frac{\partial a_h}{\partial P_{PH}} > \frac{\partial a_h}{\partial P_{PL}} \) for \( h \in \{y, o\} \), and \( R > 1 \), then \( \Theta > 0 \).

Suppose there is a motive for redistribution (\( \omega_L > \omega_H \)). Whether additional capital contributes positively to welfare hinges on whether \( \Theta \) is positive. Start with the case without bequests. In this case,

\[
\Theta = \sum_i \omega_i \pi_i \left( \frac{\theta_i}{L} - \frac{a^y_i}{KR} \right)
\]

We have that \( \sum_i \pi_i a^y_i = K \) and \( \sum_i \pi_i \theta_i = L \).

Suppose \( \pi_L \theta_L / L \geq \pi_L a^y_L / K \), meaning type-L households’ share of labor total income is greater or equal to their share of total savings. By construction, type-H’s share of labor income is less than or equal to their share of savings. If the economy is dynamically efficient and therefore \( R > 1 \), each types’ labor income is weighted more heavily than their savings in \( \Theta \). To see this, simply note that \( 1 > \frac{1}{R} \).

Because \( \pi_L \theta_L / L = 1 - \pi_H \theta_H / L \) and that \( \pi_L \theta_L / L = 1 - \pi_H \theta_H / L \), we have that:

\[
\Theta = \left( \omega_L \frac{\pi_L \theta_L}{L} + \omega_H \right) \left( \frac{1 - \pi_L \theta_L}{L} \right) - 1 \frac{1}{R} \left( \omega_L \frac{\pi_L a^y_L}{K} + \omega_H \frac{1}{R} \left( \pi_L a^y_L \right) \right)
\]

Which simplifies to:

\[
\Theta = (\omega_L - \omega_H) \left( \frac{\pi_L \theta_L}{L} \right) - 1 \frac{1}{R} \left( \pi_L a^y_L \right) + \omega_H \left( 1 - R^{-1} \right)
\]

From this expression, it’s clear that low-types having a higher labor share and \( R > 1 \) are sufficient conditions for \( \Theta \) to be positive when \( \omega_L > \omega_H \).

The logic for the \( \psi_a > 0 \) case is analogous. In this case, \( \Theta \) is:

\[
\Theta = \sum_i \omega_i \left( \frac{\pi_L \theta_i}{L} - \frac{\pi_L a^y_i}{KR} - \frac{\pi_L a^o_i}{K} \right) + \omega_i \frac{\pi_o a^o_i}{KR} - \omega_i \frac{\pi_i a^o_i}{KR}
\]

\[
= \left( \omega_L \frac{\pi_L \theta_L}{L} + \omega_H \right) \left( 1 - \frac{\pi_L \theta_L}{L} \right) - 1 \frac{1}{R} \left( \omega_L \frac{a_L}{K} + \omega_H \left( 1 - \frac{a_L}{K} \right) \right)
\]

\[
+ \omega_H \frac{\pi_H a^o_H}{KR} - \omega_H \frac{\pi_H a^o_H}{K} + \omega_L \frac{\pi_L a^o_L}{KR} - \omega_L \frac{\pi_L a^o_L}{K}
\]
Which simplifies to:

$$\Theta = (\omega_L - \omega_H)\left(\frac{\pi_L \theta_L}{L} - \frac{1}{R} \left(\frac{\pi_L a_i^y}{K}\right) + \omega_H(1 - R^{-1}) + \omega_H \frac{\pi_H a^o_j}{K} (R^{-1} - 1) + \omega_L \frac{\pi_L a^o_i}{K} (R^{-1} - 1)\right)$$

To see that low-productivity types have higher labor shares compared to savings shares when preferences are non-homothetic. To show this, I will prove that the derivative of a type’s lifetime capital share, $\frac{a^y_i + a^o_i}{K}$, to their labor share is non-negative. That is, keeping $L$ constant, by increasing $\theta_i$ you increase $\frac{a^y_i + a^o_i}{K}$. Define $a_i \equiv a^y_i + a^o_i$. The derivative of $a_i/K$ with respect to $\theta_i$ is:

$$\frac{\partial (a_i/K)}{\partial \theta_i} = \frac{\partial a_i/\partial \theta_i}{K} - \frac{a_i \partial K/\partial \theta_i}{K}$$

From Appendix A.1, we have that $\frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial \Pi_L}$ and $\frac{\partial a^o_i}{\partial \Pi_L}$ increase as permanent incomes increase. Suppose $\theta_i < 1/2$ and therefore by construction $\theta_j > 1/2$.

In this case, because type-$j$ households are losing permanent income but currently have higher permanent income, their loss in savings will outweigh the growth in savings of the type-$i$ households. Therefore, we have that $\partial K/\partial \theta_i < 0$, and therefore the above derivative is positive.

Using identical logic, suppose $\theta_i > 1/2$. Then as $\theta_i$ increased, $\theta_j$ would decrease, decreasing type-$j$’s share and increasing type-$i$’s share by construction.

Finally, using equation A.5, we see that at the hypothetical steady state with $K = \bar{K}$ and $\omega_L = \omega_H$, $\Theta > 0$ when $F_K > \delta$ (and $R > 1$) and preferences are non-homothetic, and therefore this cannot be a maximum.

### A.5 Proof of Proposition 2

Proposition 2 states that when savings behavior is non-homothetic, and the steady state associated with $\omega_L = \omega_H$ is dynamically efficient $(F_K(\bar{K}) > \delta)$, and $\gamma$ is sufficiently high, then at the constrained optimum, $\omega^i_{Ht} > \omega^i_{Lt}$ for all $t$. Because assuming $\lambda_H \geq \lambda_L$ ruled out any allocation in which $\omega_{Lt} > \omega_{Ht}$, it is sufficient to show that $\omega_{Lt} = \omega_{Ht}$ is not optimal at any horizon. To do this, I proceed according to the following steps:

1. Show that any equilibrium allocation can written as functions of fiscal policy and last period’s assets, and characterize those functions. These functions are necessary and sufficient conditions for an equilibrium.
2. Use these functions as constraints to solve for the constrained planner’s first order conditions.

3. Show that if $w_{Lt} = w_{Ht}$, for sufficiently high $\gamma$ the first order conditions are not satisfied.

**Step 1: find necessary and sufficient conditions for an allocation to be an equilibrium.** I again use the results from Section A.1 to show that any equilibrium path of capital, $\{K_{t+1}\}_{t \geq 0}$ can be expressed as an implicit function of fiscal policy and the previous period’s capital. Repeating the results here:

**Case 1:** $\psi_a = 0$: In this case, $K_{t+1}$ can be written as an implicit function of $K_t$ and $T_{it}$, $K_{t+1}(K_t, T_{it})$, where $\frac{dK_{t+1}}{dK_t} > 0$ and $\frac{dK_{t+1}}{dT_{it}} < 0$ when savings behavior is non-homothetic and $\frac{dK_{t+1}}{dT_{it}} = 0$ when savings behavior is homothetic.

Next, define $\Gamma^h_{it}$ as type-$i$ age-$h$ generation-$t$ households share of total consumption at time $t$. Defined $\Gamma^o_{it}$ as type-$i$ generation $t-1$ bequests as a share of total capital. Using the household’s Euler equation and lifetime budget constraint, and substituting in the firm’s first order conditions for prices, $c^o_{it}$ can be expressed as an implicit function of $K_t, K_{t+1}, T_{it}$ and $c^o_{i,t+1}$ can be expressed as an implicit function of $K_t, K_{t+1}, T_{it}$. Finally, because $c^o_{it} = \gamma^o_{it} C_t$ and $c^o_{i,t} = \Gamma^o_{it} C_t$, we can write $\Gamma^o_{it}(K_t, K_{t+1}, T_{it}, C_t) = c^o_{it}(K_t, K_{t+1}, T_{it})/C_t$ and $\Gamma^o_{i}(K_{t-1}, K_t, T_{it-1}, C_t) = c^o_{it}(K_{t-1}, K_t, T_{it-1})/C_t$.

Note that holding $K_t$ and $K_{t+1}$ (and therefore $C_t$) fixed, $\Gamma^o_{it}$ is increasing in $T_{it}$ and $\Gamma^o_{it}$ is increasing in $T_{it-1}$.

**Case 2:** $\psi_a > 0$: In this case, $K_{t+1}$ can be written as an implicit function of $K_t, K_{t-1}, T_{Lt}$, $T_{Lt-1}$, as well as $\{a^o_{i,t-1}, a^o_{i,t-2}\}_{i \in I}$. So we have a function, $K_{t+1}((K_t-j, T_{it-j}, \{a^o_{i,t-1-j}\}_{j=0,1})$, where $\frac{dK_{t+1}}{dK_t} > 0$ and $\frac{dK_{t+1}}{dT_{Lt}} < 0$ when savings behavior is non-homothetic and $\frac{dK_{t+1}}{dT_{Lt}} = 0$ when savings behavior is homothetic. Finally, $\frac{dK_{t+1}}{da^o_{i,t+j}} > 0$ for $i \in I$, and $j \in -1, -2$.

**Step 2:** Solve for the optimal implementable allocation, $x^*_t$.

**Case 1:** ($\psi_a = 0$): In this case, social welfare is given by the following expression:

$$SW = \sum_I \lambda_i \pi_i \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t \left( \frac{\Gamma^y_T C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \beta_i \frac{\Gamma^o_{it+1} C_{t+1}^{1-\sigma_o}}{1-\sigma_o} \right) + \frac{1}{\gamma} \beta_i \frac{\Gamma^o_{it} C_0^{1-\sigma_o}}{1-\sigma_o}$$
The planner’s problem is to choose a sequence of $T_{Lt}$ (which implies $T_{Ht} = -T_{Lt} \frac{\pi_{Lt}}{\pi_{Ht}}$ by the government’s budget constraint) and a sequence $\{C_t\}_{t \geq 0}$ in order to maximize $SW$, subject to:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma^y_{it} &= \Gamma^y_{it}(K_t, K_{t+1}, T_{it}, C_t) \text{ for } i \in \{L, H\} \\
\Gamma^o_{it+1} &= \Gamma^o_{it}(K_t, K_{t+1}, T_{it}, C_{t+1}) \text{ for } i \in \{L, H\} \\
K_{t+1} &= K_{t+1}(K_t, T_{Lt}) \\
C_t + K_{t+1} &= F(K_t, 1) + (1 - \delta)K_t
\end{align*}
\]

Define $\lambda_t$ as the lagrange multiplier with respect to the resource constraint. Define $\omega_{it} = \lambda_i \gamma^t(c^y_{it})^{-\sigma_y}$ and $\omega^o_{it} = \beta_i \pi_i \lambda_i \gamma^{t-1}(c^o_{it})^{-\sigma_o} = \omega_{it-1}/R_t$ as in the text. Let The planner’s first order condition with respect to $T_{Lt}$ is:

\[
\begin{align*}
\sum_{j \geq 0} C_{t+j} \left( \pi_L \omega^y_{Lt+j} \frac{\partial \Gamma^y_{Lt+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \pi_H \omega^y_{Ht+j} \frac{\partial \Gamma^y_{Ht+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \pi_L \omega^o_{Lt+j} \frac{\partial \Gamma^o_{Lt+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \pi_H \omega^o_{Ht+j} \frac{\partial \Gamma^o_{Ht+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) + \\
\sum_{t \geq 0} \frac{\partial K_{t+1}}{\partial T_{Lt}} \left( \lambda_{t+1}(F_K(K_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta) - \lambda_t \right) = 0
\end{align*}
\]

The first order condition with respect to $C_t$ is:

\[
\sum_{t} \lambda_i \pi_i \left( \gamma^{t-1}(\Gamma^o_{it})^{1-\sigma_o} C_t^{-\sigma_o} + \gamma^t (\Gamma^y_{it})^{1-\sigma_y} C_t^{-\sigma_y} \right) = \lambda_t
\]

**Homothetic savings:** If savings behavior is homothetic ($\frac{\partial a^y_{it}}{\partial T_{Lt}} = \frac{\partial a^y_{Ht}}{\partial T_{Lt}}$) then by Lemma X, the derivative of capital with respect to the lump-sum tax, $\frac{\partial K_{t+1}}{\partial T_{Lt}} = 0$. In this case, $\frac{\partial K_{t+1}}{\partial T_{Lt}} = \frac{\partial \Gamma^o_{Lt+1}}{\partial T_{Lt}}$, and therefore the only solution to the problem is to set $T_L$ such that $\omega^h_{Lt} = \omega^h_{Ht}$ for $h \in \{y, o\}$ and for all $t$.

**Non-Homothetic savings:** When savings behavior is non-homothetic, ($\frac{\partial a^y_{it}}{\partial T_{Lt}} < \frac{\partial a^y_{Ht}}{\partial T_{Lt}}$) then using the results in A.1, the derivative of capital with respect to the lump-sum tax, $\frac{\partial K_{t+1}}{\partial T_{Lt}} < 0$ for periods $t \geq 0$.

**Step 3: Show that $\omega_{Lt} = \omega_{Ht}$ does not satisfy the FOC.** Assume as in the Proposition a hypothetical steady state with capital level $\bar{K}$ such that $\pi_L \omega_{Lt} = \pi_H \omega_{Ht} = \pi_L \frac{\omega_{Lt}}{R(K)} = \pi_H \frac{\omega_{Ht}}{R(K)}$. That is, the hypothetical steady state corresponding to fiscal policy setting the population-weighted welfare weights are equal across types. Let $\bar{T}_L$ be the steady state fiscal policy that implements this allocation.
(a) Suppose $K_0 = \bar{K}$. Consider $\{\bar{T}_L\}_{t \geq 0}$ (and therefore $\{\bar{K}\}_{t \geq 0}$) as a potential solution to our planner’s problem. In this case, the allocation would remain unchanged, and therefore, using the FOC with respect to $C_t$, $\lambda_t \gamma = \lambda_{t+1}$. Recall that we have assumed that $F_K(\bar{K} + 1 - \delta) > \frac{1}{\gamma}$. Plugging this into the FOC with respect to $T_{Lt}$:

$$\sum_{j \geq 0} C \left( \pi_L \omega_{Lt+j} \frac{\partial \Gamma_y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \pi_H \omega_{Ht+j} \frac{\partial \Gamma_y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \pi_L \omega_{Lt+j} \frac{\partial \Gamma_o}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \pi_H \omega_{Ht+j} \frac{\partial \Gamma_o}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) =$$

$$- \sum_{t \geq 0} \frac{\partial K_{t+1}}{\partial T_{Lt}} \left( (F_K(\bar{K}) + 1 - \delta) - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) \lambda_{t+1}$$

Using the fact that $\pi_L \omega_{Lt+j} = \pi_H \omega_{Ht+j}$ and $\omega_{it+j} = \omega_{it+j-1}/R(\bar{K}) = \omega_{it+j-1/\gamma}/R(\bar{K})$, we can re-write the above as:

$$\pi_L \omega_{Lt} \sum_{j \geq 1} C \gamma^j \left( \frac{\partial \Gamma_y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{\partial \Gamma_y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \Gamma_o}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \Gamma_o}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) +$$

$$\left( \frac{\partial \Gamma_y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{\partial \Gamma_y}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) = - \lambda_{t+1} \sum_{j \geq 0} \frac{\partial K_{t+1+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} \left( (F_K(\bar{K}) + 1 - \delta) - \frac{1}{\gamma} \right) \gamma^j$$

Note that because, by assumption, $\frac{1}{\gamma R(\bar{K})} < 1$ and therefore the left hand side of the equation is non-zero. $T_{Lt}$ only affects the consumption share of generation $t$ directly, but changes the consumption share of every subsequent generation by decreasing the capital stock and increasing the interest rate. Therefore, the first term above is negative, as the increasing interest rate decreases the consumption share of the young (which is weighted more heavily, as $\frac{1}{\gamma R(\bar{K})} < 1$) than the increase in the consumption share when old. Note that the right hand side is positive, as $\lambda_t > 0$, $\frac{\partial K_{t+1+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} > 0$, and $F_K(\bar{K}) + 1 - \delta - \frac{1}{\gamma}$ is positive by assumption.

As $\gamma \rightarrow 1$, the first term gets larger in terms of absolute value and approaches $-\infty$. Therefore, for sufficiently large $\gamma$, the first order condition is not satisfied, as the right hand side becomes an increasingly large positive number, while the left hand side becomes an increasingly large negative number.

(b) Now suppose $K_0 \neq \bar{K}$. Consider a path for fiscal policy, $\{\tilde{T}_L\}$, now with a time subscript, that implements the first best level of inequality at each period.
Prove that $\tilde{T}_L$ converges to $T_L$ and therefore $K_t$ converges to $\bar{K}$. To show that the path of fiscal policy converges to $\tilde{T}_L$, the policy associated with the first-best steady state I show that the following are true:

1. The ratio $\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t}$ is monotonically decreasing in $K_t$ for a given fixed $T_L$. Therefore, if $K_t > \bar{K}$, $\frac{\pi(K_t)}{K_t} - \delta = \frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} - 1 < 0$ and capital decreases, while the opposite is true if $K_t < \bar{K}$. Therefore, steady states are unique and stable.

2. If $K_t = \bar{K}_t > \bar{K}$, then then $T^*_L$ associated with first best equality in this case is higher that the $\tilde{T}_L$ associated with the steady state level of capital of $\bar{K}$.

3. Using (1) and (2) Setting $T^*_L$ at time $t$ will bring $K_{t+1}$ closer to $\bar{K}$. This implies that the $\tilde{T}^*_L$ at time $t$ is closer to $\bar{T}_L$.

(1) Proof that $\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t}$ is monotonically decreasing in $K_t$:

It remains to be shown that the derivative, $\frac{\partial K_{t+1}/K_t}{\partial K_t}$ is equal to:

$$\frac{\partial K_{t+1}/K_t - K_{t+1}/K_t}{K_t} < 0$$

If we multiply by, $\frac{K_t}{K_{t+1}}$, we can see that this derivative is negative whenever:

$$\frac{\partial K_{t+1}K_t}{\partial K_tK_{t+1}} < 1$$

Using the implicit function theorem and the asset market clearing condition, this can be written as:

$$\frac{\partial K_{t+1}K_t}{\partial K_tK_{t+1}} = \frac{\sum_{i} \pi_i \alpha_i A_t w_K}{\frac{K_{t+1}}{A_t} - \sum_{i} \pi_i \alpha_i A_r R_K} = \frac{A_t w_K}{1 - A_r R_K}$$

Where the final expression comes from the fact that $K_{t+1} = A_t$. Becuase $A_r > 0$ and $R_K < 0$, the denominator is above 1. Therefore, if $A_t w_K < 1$, this fraction is less than one, meaning the derivative is negative, and the steady state is unique and stable.

(2)

(3)
Again consider the first order condition with respect to consumption:

$$\sum_t \lambda_t \pi_t \left( \gamma^{t-1} (\Gamma_t^{o})^{1-\sigma_o} C_t^{-\sigma_o} + \gamma^t (\Gamma_t^{y})^{1-\sigma_y} C_t^{-\sigma_y} \right) = \lambda_t$$

Note that as $K_{t+1} \to \bar{K}$, $C_{t+1} \to C$, and therefore for any arbitrary small $\epsilon$, there exists a $\tau \geq 0$, such that for $t \geq 0$, $|\lambda_{t+1} - \lambda_t| < \epsilon$ for all $t \geq \tau$.

Again using the fact that $\pi L \omega_{Lt+j} = \pi H \omega_{Ht+j}$ by assumption, we can re-write the first order condition with respect to $T_{Lt}$ as:

$$\pi_L \sum_{j \geq \tau} C_{t+j} \gamma^j \left( \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^o}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^o}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) +$$

$$\left( \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt}^y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt}^y}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) = - \lambda_{t+1} \sum_{j \geq 0} \frac{\partial K_{t+1+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} \left( \lambda_{t+1} (F_K(\bar{K}) + 1 - \delta) - \lambda_t \right)$$

This term can be broken further into the (finite) portion before $t = \tau$ and the (infinite) portion for $t \geq \tau$.

$$\pi_L \sum_{j \geq \tau} C_{t+j} \gamma^j \left( \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^o}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^o}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) +$$

$$\pi_L \sum_{j \geq 1} C_{t+j} \gamma^j \left( \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^o}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \omega_{Lt} \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt+j}^o}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) +$$

$$\left( \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt}^y}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{\partial \Gamma_{Lt}^y}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) = - \sum_{j \geq 0} \frac{\partial K_{t+1+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} \left( \lambda_{t+1} (F_K(\bar{K}) + 1 - \delta) - \lambda_t \right)$$

$$- \sum_{j \geq \tau} \frac{\partial K_{t+1+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} \left( \lambda_{t+1} (F_K(\bar{K}) + 1 - \delta) - \lambda_t \right)$$

Because after $t \geq \tau$, $C_t, K_{t+1}$, and $\lambda_{t+1}/\lambda_t$ are all arbitrarily close to their steady state counterparts, the above can be written as:
\[
\pi_L \omega_L \left[ \sum_{j \geq 1} \infty C_j \left( \frac{\partial \Gamma^y_{Lt+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{\partial \Gamma^y_{Ht+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \Gamma^o_{Lt+j}}{R(K)} \frac{1}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\partial \Gamma^o_{Ht+j}}{R(K)} \frac{1}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) + \right.
\]
\[
\pi_L \sum_{j \geq 1} \frac{\tau-1}{C_t+j} \gamma^j \left( \frac{\partial \Gamma^y_{Lt+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{\partial \Gamma^y_{Ht+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{\partial \Gamma^o_{Lt+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{\partial \Gamma^o_{Ht+j}}{R(K)} \frac{1}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) + \left. \right. 
\]
\[
\left( \frac{\partial \Gamma^y_{Lt}}{\partial T_{Lt}} + \frac{\partial \Gamma^y_{Ht}}{\partial T_{Lt}} \right) = - \sum_{j \geq 0} \frac{\partial K_{t+1+j}}{\partial T_{Lt}} \left( \lambda_{t+1}(F_K(\bar{K})) + \frac{1}{1} \right) \gamma^j 
\]

Again, as \( \gamma \to 1 \), the right hand side becomes an (infinite large) positive number, while the left hand side is a negative number. Therefore, there exists a \( \hat{\gamma} \in (0, 1) \) such that if \( \gamma > \hat{\gamma} \) implementing the first best level of inequality violates the planner's first order conditions.

**Case 2** (\( \psi_a > 0 \)): The optimal implementable allocation \( x^*_t \) maximizes the following expression:

\[
\max_{\{c_t\}_{t \geq 0}, T_L} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \lambda_t \sum_{i \in I} \gamma^t \left( \frac{\Gamma^y_i C_t^{1-\sigma_y}}{1 - \sigma_y} + \gamma^{-1} \beta_i \frac{\Gamma^o_i C_t^{1-\sigma_o}}{1 - \sigma_o} + \beta_i \gamma^{-1} \psi_a \left( a^0_t \right)^{1-\eta} \right) 
\]

subject to:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma^y_{it} &= \Gamma^y_{it}(K_t, K_{t+1}, T_{it}, C_t, a^o_{t-1}) \quad \text{for } i \in \{L, H\} \\
\Gamma^o_{it+1} &= \Gamma^o_{it}(K_t, K_{t+1}, T_{it}, C_{t+1}, a^o_{t-1}) \quad \text{for } i \in \{L, H\} \\
K_{t+1} &= K_{t+1}(K_t, T_{Lt}, \{a^0_{it-1}, a^o_{it-2}\}_{i \in I}) \\
C_t + K_{t+1} &= F(K_t, 1) + (1 - \delta)K_t \\
a^o_{it+1} &= a^o_{it+1}(K_{t+1}, K_t, a^o_{it-1}, T_{it}) 
\end{align*}
\]

The first order conditions are:

**A.6 Derivation of Unconstrained First Best**

Define the unconstrained first-best allocation, \( x^* \equiv \arg \max_{x \in X} SW(x) \)

Let \( \{c^y_{it}, c^o_{it}\}_{i \in I, t \geq 0} \) be the sequence of consumption levels for the young and old associated with \( x^* \). Define the first best social welfare weights, \( \omega^y_{it} = \pi_i \lambda_i (c^y_{it})^{-\sigma_y} \) and \( \omega^o_{it} = \)
\[ \pi_t \lambda_t \beta_t (c^*_u)^{-\sigma_o}. \] At the unconstrained first-best allocation, \( \omega^*_L = \omega^*_H \) and \( \omega^*_L = \omega^*_H \) for all \( t \geq 0. \)

At the unconstrained first-best allocation, social welfare weights are equal across both types at all points in time. Intuitively, if we supposed that the Pareto weights for each type were equal, this would imply a perfectly equal allocation of consumption when young and consumption when old across the two household types.

Proof:

A.6.1 Proof of Lemma 3 (i)

The steady state equilibrium conditions when \( \tau_K = 0 \) are the following.

\[
\frac{1}{2} \sum T_i + \frac{1}{2} \sum T_o = rB \\
(\theta_L w(K_{ss}) - a_L - T_L - T_y)^{-\sigma_y} = \beta R(K_{ss})(\theta_L w(K_{ss}) - T_L - T_o + a_L R(K_{ss}))^{-\sigma_o} \\
(\theta_H w(K_{ss}) - a_H - T_H - T_y)^{-\sigma_y} = \beta R(K_{ss})(\theta_H w(K_{s}) - T_H - T_o + a_H R(K_{ss}))^{-\sigma_o} \\
K_{ss} + B = \frac{1}{2} a_L + a_H
\]

To keep \( T_H, T_H, \) and \( B \) constant, increasing \( T_o \) implies reducing \( T_y \) in order to satisfy the government budget constraint. In this case, the only way for the Euler equations to hold is for \( a_L \) and \( a_H \) to decline.

A.6.2 Proof of Lemma 3 (ii)

To keep \( T_L, T_H, T_y, T_o \) constant and increase \( B_t \ldots \)

[To be added]

A.7 Proof of Proposition 3

Proposition 3 states that when the steady state associated with \( \tau_{Kt} = 0, B_t = \bar{B} \) and \( T_{yt} = T_{ot} = 0 \) is dynamically efficient then the optimal policy implements a higher than first-best level of inequality. I first show that when the steady state is dynamically inefficient, the planner has all the tools necessary to implement first best. Then I show that when \( F_K(K) > \delta \), for sufficiently high \( \gamma \) the planner would never choose to increase debt or inter-generational transfers, and therefore the solution is identical to that in the previous section.
A.7.1 Proof that $x_i^* = x^*$ when $F_K(\bar{K}) + 1 - \delta < \frac{1}{\gamma}$

Characterize the first best allocation, $x^*$ I begin by finding $x^*$ and then proving that it is implementable as a non-binding equilibrium in this case. To find the first-best allocation, I solve the problem of benevolent social planner who discounts future generations at rate $\gamma$, and puts weight $\lambda_i$ on the utility of type-i households. The planner aims to choose the allocation that maximizes the discounted infinite sum of the utility of all generations $(X)$.

$$S(x) = \sum I \lambda_i \left( \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t \left( \frac{(c_i^y)^{1-\sigma_y}}{1-\sigma_y} \beta (c_{i+1}^o)^{1-\sigma_o} \left( c_i^o \right)^{1-\sigma_o} \right) + \beta \Phi_t \right) \right)$$ (A.6)

The unconstrained planner picks an allocation, $\{c_i^t\}$, $K_t$ that maximizes $S(x)$ subject only to the resource constraint $(X)$.

$$\sum I \lambda_i \left( \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t \left( c_i^y + c_i^o \right) + K_{t+1} \right) = (1 - \delta)K_t + F(K_t, 1)$$ (A.7)

Let $\Gamma_i^y$ be the share of the total consumption of the young at time t, $c_i^y$ consumed by type i households so that $c_i^y = \Gamma_i^y c_i^0$. Let $\Gamma_i^o$ be define analogously. Define $\Phi_i^y = \sum I \lambda_i (\Gamma_i^y)^{1-\sigma_y}$ and $\Phi_i^o = \sum I \lambda_i (\Gamma_i^o)^{1-\sigma_o}$. Then $(X)$ can be rewritten as

$$\frac{1}{4} \sum I \gamma^t \left( \Phi_i^y \left( c_i^y \right)^{1-\sigma_y} + \beta \Phi_{t+1} \left( c_{i+1}^o \right)^{1-\sigma_o} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \beta \Phi_{t+1} \left( c_i^o \right)^{1-\sigma_o}$$

The planner’s FOC with respect to $c_i^y$, $c_i^o$, and $K_{t+1}$ are

$$\gamma \frac{\phi_i^y}{\phi_i^o} (c_i^y)^{-\sigma_y} = \beta (c_i^o)^{-\sigma_o}$$ (A.8)

$$\frac{\phi_i^y}{\phi_{t+1}^o} (c_i^y)^{-\sigma_y} = \beta (c_{t+1}^o)^{-\sigma_o} (F_K(K_{t+1}, 1) + (1 - \delta))$$ (A.9)

$$\frac{1}{2}(c_i^y + c_i^o) + K_{t+1} = F(K_t, 1) + (1 - \delta)K_t$$ (A.10)

The planner’s first order condition with respect to $c_i^o$ is given by:

$$\beta \Phi_t (c_i^o)^{-\sigma_o} = \gamma \Phi_t (c_i^y)^{-\sigma_y}$$ (A.11)

The planner’s first order conditions with respect to $\Gamma_i^y$ and $\Gamma_i^o$ imply that the optimal
allocation satisfies (X)-(X).

\[ c_t^L = c_t^H \left( \frac{\lambda_L}{\lambda_H} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_y}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A.12)

\[ c_t^O = c_t^H \left( \frac{\lambda_L}{\lambda_H} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_o}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A.13)

Therefore, \( \Gamma_{iy}, \Gamma_{io}, \Phi_y, \) and \( \Phi_o \) are also constant, and an optimal steady state solution exists. Taking the steady state version of the above equations and combining them together shows that the optimal long-run capital stock corresponds to the well known ‘modified golden rule’ level.

\[ \frac{1}{\gamma} = F_{K}(K^*, 1) + 1 - \delta \]  \hspace{1cm} (A.14)

Equations (7)-(8) characterize the unconstrained planner’s first best allocation, \( x^* \). Because \( \bar{K} \geq K^* \), the economy with \( \tau_K = 0 \) and \( \lambda^m = \lambda^{m*} = \frac{\lambda_H}{\lambda_L} \) is currently over-investing in the long-run relative to the first best steady state level. Note that the optimal path of capital is monotonically converging to the steady state level.

To see this, suppose that \( K_t, K_{t+1} < K^* \), but that \( K_t > K_{t+1} \). Using equations (7) and (8) and the fact that \( F_{K_t} - \delta > 0 \) when \( K_t < K^* \) we see that \( c_t^0 < c_{t+1}^y \) and \( c_t^0 < c_{t+1}^o \) along the optimal path. This means that \( c_t = \frac{1}{2}(c_t^y + c_t^o) < c_{t+1} \). Using the resource constraint, this implies that \( F(K_{t+1}) + (1-\delta)K_{t+2} > F(K_t) + (1-\delta)K_t - K_{t+1} \). Because I’ve assumed \( K_t > K_{t+1} \) this implies \( K_{t+2} < K_{t+1} \). Applying this logic forward, this implies \( K_{t+j+1} > K_{t+j} \) for all \( j \), meaning \( K_t \) never increases, a contradiction.

**Show that \( x^* \) can be implemented.** To show that this allocation can be implemented as a non-binding equilibrium, one can simply (1) solve for a set of prices, assets, and tax instruments that implement it, and (2) show that these tax instruments do not violate the political constraint whenever \( \frac{1}{\gamma} < F_{K'}(K^*) + 1 - \delta \).

Take the first best allocation, \( x^* \). Set \( \tau_K = 0 \) and set \( w_t = F_L(K_t^*) \) and \( R_t = (F_{K^*}(K_{t+1}^* + 1-\delta)) \) for all \( t \). Note that we’ve assumed that \( B_{-1}, a_{L,-1}, a_{H,-1}, R_0 \) and \( K_0 \) are all exogenously given. Starting in period 0, use \( R_0 a_{t_0} \) along with \( w_0 = F_L(K_0) \) and \( c_{t_0}^y \) to solve for \( T_{L0} \) and \( T_{H0} \) as functions of \( T_{o0} \) using the budget constraint of the initial old for both types. Plugging these functions into the initial young’s budget constraint, along with \( w_0(K_0) \) and \( c_{t_0}^y \) gives you \( a_{L0} \) and \( a_{H0} \) as functions of both \( T_{o0} \) and \( T_{y0} \). Arbitrarily set \( B_t = 0 \) for all periods. Use the asset market clearing condition () to write \( T_{y0} \) as a function of \( T_{o0} \). Finally use the government’s budget - now in terms only of \( T_{o0} \) to solve for \( T_{o0} \). This in turn pins down \( a_{L0} \)
and \( a_{H0} \). Given these asset levels, the process above can be repeated in all periods.

To see that the implied \( T_{yt} \) and \( T_{ot} \) never violate the political constraint \( (\cdot) \) - i.e. that implementing \( x^\ast \) requires a policy in which \( T_y > T_o \) for all \( t \) - suppose that there existed at least one period, \( t' \) in which \( T_{yt'} < T_{ot'} \). Above I established that the planner’s optimal solution, \( K_t \) converges monotonically to the steady state level, \( K^\ast \). From Lemma 2, we know that given \( \tau K = 0 \) and \( \{T^h, T^\ell\} \) corresponding to \( \lambda^{m^\ast} \), \( K_{t+1}(T_{ot'}, K_t) > K_t \) because \( K_t < K_{ss}(T_{ot'}) \), the steady state capital level associated with \( \{T_{ot'}, T_{yt'}\} \). This violates monotonicity, which presents a contradiction.

Therefore, the optimal set of lump-sum taxes derived above will always satisfy the political constraint that \( T_{yt} \geq T_{ot} \).

A.8 Proof of Proposition 4

The model is identical to the one in Section 2 with \( \psi_a = 0 \) and \( \theta_i^o = 0 \) for both types, except for the households’ first order conditions are now:

\[
\begin{align*}
   f_t(\ell_i^o) &= u_c^y(c_i^o)(1 - \tau_i)\theta_i w \\
   u_c^y(c_i^o) &= \beta Ru(c_i^o)
\end{align*}
\]

Assuming generations are equally sized, the total change in social welfare:

\[
\sum I \lambda_i \pi_i \left( u_c^y(c_i^o) \left( d((1 - \tau_i)\ell_i^o\theta_i w) + dT - da_i^y \right) - f_t(\ell_i^h) \right) + \beta u_c^o(c_i^o) \left( Rda_i^y + dR_i^y \right)
\]

Expanding the first term and referring to \( \theta_i^y = \theta_i \) and \( \ell_i^y = \ell_i \):

\[
d((1 - \tau_i)\ell_i\theta_i w) = -\ell_i\theta_i w d\tau_i + \theta_i\ell_i(1 - \tau_i)dw + \theta_i w(1 - \tau_i)d\ell_i
\]

Expanding the \( dT \) term:

\[
dT = \tau_i L dw + \tau_i w dL + d\tau_i w L
\]

Define \( \omega_{ih} = \lambda_i \beta^{h-1} u_c^h(c_i^h) \), where \( \sum I \sum H \omega_{ih} = 1 \) and subbing in the labor supply condition and Euler equation, the total change becomes:

\[
dSW = \sum I \pi_i \omega_{iy} \left( L - \ell_i \theta_i \right) w d\tau_i + \sum I \pi_i \left( \omega_{iy}(\theta_i \ell_i (1 - \tau_i) dw) + \omega_i a_i^y dR \right) + \tau_i d(w L)
\]
Defining Θ as:

\[
\Theta = L^{-1} \sum_I \pi_i \omega_i \left( \theta_i \ell_i^h (1 - \tau) + a_i^{h-1} \frac{\partial R}{\partial w} \right)
\]

Let \( \omega_i = \omega_{iy} \). Recall that \( \omega_{ih+1}/\omega_{ih} = \beta u_c h^{h+1}(c_i^h)/u_c(c_i^h) = R \), so Θ becomes:

\[
\Theta = \sum_I \omega_i \pi_i \left( \theta_i \ell_i^h (1 - \tau) + \frac{Ra_i^y}{L} \frac{\partial R}{\partial w} \right)
\]

Because we’ve assumed that households only earn and save in the first period of life, the change in social welfare is:

\[
dSW = \sum_I \omega_i \left( L - \ell_i^h \theta_i \right) wd\tau + L\Theta dw + \tau d(wL)
\]

Using a similar procedure as in Appendix A.3, I can solve for the general equilibrium change in steady state capital.

I use the government’s budget constraint and the household’s intra-temporal condition at each age to write household labor as a function of labor, assets, capital, and tax policy, \( \ell_i(K, L, \tau, a_i^h) \).

\[
f\ell(\ell_i) = w(K, L)(1 - \tau) \theta_i u_c (\theta_i w(K, L) \ell_i (1 - \tau) + T(\tau) - a_i^y)
\]

The firms’ first order conditions now are:

\[
w = F_L(K, L)
\]
\[
R = F_K(K, L)
\]

The labor market clearing condition is:

\[
L = \sum_I \pi_i \ell_i(w(K(R), L), \tau, T(\tau), a_i^y)
\]

I use the household Euler equation and the firm’s first order conditions to write consumption at each age, \( c_i^h \) as a function of \( R \) and of permanent income, \( PI_i \), which is given by:

\[
PI_i = (1 - \tau) \theta_i w(K(R), L) \ell_i + T(\tau)
\]
The households’ budget constraints then allow me to write saving, \( a^y_i \), as a function of permanent income.

\[
a^y_i = (1 - \tau_i)\theta_i w(K(R), L)\ell_i + T(\tau_\ell wL) - c^y_i(R, PI_i)
\]

Using the the same procedure as in the fixed labor case, we can write the asset market clearing condition as a function of \( T, R, \) and \( L \).

\[
K(R, L) = \sum I \pi^y_i a^y_i(R, (1 - \tau_i)\theta_i w(K(R), L)\ell_i + T(\tau_\ell wL))
\]

Assume \( \pi_{ih} \) is constant across types and ages and taking the total derivative of the above gives:

\[
\frac{\partial K}{\partial R} dR + \frac{\partial K}{\partial L} dL = \sum I \pi^y_i \left[ \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial R} dR + \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial PI_i} (\frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial R} + \frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w}{\partial R}) dR + \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial PI_i} \frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w}{\partial L} dL + \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial PI_i} \frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial \tau_\ell} d\tau_\ell + \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial PI_i} \frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial \ell_i} d\ell_i \right]
\]

Define the average derivative of savings to the interest rate (including substitution, income, and permanent income effects) as:

\[
\frac{\partial A}{\partial R} = \sum I \pi^y_i \left( \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial R} + \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial PI_i} \frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial R} \right)
\]

Define the average derivative of savings to the aggregate wage level:

\[
\frac{\partial A}{\partial w} = \sum I \pi^y_i \left( \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial PI_i} \frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial w} + \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial PI_i} \frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial T} \frac{\partial T}{\partial w} \right)
\]

Collecting all the ‘dR’ terms together, and dividing through to solve for the general equilibrium change in \( dR \):

\[
dR = \left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} - \left[ \frac{\partial A}{\partial R} + \frac{\partial A}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w}{\partial K} \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} \right]^{-1} \left( \frac{\partial A}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w}{\partial L} - \frac{\partial K}{\partial L} \right) dL + \sum I \pi^y_i \left[ \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial PI_i} \frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial \tau_\ell} d\tau_\ell + \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial PI_i} \frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial \tau_\ell} d\tau_\ell + \frac{\partial a^y_i}{\partial PI_i} \frac{\partial PI_i}{\partial \ell_i} d\ell_i \right] \right)
\]

Simplifying the above:
\[
\left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} - \sum_{I,H} \left[ \frac{\partial A}{\partial R} + \frac{\partial A}{\partial w} \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} \right] \right)^{-1} \left( \left( \frac{\partial A}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w}{\partial L} - \frac{\partial K}{\partial L} \right) dL + \sum_{I} \frac{\partial a_{i}^{y}}{\partial P_{I_{i}}} \left( (wL - \theta_{i} \ell_{i} w) d\tau_{\ell} \right) + C \right) \\
C = \sum_{I} \pi_{iy} \left( \frac{\partial a_{i}^{y}}{\partial P_{I_{i}}} \left( (1 - \tau_{\ell}) w \theta_{i} d\ell_{i} + \tau_{\ell} w dL \right) \right)
\]

Note that:
\[
C = C + \frac{\partial A}{\partial P_{I_{i}}} w dL
\]

where \( C = \text{Cov} \left( \frac{\partial a_{i}^{y}}{\partial P_{I_{i}}}, (1 - \tau) w \theta_{i} d\ell_{i} \right) = \text{Cov} \left( \frac{\partial a_{i}^{y}}{\partial P_{I_{i}}}, (1 - \tau) w \theta_{i} d\ell_{i} \right) \), as \( \tau_{\ell} w dL \) does not vary over types.

Finally, to find \( dK \) multiply this term by \( \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} \):
\[
dK = \frac{\frac{\partial K}{\partial R} \left( \left( \frac{\partial A}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w}{\partial L} + \frac{\partial A}{\partial P_{I_{i}}} w - \frac{\partial K}{\partial L} \right) dL + \sum_{I} \frac{\partial a_{i}^{y}}{\partial P_{I_{i}}} \left( (wL - \theta_{i} \ell_{i} w) d\tau_{\ell} \right) + C \right)}{\left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} - \sum_{I} \left[ \frac{\partial A}{\partial R} + \frac{\partial A}{\partial w} \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} \right] \right)}
\]

Using the fact that \( A = K \), I multiply the numerator and denominator by \( \frac{A}{R} \). Define \( \Omega \) as in the text:
\[
\Omega = K_{R}(K_{R}(1 - A_{w}w_{K}) - A_{R})
\]

Then \( dK = \Omega \left( \left( \frac{\partial A}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w}{\partial L} - \frac{\partial K}{\partial L} \right) dL + \sum_{I} \frac{\partial a_{i}^{y}}{\partial P_{I_{i}}} \left( (wL - \theta_{i} \ell_{i} w) d\tau_{\ell} \right) + K C \right) \)

Using the definition of \( K_{PI} \):
\[
K_{PI} = \frac{\Omega}{K} \sum_{I} \frac{\partial a_{i}^{y}}{\partial P_{I_{i}}} \left( (wL - \theta_{i} \ell_{i} w) d\tau_{\ell} \right)
\]

and using the definition of \( \mathcal{L} \):
\[
\mathcal{L} = \Omega \frac{L}{K} \left( \frac{\partial A}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w}{\partial L} + \frac{\partial A}{\partial P_{I_{i}}} w - \frac{\partial K}{\partial L} \right)
\]
The total welfare effect is the direct effect plus:

$$\frac{dL}{L} \left( \tau L w + w (\Theta L + \tau L)w_L \right) + w(\tau L + L\Theta)w_K \frac{dK}{K}$$

$$= \frac{dL}{L} \left( \tau L w + w (\Theta L + \tau L)(w_L + w_L \mathcal{L}) \right) + w(\tau L + L\Theta)w_K(K_{PR} + C)$$

### A.9 Extension with large open economy

In this case, the asset market clearing condition is:

$$K = A + NFA$$

Taking the total derivative:

$$dK = dNFA + dA$$

Proceeding as in the baseline case, this is approximately equal to:

$$dR = \Delta_{NH} \frac{K}{R} \left( K_R(1 - A w_R) - A \frac{NFA}{K} - \frac{NFA}{K} NFA_R \right)$$

Finally, multiplying by $\frac{\partial K}{\partial R}$ gives the final expression.

$$dK = K_R \Delta_{NH} \left( K_R(1 - A w_R) - A \frac{NFA}{K} - \frac{NFA}{K} NFA_R \right)^{-1}$$

### A.10 Extension with H generations

The proof is identical to the $H = 2$ case except that total steady state assets, $A$ are now given by:

$$A = \sum_I \sum_H \pi_{ih} a^b_i$$

Finally, to find $dK$ multiply this term by $\frac{\partial K}{\partial R}$:

$$dK = \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} \left( \left( \frac{\partial A}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w}{\partial R} \right) \frac{\partial A}{\partial R} + \sum_{I,H} \frac{\partial a^b_i}{\partial R} \left( \sum_H (w L - \theta_{ih} \ell^b_i w) \frac{1}{R^{n-1}} d\tau \ell \right) + C \right)$$

$$\left( \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} - \sum_{I,H} \left[ \frac{\partial A}{\partial R} + \frac{\partial A}{\partial w} \frac{\partial K}{\partial R} \right] \right)$$
Using the fact that $A = K$, I multiply the numerator and denominator by $\frac{A}{R}$. Define $\Omega$ as in the text:

$$\Omega = K_R(K_R(1 - A_w w_K) - A_R)$$

Then $dK = \Omega \left( \left( \frac{\partial A \partial w}{\partial w \partial L} - \frac{\partial K}{\partial L} \right) dL + \sum_{I, H} \frac{\partial a_i^h}{\partial P_I} \left( \sum_H (wL - \theta_i h_i^L w) \frac{1}{R^{h-1}} d\tau \right) \right) + KC$.

Using the definition of $K_{PI}$:

$$K_{PI} = \Omega \left( \frac{\sum_{I, H} \partial a_i^h}{K} \left( \sum_H (wL - \theta_i h_i^L w) \frac{1}{R^{h-1}} d\tau \right) \right)$$

To take this to the data, I need an estimate of discounted permanent income for each quintile. Recall that a household’s permanent income is defined as the discounted weighted sum of their permanent income each period.

$$PI_{ij} = \sum_H \theta_i^h h_i^L w \frac{1}{R^h}$$

Therefore, the most straightforward approach is to choose an appropriate discount rate $R$, and to estimate $PI_{ij}$ as:

$$\hat{PI}_{ij} = \sum_H \hat{P}I_{hij} w \frac{1}{R^h}$$

Due to data limitations, I split the data into 6 equally sized age groups, each spanning 8 years. I use 1.03 as my annual discount rate. Therefore, the appropriate discount rate in the formula is given by the following expression.

$$R = \frac{1}{8} \sum_{k=1}^{8} (1.03)^k$$

A second approach assumes that $\theta_i^h h_i^L$ is approximately equal over the life-cycle. In this case, $PI_{ij} \approx w \theta_i h_i^L \sum_H \frac{1}{R^h}$. 

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A.11 Extension with balanced growth path.

First, divide the young type-i’s household budget constraint by the scaling factor, $Z_t$. Note I define $T_{it} = w_i L_t - w_i \theta_i \ell_{it}$

$$\frac{c_i^y}{Z_t} = \frac{\theta_i F_L(K_t)}{Z_t} + \frac{T_{it}}{Z_t} - \frac{a_i}{Z_t}$$

Doing the same for the type-i old households and plugging this expression into the household Euler equation gives you:

$$\left(\frac{\theta_i F_L(K_t)}{Z_t} + \frac{T_{it}}{Z_t} - \frac{a_i}{Z_t}\right)^{-\sigma_y} = \beta_i (F_K(K_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta) \left(\frac{a_it F_K(K_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta}{Z_{t+1}}\right)^{-\sigma_o}$$

Using the fact that $Z_{t+1} = (1 + g)Z_t$:

$$\left(\frac{\theta_i F_L(K_t)}{Z_t} + \frac{T_{it}}{Z_t} - \frac{a_i}{Z_t}\right)^{-\sigma_y} = \frac{\beta_i}{1 + g} (F_K(K_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta) \left(\frac{a_i F_K(K_{t+1}) + 1 - \delta}{Z_t}\right)^{-\sigma_o}$$

This implicitly defines $\frac{a_i}{Z_t}$ as a function of $\frac{T_{it}}{Z_t}$, $K_t$, and $K_{t+1}$.

$$\left(\theta_i (1 - \alpha) \frac{K_t^\alpha}{Z_t} + \frac{T_{it}}{Z_t} - \frac{a_i}{Z_t}\right)^{-\sigma_y} = \frac{\beta_i}{1 + g} \left(\frac{K_{t+1}^{\alpha-1}}{Z_{t+1}} + 1 - \delta\right)^{1-\sigma_o} \left(\frac{a_i}{Z_t}\right)^{-\sigma_o}$$

Take the asset market clearing condition and divide it by $Z_{t+1}$:

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{Z_{t+1}} = \frac{a_i T_{it}}{\tilde{Z}_t \tilde{K}_{r, t} \tilde{K}_{r, t+1}}$$

It’s therefore possible to define a balanced growth path and solve for $\frac{K}{Z}$. Take the BGP version of the asset market clearing condition:

$$\frac{K}{\tilde{Z}} = \frac{a_i}{\tilde{Z}} \left(\frac{K}{\tilde{Z}} \frac{T_{it}}{\tilde{Z}_{t+1}}\right)$$

Following the same steps as in the baseline model and take the total derivative of $\frac{K}{Z}$ with respect to $\frac{T}{Z}$. Defined all variables, $\tilde{x} \equiv \frac{x}{Z}$:

$$\dot{\tilde{x}}_{PI} = \frac{\tilde{K}_R}{K_R(1 - \tilde{A}_R \tilde{w}_K)} - \tilde{A}_R \sum_i \pi_i \frac{\partial \tilde{a}_i}{\partial PI_i} (\tilde{w} L - \tilde{w} \theta_i)$$

Note that the derivative $\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial PI_i} = \frac{\partial a_i}{\partial PI_i} \frac{Z}{Z}$, Note also that the elasticity of $x/Z$ with
respect to $y$ is \( \frac{\partial Z}{\partial y}(yZ/x) = x_y \). Finally, divide by $wL/Z$ to get an expression for $\hat{K}_{PL}$. Therefore, our expression for $\hat{K}_{PI}$ is identical to equation (14).

The firm’s first order condition is:

\[
F_K(K) = \alpha K^{-1/\rho}Y^{1/\rho} = r - \delta \\
\log(\alpha) + \frac{-1}{\rho}\log(K) + \frac{1}{\rho}(\log(Y)) = \log(r - \delta)
\]

Again assuming $\delta = 0$, the above implies $K_r = \frac{\partial \log(K)}{\partial \log(r)} = \rho \left( -1 + \frac{\partial \log(Y)}{\partial \log(K)} \right) = \rho - \left( \alpha \frac{L}{K} \right)$

The households’ first order conditions in terms of the new normalized variables are:

\[
f_{\ell}(\ell^y) = u_c^y(\tilde{c}^y)(1 - \tau_\ell)\theta_i w \\
u_c^y(\tilde{c}^y) = \beta Ru_c^o(\tilde{c}^o)
\]

Again, assuming generations are equally sized, the total change in social welfare:

\[
\sum_I \lambda^i \pi_i \left( u_c^y(\tilde{c}^h_i) \left( d((1 - \tau_\ell)\ell^h_i \theta_i \tilde{w} + d\tilde{T} - d\tilde{a}^h_i) - f_{\ell}(\ell^h_i)d\ell^h + \beta u_c^o(\tilde{c}^o) \left( R\tilde{a}^h_i + dR\tilde{a}^h_i \right) \right) + \sum_I \pi_i \omega_{ih}(\theta_i \ell_i (1 - \tau_\ell)\tilde{w} + \theta_i \tilde{w}(1 - \tau_\ell)\ell_i) \\
\right.
\]

Expanding the first term and referring to $\theta^y_i = \theta_i$ and $\ell^y_i = \ell_i$:

\[
d((1 - \tau_\ell)\ell_i \theta_i \tilde{w}) = -\ell_i \theta_i \tilde{w}d\tau_\ell + \theta_i \ell_i (1 - \tau_\ell)\tilde{w} + \theta_i \tilde{w}(1 - \tau_\ell)d\ell_i
\]

Expanding the $dT$ term:

\[
dT = \tau_\ell Ld\tilde{w} + \tau_\ell \tilde{w}dL + d\tau_\ell \tilde{w}L
\]

Define $\omega_{ih} = \lambda_i \beta^{h-1} u_c^h(\tilde{c}^h_i)$, where $\sum_I \sum_H \omega_{ih} = 1$ and subbing in the labor supply condition and Euler equation, the total change becomes:

\[
dSW = \sum_I \pi_i \omega_{iy} \left( L - \ell_i \theta_i \right) \tilde{w}d\tau_\ell + \sum_I \pi_i \left( \omega_{iy}(\theta_i \ell_i (1 - \tau_\ell)\tilde{w}) + \omega_{io} \tilde{a}^i dR \right) + \tau_\ell d(\tilde{w}L)
\]
Defining Θ as:

\[
θ = L^{-1} \sum_{i} \pi_{i} \omega_{ih} \left( \theta \ell_{i}^{h} (1 - \tau_{\ell}) + \tilde{a}_{i}^{h} \frac{\partial R}{\partial \tilde{w}} \right)
\]

Let \( \omega_{i} = \omega_{iy} \). Recall that \( \omega_{i+1}/\omega_{ih} = \beta u_{c}^{h+1}(\tilde{c}_{i}^{h+1})/u_{c}^{h}(\tilde{c}_{i}^{h}) = R \), so Θ becomes:

\[
θ = \sum_{i} \omega_{i} \pi_{i} \left( \theta \ell_{i} L (1 - \tau_{\ell}) + \frac{R \tilde{a}_{i}^{h} \partial R}{L \tilde{w}} \right)
\]

Because we’ve assumed that households only earn and save in the first period of life, the change in social welfare is:

\[
dSW = \sum_{i} \omega_{i} \left( L - \theta \ell_{i}^{h} \right) \bar{w} d\tau_{\ell} + L \tilde{\Theta} dw + \tilde{\tau}_{\ell} d(wL)
\]

Direct Effects

General Equilibrium Costs

Expanding the GE costs as before:

\[
dSW = \sum_{i} \omega_{i} \pi_{i} (\tilde{w} L - \tilde{w} \theta \ell_{i}) d\tau_{\ell} + wL (\tilde{\Theta} + \tilde{\tau}_{\ell}) w_{K} \pi_{i}
\]

Direct Effect of Redistribution

Direct Effect of NH Savings

Direct Effect of Labor Distortion

Feedback Effects

Therefore, the ratio of the two channels remains the same as in baseline case.

A.12 Isolating Non-Homothetic Savings Channel

To isolate the effects of the NH savings channel, I solve for the direct effect of the 1 percentage point increase in the average tax rate + the budget balancing transfer on each household type’s expected permanent income. I denote this change, \( \Delta PI_{i} \).

Households who are age \( h \), type-\( i \), and have drawn state \( s \), earn \( y_{hi}^{ij} = \ell_{ij}^{h} \theta_{ij}^{h} e_{j}^{w} \). They pay labor income taxes equal to \( \bar{\tau}_{\ell} \tau_{\ell}(y_{hi}) \) in labor income taxes, where \( \tau_{\ell}(y_{hi}) \) is defined following Bénabou (2002). Then if we hold \( y_{hi} \) constant at the original steady state level, a one percentage point change in \( \bar{\tau}_{\ell} \), \( d\bar{\tau}_{\ell} \) will increase type-\( i \) households expected lifetime tax
burden by:

\[ d\tau_{\ell i} = d\bar{\tau}_\ell \sum_H \sum_j \mu_j e_j \theta_i^h \ell_{ij} w * \tau_{\ell hi j}(e_j \theta_i^h \ell_{ij} w) \]

Here \( \mu_j \) is the probability of realizing state \( e_j \). Summing these changes together over all types and ages gives you the expected increase in the uniform transfer attributable to this change:

\[ dT = \sum_I \pi_{ih} d\tau_{\ell i} \], which each household receives each period.

Using the original steady state interest rate \( r \), the present value of this change is:

\[ \Delta PI_i = \sum_H \sum_j \mu_j y_{hi j} * \tau_{\ell hi j}(y_{hi j}) (1 + r)^h \]

Then to construct the hypothetical lump-sum taxes for each type, as stated in the text, the following two conditions must hold:

\[ \sum_H \frac{T_{ih}}{(1 + r)^h} = \Delta PI_i \]

\[ T_{ih} = \frac{T_{ih+1}}{1 + r} \] for all \( h \)