Redistribution policy: A European model

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Abstract

Following the rationale for regional redistribution programs described in the official documents of the European Union, this paper studies a simple multicountry model built around two regions: a core and a periphery. Technological spillovers link firms’ productivity within each of the two regions, and each country’s territory falls partly in the core and partly in the periphery, but the exact shares vary across countries. In line with the official view of the European Union, we find that the efficient regional allocation requires both national and international transfers. If migration is fully free across all borders, the optimal redistribution policy results from countries’ uncoordinated policies. However, if countries have the option of setting even imperfect border barriers, then efficiency is likely to require coordination on both barriers and international transfers (both of which will be set at positive levels). The need for coordination increases as the Union increases in size.

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1. Introduction

A central motivation for redistributive policy in the European Union (EU) is the concern with regional inequalities: disparities in income, unemployment and standards of living among regions often belonging to the same country. Article 158 of the Treaty of Amsterdam reads: “The Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the level of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favored regions or islands.” Two aspects deserve to be stressed: first, the discussion is explicitly in terms of “cohesion” or...
“solidarity”, recurring terms in EU rhetoric; second, the reference unit is the region, not the country. Especially when comparing European redistribution policy with its North American counterpart, it is important to emphasize that regional inequality cuts across national borders: it is the inequality between regions belonging to the core of Europe—the rich

Fig. 1. (a) Dark grey: EU regions eligible for Structural Funds under Objective 1 in 2000-06. Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/objective1/map_fr.htm (updated May 17, 2004). (b) The model. The outer circle is the EU; the lighter area the core, and the darker one the periphery.
regions clustered around Europe’s geographical center—and regions belonging to the periphery—the poorer regions around the Mediterranean Sea and at the Eastern and Northern border of the Union. Fig. 1(a) shows a map of the regions entitled to redistributive transfers in 2000-06 because of their economic backwardness, regions whose income per capita, with very few exceptions, was below 75% of the EU average in 1994-99. It is immediate that all these regions lie at the outer borders of the EU territory, a fact that was already true before enlargement.1

The analyses of redistributive policy developed for the U.S. and Canada stress the interaction between a federal government and a number of individual states with different endowments, but do not, as a rule, include an intermediate layer of regional inequality that overlaps state borders (for example, Boadway and Flatters, 1982; Inman, 1988; Inman and Rubinfeld, 1996; Wildasin, 1990, 1998). These are models where geographical location plays a role only because it correlates with particular natural endowments or because it subjects firms or individuals to a specific state policy. Not surprisingly, then, the rationale for redistributive policy that emerges abstracts from questions of industrial location and agglomeration effects. In Europe, on the other hand, redistribution programs are tied closely to the belief that geography matters greatly—and not so much because of natural endowments, but because population density and the concentration of economic activity differ between the core and the periphery of Europe, and because agglomeration externalities benefit firms located close to other firms and to thick markets. The main arguments and the evidence in their support have been described elsewhere (see, for example, Puga, 2001; Overman and Puga, 2002; Quah, 1996). Here, we want to emphasize how much this view inspires official EU policy. The Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (European Commission, 2001a) reads for example: “Economic location is characterized by important externalities” [...], (and) “the emerging picture is one of very high concentration of activities in central regions, which account for only 14 percent of the land area, but a third of the population and almost half (47%) of the GDP. [...] In all but 11 of the 88 central regions GDP per head in 1998 was above the EU average, while all but 23 of the 111 peripheral regions had a level below the average. [...] Productivity in the central regions was 2.4 times higher than in the peripheral ones” (pp. 29–30).2

The goal of this paper is to tell an extremely stylized but not implausible story that captures this view, and evaluate the redistribution policy, if any, that derives logically from the approach. We find that, in line with official statements by EU bodies, economic efficiency in our model does indeed entail redistribution, both within a country and, if countries differ in their distance from the core, across countries. Whether or not these transfers translate into the need for a centralized policy is a more delicate issue. The crucial question is the ease of migration. If free migration holds everywhere, decentralized national policies will be

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1 EU redistribution policy is enacted through the Structural Funds and organized around three main objectives. Objective 1 is the development of the poorest regions (70% of total transfers in 2000); objective 2 is contributions to regions in “structural difficulties”, for example, declining rural areas (11% of total transfers in 2000); objective 3 (12%) is human capital development. The remaining funds are used to support the common fisheries policy. The figure shows regions supported through objective 1.

2 The EU belief in the importance of geography has given rise to the formal adoption of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) in May 1999 emphasizing “spatial development policy as a new dimension of European policy” (European Commission, 2001b).
efficient: because of migration, individuals must enjoy equal utility in all locations, and national policies will perfectly internalize all externalities abroad. As long as (positive) regional and international transfers are among the policy tools under countries’ control, the coordinating actions of a central agency are not required. This is a well-known result, first made clear by Myers (1990), and it holds in the model studied in this paper.3

However, migration policy is also de facto among a country’s policy tools: even within the post-Maastricht EU, free labor movement is far from reality, hampered by official issues of certification and very real concerns about domestic labor forces. In the present enlarged EU, free mobility is not envisioned in the short term. If the countries’ disparity in incomes, herein geography, is large enough, at least some of these countries would prefer to impose barriers to migration, but if they do so, the barriers will prevent them from internalizing perfectly the effects of their policies abroad and the distribution of workers both across countries and between core and periphery will be inefficient. Achieving efficiency then does indeed demand coordination: preventing these countries’ unilateral migration policy requires compensating them, and the necessary utility differentials can only be achieved if migration is in fact constrained; but, at the same time, the geographical distribution of economic activity can be set at its efficient level by a central agency choosing the correct flow of international transfers. Once we recognize that border control decisions are endogenous, the approach applied in the literature to questions of political secessions becomes useful, and the scope for redistribution highlighted for example by Bolton and Roland (1997) or Le Breton and Weber (2001) appears in the analysis. Redistributive transfers then play two roles: they influence directly the allocation of resources, but they also affect it indirectly by preventing costly unilateral actions. The conclusion by Boldrin and Canova (2001) that “regional policies serve mostly a redistributional purpose, motivated by the nature of the political equilibria upon which the European Union is built” (p.210), fits our interpretation, but loses its somewhat sinister tone.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and characterizes the efficient allocation; Section 3 studies optimal national policies; Section 4 analyzes the effects of enlarging the set of countries, and Section 5 concludes. The Appendix contains some of the proofs.

2. The model

We begin by describing the simple logic of the model, loosely inspired by Ciccone and Hall (1996). Imagine Europe as a circle, composed of different countries, each a slice of equal size. The contribution of the model is to introduce “the region” as a third level of analysis: there are two regions, a central one, the core, the lighter area in Fig. 1(b), and an external one, the periphery, the shaded outer band in the figure. Each country’s territory comprises areas from both regions, but the exact shares differ across countries—this is why the smaller circle representing the core is off-center in the figure. This is the only source of heterogeneity between countries in the model.

3 Extensions or qualifications to the original results can be found in Mansoorian and Myers (1993), Wellish (1994), and Hindriks and Myles (2001).
The regions play a role because labor productivity depends on agglomeration effects which are active at the regional level. Production technology exhibits constant returns to scale at the firm level but labor productivity, taken as given by the individual firms, depends in fact on the density of employed workers in the region. What matters here is whether a firm is located in the core or in the periphery, and not the existence of national borders: all firms in the core share the same productivity, as do all firms in the periphery, independently of their national identity; whereas firms in the same country but in different regions may face different productivity if the density of workers in the two regions differs. Ex ante, the only distinguishing factor between the two regions is size: in all countries, the area belonging to the core is smaller than the area belonging to the periphery.

Individuals’ mobility is free within each country and across all countries, unless barriers to migration are explicitly put in place. The tendency towards agglomeration is checked, in part, by congestion costs that capture the difficulty of living in very crowded environments—they are a shorthand for the increased cost and reduced availability of housing and for congested local public goods. Congestion costs are local and increase with the density of inhabitants in the specific national subregion: they can differ both across regions in the same country and across countries in the same region.

A few remarks may help the interpretation of the model. First, notice that the border between core and periphery is exogenous. Location choices and differences in regional densities will be determined in equilibrium, but the existence of two separate regions with no productivity spillovers across them is posited. As in the simplest economic geography models (Krugman, 1991, for example), the two regions represent two alternative and well-defined location possibilities, each characterized by local externalities. The assumption mirrors the importance that EU documents attribute to exogenous geographical factors: in Fig. 1(b), the border could be interpreted as a mountain range (the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Baltics, the Carpathians) and a sea (the North Sea, the Baltic Sea). Second, while productivity spillovers extend to the whole region, congestion costs are local. If we interpret congestion costs as either housing costs or congested public goods—the preferred readings of congestion from the EU documents—both the regional and the national dimension matter. There is no good reason to impose, for example, equal housing costs in all core cities or equal enjoyment from locally provided public goods, if the local densities of inhabitants differ. At the same time, firms are said to be able to operate at a larger scale, benefiting from high density of economic activity in the region as a whole and, in particular, ignoring national borders. Finally, the population is homogenous everywhere. The lack of emphasis on human capital differences, whether across regions or across countries, is in line with the European debate, where such a difference, if it exists at all, is not seen as large. Indeed, the comparable human capital of workers in the accession countries is considered one of the most important facilitating aspects of enlargement of the Union.

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4 In Krugman (1991), the barrier between the two regions is given by transport costs, which induce aggregate increasing returns at the regional level through the location of manufacturing demand, i.e., of workers. A different modeling approach could specify not a fixed border between regions, but a radius such that each firm’s productivity is affected by labor density within the radius, on a featureless plain. The model may be worth pursuing, but is more complex and probably goes too far in ignoring physical geographical barriers.
2.1. A single country

Consider first the simplest case—a single country in isolation. Its total area is normalized to 1, of which a share \( a_c \) (smaller than 1/2) belongs to the core, while the complementary share \( a_p = 1 - a_c \) belongs to the periphery. Call \( n_r, r = \{c, p\} \), the density of workers in region \( r \), or \( n_r = N_r / a_r \) where \( N_r \) is total labor living and working in the region. The total population, \( N_c + N_p \) equals 1. Labor markets are flexible and workers are paid their marginal product, which in region \( r \) equals \( f(n_r) \), where \( f \) is an increasing function of \( n_r \). A worker in region \( r \) has utility \( h(n_r) \) equal to his “net income”, or his wage net of congestion costs: \( h(n_r) = f(n_r) - c(n_r) \), where the function \( c \) is increasing and convex in \( n_r \).

To illustrate the workings of the model with an example, we will posit specific functional forms: \( f(n_r) = n_r \) and \( c(n_r) = 1/(2\gamma)[\max(0,n_r-C_0\gamma)] \) (congestion costs are negligible until density reaches a given threshold, and rise steeply then), where \( \gamma = (\gamma_1, \gamma_2) \) and \( \gamma > 1 \).

In the decentralized equilibrium, workers locate themselves in the two regions so as to equate their net incomes, if both regions are inhabited, or concentrate in one of the two. Taking into account \( n_p = (1-a_c n_c) / a_p \) denote by \( h_p(n_c) = h(n_p) \), the net income of a worker in the periphery, as function of the density in the core. Given \( a_c < 1/2 \), \( h_p(n_c) \) is everywhere decreasing in \( n_c \), while \( h(n_c) \), the net income of a core worker, must be increasing in \( n_c \) for all \( n_c \leq 2 \) but will have an interior maximum at some \( n_c^* > 2 \) if congestion costs are sufficiently convex, that is, if \( \gamma \) is large enough. With \( \gamma \) in the appropriate boundaries (derived explicitly in the Appendix), the two functions have the shapes drawn in Fig. 2(a), from which the equilibria can be easily read. There are three equilibria: the interior symmetrical equilibrium with \( n_p = n_c = 1 \), equal productivity and equal congestion costs in both regions, and the two equilibria with full concentration in either one of the two regions. Note that the symmetrical equilibrium is always dominated by complete concentration in the periphery.

Individuals making their location choice neglect their individual contribution to a region’s productivity and congestion, and, in general, the decentralized equilibrium will not be optimal. Consider then the problem of a policymaker, directly choosing the allocation of workers between the two regions. The policymaker maximizes \( H = N_c h(n_c) + N_p h(n_p) \)—with given total population and free mobility across regions, maximizing aggregate net income or per capita income is equivalent. Notice that, in all equilibria of the decentralized problem, either \( h(n_c) = H(n_c) \) or \( h_p(n_c) = H(n_c) \). Thus, we can deduce immediately from Fig. 2(a) that the symmetrical allocation cannot be a global maximum—as mentioned above, it is always dominated by complete concentration in the periphery (\( h(1) = 1 < h_p(0) \)). Congestion costs are not differentiable at \( n_p = n_c = 1 \), but given that this point can be ruled
out, we can use standard calculus to characterize the optimal partition of workers, taking into account the two different cases $n_c<1$ and $n_c>1$. It is not difficult to establish that there cannot be an interior maximum for $n_c<1$, but the conclusion changes for $n_c>1$: if congestion costs are sufficiently convex, an interior maximum exists at $n_c^*=2/(1/\alpha_c)$, and the function $H(n_c)$ has the shape depicted in Fig. 2(b). As shown in the Appendix, two further observations can be added: first, if the maximum is interior, it must be unique. Second, if it is interior, it cannot be an equilibrium of the decentralized problem.

The conclusion is immediate. We know from Fig. 2(a) that net income in the core is higher than net income in the periphery for all $n_c>1$. To support the global optimum and prevent further migration to the core, the policymaker will need to use redistributive tools: transfers must take place from the core to the periphery.\(^8\)

The important variable at the center of the model is the share of the country’s area belonging to the core. The smaller is such a share, the higher is the density in the core. We know from Fig. 2(a) that net income in the core is higher than net income in the periphery for all $n_c>1$. To support the global optimum and prevent further migration to the core, the policymaker will need to use redistributive tools: transfers must take place from the core to the periphery.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) When the global maximum is interior, the correct taxes and transfers can be derived from the first-order conditions of the central planner problem. As expected, they must correspond to the impact of the individual mover on inframarginal individuals, in both locations. Note that the story is static, and the subsidies to the periphery have the sole scope of reducing internal migration flows and limiting congestion in the core. Richer stories could be told—where the subsidies take the form of public investment aimed at improving future productivity—but it is not clear that the simple static model is really off the mark. In Italy, for example, convincing readings of the redistribution policy towards the South see it linked, in large part, to the need to contain social tensions in Northern industrial cities, after the large internal migration flows of the 50s and 60s.
decentralized equilibrium with full concentration in the core. If such concentration is suboptimal, net income is lower the smaller the core area. In addition, the size of the core area influences the optimal distribution of workers between the two regions: if the global optimum is interior, the larger the core area, the higher the optimal concentration in the core. The intuition is straightforward: as the core area increases, maintaining the same optimum is interior, the larger the core area, the higher the optimal concentration in the core.

The goal of this section is to investigate whether, in line with official European motivations for regional transfers, the optimal allocation in this model requires international transfers. However, before addressing this question directly, we need to evaluate the equilibria without policy intervention. Consider the decentralized equilibria in the two countries when migration is free. There are equilibria where one country becomes empty, but we will ignore them here and focus instead on distributions of workers such that both countries are inhabited. With equal productivity and equal wages in the two core areas (and similarly in the two periphery areas), regardless of national borders, workers will migrate so as to equate congestion costs within each region. If both regions are inhabited, then the mean of the core shares (and similarly when workers must have \(1c = \frac{n_{1c}}{n_{2c}} \), \(r = \{c, p\}\). If instead, the equilibrium is a corner solution and workers concentrate in one region, following the same reasoning we know that the region must be the same in both countries (or workers will move, within the same region, to the less-congested country). Thus, if all workers concentrate in the core (periphery), we must have \(n_{1c} = n_{2c} = n_{c} \), \(n_{1p} = n_{2p} = n_{p} \). When all workers concentrate in the core and the density is equalized across countries, then we also know that such a density must equal \(1/\overline{x}_c = (x_{1c} + x_{2c})/2\), the mean of the core shares (and similarly when workers

\[ n^*_{1c} \] solves: \( 4\gamma/x_{pc} = (n^*_{1c} - 1)^{1-\gamma} n^*_{1c}(1+\gamma) - 1 \). Totally differentiating this first-order condition yields \( d n^*_{1c}/dx_{pc} > 0 \).

More precisely, this need only be true in the region where density is larger than 1. In the other, congestion costs are 0, and the distribution of workers—which does not affect productivity—is irrelevant. It follows that per capita income is independent of the distribution of workers in the region across the two countries as long as their density is smaller than 1, and, in studying it, we can focus on \(n_{1r} = n_{2r}, r = \{c, p\}\) without loss of generality.

9 The optimal allocation \(n^*_{1c}\) solves: \(4\gamma/x_{pc} = (n^*_{1c} - 1)^{1-\gamma} n^*_{1c}(1+\gamma) - 1\). Totally differentiating this first-order condition yields \(dn^*_{1c}/dx_{pc} > 0\).
concentrate in the periphery). Because densities must be equalized across countries, we can study the possible equilibria with the help of a figure that is almost identical to Fig. 2(a), taking into account $n_c = a_c P / C_1^b$ and $n_p = a_p P / C_0 a_c P / C_1^b$. For the larger core country 1, this is Fig. 3(a), where the thin line corresponds to the autarky case analyzed in the previous section.11

We can conclude that, once again, there are only three candidate equilibria: an interior equilibrium at $n_c = n_p = 1$, a corner solution at $(n_c = 0, n_p = 1/a_c)$, and a second corner solution with full concentration in the core: $n_c = 1/a_c, n_p = 0$.12 Before analyzing the implications of these equilibria, notice that everything we have said carries over identically to the case of more than two countries: in all equilibria with free migration, the densities of workers must be equalized across countries, and in equilibrium they will either equal 1 everywhere or, if congestion costs are not too convex, equal 0 in one region and the inverse of the average region share in the Union in the other.

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11 For the smaller core country 2, the function $h_p(n_c)$ tilts up, as opposed to tilting down, and the upper boundary of admissible $n_c$ values $(1/a_c)$ falls, as opposed to increasing.

12 The equilibrium with full concentration in the core exists if the convexity of the congestion costs is in the appropriate range. The characterization of the appropriate bounds on $\gamma$ in the Appendix generalizes to the case of multiple countries. To ensure that the required conditions are satisfied for all countries in the analysis, we assume in what follows $\gamma \in \{\gamma(x_c), \gamma(x_p)\}$, using the notation in the Appendix, where country 1 ($n$) has the largest (smallest) core share (both bounds are increasing in $x_c$). Core shares must be such that the interval is not empty.
From these conclusions, we can immediately predict migration flows, although they will depend on which of the three equilibria emerges. Focus on the case of full concentration in the core. Then, if $n_c = 1/\bar{x}_c \forall i$, it follows immediately that $N_{ic} = N_i = x_{ic}/\bar{x}_c$, or $N_i > 1 \Rightarrow x_{ic} > \bar{x}_c$: countries with core regions larger than the mean will be migration recipients, and countries with core regions smaller than the mean will be migration sources.\(^\text{13}\) Starting from full concentration in the core, immigration reduces per capita net income because it increases an already too high density (while emigration does the opposite), and countries that are targets of immigration will be tempted to close their borders to incoming flows of workers. Once we introduce explicit policies, however, simply closing the borders will not be an equilibrium: both countries will consider the full range of available policy tools, including internal redistribution between core and periphery workers, migration barriers and international aid. We leave the analysis of these cases to the next section.

It is tempting to compare the results above to the single country case analyzed earlier, and in particular to rank welfare, here per capita income. However, notice that in moving to the multiple countries case, we have not only freed migration across counties but also assumed that countries’ regional productivities are subject to spillovers from abroad. It is not clear that this latter feature is under a country’s control—most probably it is not—and, in this paper, we take these spillovers as part of the exogenous technological environment. Thus, the comparison to the single-country analysis above cannot be interpreted as a comparison between integration and autarky.

Consider now the global optimum in the two-country example. The first observation is that the density of workers cannot be larger than 1 in one national core (or periphery), while being smaller than 1 in the other: with equal productivity, independently of national borders, and convex congestion costs, optimal regional densities must be equalized. If the optimum has high concentration in the core, then $n_{1c}^* = n_{2c}^* = n_c^*$. The statement requires convex costs, and thus does not apply to the international distribution of workers in the periphery if their densities are below 1. Nevertheless, as long as densities in the peripheries are below 1, we can select any arbitrary distribution of workers there without affecting per capita income or the characterization of the optimal density in the core. In particular, we can set $n_{1p}^* = n_{2p}^* = n_p^*$.\(^\text{14}\)

With densities equalized across countries, we can once again exploit the single country analysis, again taking into account $n_c \in [0, 1/\bar{x}_c]$ and $n_p = 1/\bar{x}_p - (\bar{x}_c/\bar{x}_p) n_c$. With $H_1(n_c)$ and $H_2(n_c)$ both having an interior maximum at high but not complete concentration in the core, the global optimum will also be an interior solution. Fig. 3(b) depicts the result, where the two thin lines correspond to the two single country cases, with different core shares. Notice, trivially, that both countries are guaranteed higher per capita income in the

\(^{13}\) The direction of migration depends on the assumption of identical population size in the status quo, prior to any population movement. Stating results in terms of countries’ relative equilibrium populations would be more robust, but also more cumbersome.

\(^{14}\) The observation, already made in the decentralized equilibrium, was finally irrelevant there because it only applies to interior equilibria, and even then not to the symmetrical one. If the global optimum is interior, on the other hand, selecting the symmetrical allocation will affect migration flows and international transfers. We will discuss the matter further below.
global optimum than in the decentralized equilibrium: migration ensures that income must be equalized everywhere and the global optimum maximizes it by definition.

If the global optimum is interior, then it is associated with internal redistribution, and, if \( n_{1p} = n_{2p} \), this must be true in each country. But is international redistribution always a feature of the global optimum? The answer is closely tied to migration flows. If \( n_{1p} = n_{2p} \), we can establish two results:

1. There must be migration into the large core country;
2. There must be international redistribution in favor of the small core country.

To see why (1) must hold, notice if densities are equalized, then
\[
N_{1c} = \left( \frac{a_{1c}}{a_{2c}} \right) N_{2c}
\]
and
\[
N_{1p} = \left( \frac{a_{1p}}{a_{2p}} \right) N_{2p}.
\]
By substitution, we can then verify immediately that \( N_{1c} + N_{1p} \leq N_{2c} + N_{2p} \Leftrightarrow n_c \leq n_p \), a condition that cannot be satisfied if the global optimum is interior. Establishing (2) is simpler still: if densities are equalized, the number of workers in the core region is higher in the large core county, and vice versa for periphery workers. However, salaries and congestion costs are equalized across core regions (and periphery regions). Thus, per capita transfers paid by core workers and received by periphery workers must be equalized. It follows that the total flow of transfers paid by the core region in country 1 must be higher than in country 2, while the total flow received in the periphery of country 1 must be smaller than for the periphery of country 2—some of the funds must be crossing borders.

These results generalize easily to the case of multiple countries. We can state:

**Proposition 1.** Consider a world with \( n \) countries and free migration. In the global optimum, \( n_{i\ast\ast} = n_{c\ast\ast} = (1, 1/\bar{a}_c) \) \( \forall i \), and the optimal allocation \( n_{i\ast\ast} \) and per capita income \( h(n_{i\ast\ast}) = h_p(n_{i\ast\ast}) \) depend only on the mean core share \( \bar{a}_c \). In addition, if \( n_{ip} = n_{p} \) \( \forall i \), then in the global optimum: (i) All countries with core shares larger than the mean are migration recipients; and all countries with core shares smaller than the mean are migration sources; (ii) All countries with core shares larger than the mean are net disbursers of international transfers, and all countries with core shares smaller than the mean are net recipients. (The proof is in the Appendix).

We can think of the mean core share \( \bar{a}_c \) as summarizing all that matters in the model: it defines optimal regional allocations and income per capita in all countries and, in the symmetrical equilibrium, determines whether individual countries are sources or targets of migration and transfers. It is a simple result that makes the model particularly easy to extend to multiple countries and constitutes one of its strong points. If we look beyond the symmetrical equilibrium and \( n_{ip} \neq n_{jp} \) for some \( i, j \), the prediction is less clean because the total population in each country is not pinned down—any international distribution of periphery workers such that \( n_{ip} < 1 \) \( \forall i \) is compatible with the optimum. As mentioned earlier, asymmetric distributions would not change \( n_{i\ast} \), or per capita income, but would change population sizes and transfer flows. These asymmetric equilibria arise from the absence of congestion costs when densities are smaller than 1—a special but not unrealistic assumption—and deserve a brief discussion because they will be useful reference points in the next section. Migration flows and international transfers are substitutes in this model. In the symmetrical
equilibrium studied above, per capita incomes are equalized when some transfers flow from the larger to the smaller core countries; in the absence of these transfers, further migration would take place into the peripheries of the larger core countries, until all taxes collected on core residents are transferred to each country’s own periphery. Notice that the global optimum characterizes \( n_c^* \) uniquely—hence, the additional migration can only be to the peripheries of countries with larger than average core areas. Similarly, the global optimum can be implemented with an allocation that requires no migration, but larger international transfers - again the only difference is the density of periphery workers; with fewer periphery workers in countries that were migration targets, a larger share of taxes collected on core workers goes abroad.\(^{15}\)

3. Optimal national policies

Having established the features of the optimal policy in this setting, we can now ask a question that is central to the actual working of redistribution policy in the European Union. The optimal policy requires international transfers—does it require a central agency, or would it emerge even without coordination, from the decentralized interactions of the individual countries? On one hand, it is clear that the technological spillovers create important externalities among countries - if effects abroad are ignored, national choices of internal transfers, and thus of regional densities, will be sub-optimal. However, if migration is free, as we have assumed so far, national policy makers should take into account the effect of their policies on migration flows, or, equivalently, on per capita in comes abroad: free migration provides the channel through which the international impacts of national policies are internalized. The observation, originally due to Myers (1990), applies here and is the logical starting point of our analysis of optimal national policies:

**Proposition 2. (Myers, 1990).** Suppose migration is free. Each country chooses the density of its citizens in its two regions, and is free to distribute (nonnegative) transfers abroad. Then, the decentralized equilibrium replicates the global optimum. (The proof is in the Appendix).

\(^{15}\) (1) Call per capita taxes collected in the cores \( t_c \) and per capita transfers in the peripheries \( t_p \) (note that they must be equal everywhere). Aggregate balance requires: \( t_c \sum_{i} N_{ic} = t_p \sum_{i} N_{ip} \). In the absence of international transfers, \( t_c N_{ic} = t_p N_{ip} \). Simple manipulation shows that the two conditions yield: \( N_{ic} + N_{ip} = \frac{\alpha_{ic}}{\alpha_{c}} \). If \( n_c = n_c^* > 1 \) and the corresponding densities in the peripheries are everywhere smaller than 1, the global optimum can be implemented with no international transfers. But only if it is accompanied by increased migration than in the symmetrical equilibrium: if \( n_p = n_p \forall i \), then \( N_{ic} + N_{ip} = \frac{\alpha_{ic}}{\alpha_{c}} \), which implies smaller migration flows. (2) Similarly, the global optimum can be implemented with an allocation that requires no migration, but larger international transfers. In the absence of migration, each country’s population equals 1, and with \( n_c^* > 1 \) everywhere, \( N_{ip} = 1 - N_{ic} < 1 - \alpha_{ic} = \alpha_{p} \), or \( n_p < 1 \) everywhere, as required. The difference is in the periphery population, which now equals \( 1 - \alpha_{ic} n_c^* \), as opposed to \( 1 - \frac{\alpha_{ic}}{\alpha_{c}} n_c^* \) in the symmetrical equilibrium. With equal taxes collected in the core, funds transferred abroad (received from abroad) are larger if the core share is larger than the mean (smaller than the mean).
Proposition 2 leads to two further observations. First, and most obviously, the optimality of the decentralized policy equilibrium will not follow in the presence of exogenous migration costs. This model has the advantage of making the reason quite clear: the problem is not the insufficient migration flow per se – after all there exists here a global optimum with no migration – but the fact that migration costs limit the extent to which the consequences abroad of national policies are internalized. In this case, the need for a central agency and a centralized policy is immediate, although it can be argued that its first mandate should be the elimination of migration costs, as opposed to redistribution policy. The policy point is not new, but is important: facilitating migration would be a more direct route to higher global welfare than a program of international transfers. The second observation is slightly more subtle and clarifies why migration flows should be the object of treaties and coordinated policy in most circumstances. The fact that free migration would lead countries to replicate the global optimum does not imply that it is individually optimal for each of them. If migration barriers are a policy tool under the control of countries’ policymakers, then the analysis of optimal national policies should allow for countries choosing whether or not to set-up border barriers. If indeed we find that a country would prefer to deviate from the free migration equilibrium and close its borders to foreign workers, then reestablishing the global optimum would require the presence of a coordinated policy including transfers in the country’s favor. However, here we face a contradiction: differences in incomes cannot be sustained without some obstacle to migration. We reach the conclusion that some barriers to migration might be optimally preserved but would need to be set in a coordinated manner and accompanied by correct complementary policies.

To clarify this second point, proceed by stages, assuming the absence of exogenous migration costs. Consider the temptation to deviate unilaterally from the global optimum—the free migration equilibrium—by closing borders. More precisely, think of the decision problem as a two-stage game. In the first stage, countries simultaneously decide whether or not to close their borders to migration flows; in the second stage, given migration policy decisions, countries choose their regional densities.

16 In more standard models, this point is seen most clearly when countries are identical and the equilibrium is symmetrical. Then both the global optimum and the decentralized equilibrium induce no migration, but whether they lead to the same allocation of resources still depends on the absence of migration costs. It should be added that the presence of migration costs changes the optimum allocation too. However, barring prohibitive costs to both internal and external migration—in which case there is no allocative problem – the suboptimality of the decentralized equilibrium will hold in general for the reason discussed in the text.

17 Rodrik (2002) argues that a scheme of multilaterally negotiated visa for developing countries’ workers would “likely create income gains that are larger than all the items on the WTO negotiating agenda taken together”.

18 In the discussion that follows, the cost of establishing migration barriers is ignored. If the cost is fixed, the analysis continues to hold with little modification, with a country choosing to impose barriers if the gains from doing so, net of cost, are sufficiently high. A much larger, and interesting, departure would be to consider alternative means of regulating migration (see for example Myers and Papageorgiou (2002), and their proposal of a system of immigration tolls and emigration subsidies).
or, equivalently, their internal and external transfers. We want to ask whether free migration is an equilibrium. A country (or group of countries acting jointly) deviating and setting up border barriers anticipates the optimal transfer policy of the other countries in stage 2, but takes as given their border policy. Notice that given Proposition 2, we can think of a set of countries among which migration is free as choosing their regional densities so as to maximize jointly their total income. In addition, because the optimal allocation among any set of countries does not depend on the individual core share of each country in the set, but only on the average core share of the set (by an immediate extension of Proposition 1), we can always study the temptation for unilateral deviation as a two country problem, the candidate for deviation, country \( i \), and the rest of the world, \(-i\).

Call \( \bar{x}_{-ic} \) the mean core share in the rest of the world, i.e., excluding country \( i \). The first immediate observation is that, if all countries were identical, there would be no incentive to deviate. The problem is analogous to that of two identical countries choosing between the global optimum and a Nash equilibrium with closed borders. In both cases, incomes per capita are equalized everywhere, and, by definition, they are maximized in the global optimum: setting up migration barriers can only lead to lower welfare. But matters change when countries differ. We can show:

**Lemma 1.** If the global optimum is interior, there exists a threshold \( \sigma \in (0,1) \) such that if \( \bar{x}_{-ic}/\bar{x}_{ic} \leq \sigma \), country \( i \) prefers to close its borders.

**Proof.** To see why this is the case, consider the limiting case, where \( \bar{x}_{-ic} = 0 \). When country \( i \) closes its borders, there are no international transfers or migration between \( i \) and \(-i\), \( n_{-ip} = 1 \) (because \( \bar{x}_{-ic} = 0 \)), and \( n_{ic}^{*} \) is set so as to maximize country \( i \)'s income. When borders are open, on the other hand, spillovers are taken into account: if the global maximum is interior, \( n_{ic}^{**} \) must be larger than 1, but it is different, and smaller than \( n_{ic}^{*} \) (because productivity in the periphery, the only relevant objective in the rest of the world, is strictly decreasing in the density of workers in \( i \)'s core). In addition, at \( n_{c}^{**} > 1 \) income in the periphery must be strictly smaller than income in the core (because it is equal at \( n_{c} = 1 \) and strictly decreasing in \( n_{c} \) for all \( n_{c} \geq 1 \)) and transfers must be flowing from the core to the periphery and hence, as long as there is any population left abroad, from country \( i \) to the rest of the world. Comparing country \( i \)'s welfare with closed borders and in the global optimum is particularly easy when the global optimum is implemented with no migration. In this case, \( n_{-ip} = 1 \) by necessity; the only two differences are the out-flowing transfers and the smaller core density at \( n_{c}^{**} \). Because the allocation of workers abroad is

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19 We can think of migration policy decisions as a coalitional problem. All such decisions are made simultaneously and the equilibrium concept we use is Strong Nash Equilibrium: free migration is an equilibrium if no country, or group of country, has an incentive to set up barriers, given the absence of barriers among its complement countries. Transfer decisions are made in period 2, and here it is appropriate to require that, given the coalitional structure, transfer policies are correctly anticipated. In the language of Hindriks and Myles (2001), we are studying a membership-based equilibrium, as opposed to a policy-based equilibrium.
unchanged, $i$ is transferring resources to the rest of the world, and $n^\ast\ast$ does not maximize $i$’s income, it follows that country $i$ must be worse off in the global optimum: it strictly prefers to close its borders. In the global optimum, per capita income is determined uniquely; hence, the result holds more generally, for any equilibrium migration flows. Because the problem has no discontinuities in core shares, the result will continue to hold for $x_{ic}$ close to zero but positive, until a threshold $\sigma$ is reached, and we know from the reasoning above that $\sigma<1$ because there can be no deviation when countries are identical.

Notice that the equivalence between a single country with core share $x_{ic}$ and a group of countries with mean core share $\bar{x}_c = \bar{x}_{jc}$ can be exploited to derive two immediate corollaries of Lemma 1. First, by definition of the global optimum, when country $i$ prefers to close its borders, $i$’s complement $-i$ must prefer free migration (or global income would not be maximized). But $i$’s complement $-i$ is equivalent to a single country $j$ with core share $x_{jc} = \bar{x}_{jc}$; we can then rephrase the lemma from the point of view of country $j$, and state that there exists a $\sigma>1$ such that, for $\bar{x}_{jc}/x_{jc} = \sigma$, country $j$ must prefer open borders. Second, Lemma 1 can be read in terms of incentives for joint deviation by any subset $S$ of countries with mean core share $\bar{x}_{Sc}$ sufficiently larger than the overall mean $(\bar{x}_{Sc}/\bar{x}_{Sc} < \sigma)$. Notice that, with $x_{1c} > x_{2c} > \cdots > x_{nc}$, if country 1 has no incentive to close its borders, neither does any other country acting unilaterally, or any possible subset of countries acting jointly. Thus, ruling out deviation by country 1 alone is necessary and sufficient to rule out any deviation.

Lemma 1 implies that if the global optimum is to be implemented when countries are sufficiently asymmetrical, some compensation towards the larger core countries is necessary. We are not stating that this is always feasible. The definition of global optimum implies that a country or a group acting jointly can be induced by its complement—the set of remaining countries—to forego the introduction of migration barriers, not that every individual country, or subset of countries, can simultaneously be prevented from doing so. With more than two countries, the second objective is much more problematic. All we can say at this stage is that, if the efficient regional allocation can be supported in equilibrium, then compensating transfers must be taking place. In other words, either countries are similar enough that country 1 prefers open borders—in which case free migration is optimal; countries should be left to set their transfers, domestically and internationally, without explicit coordination, and the main role of an international agency should be limited to eliminating existing migration costs. Or countries are dissimilar enough that country 1 prefers to set-up migration barriers—in which case free migration cannot be maintained in equilibrium, barriers will be put in place, and the efficient allocation

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20 As usual, the convexity parameter $\gamma$ must be compatible with an interior maximum both in the global optimum and when the country closes its borders, and for different values of $\bar{x}_{ic}$. In numerical simulations, we have had no difficulty finding an acceptable range of $\gamma$ values for $\bar{x}_{ic} \in [0, x_{ic})$. The values of $\sigma$ found in the numerical exercises were typically large, a 3–4% difference in core share being sufficient to trigger deviation.
of workers among the different regions may be sustained only if accompanied by a cooperative agreement on migration and international transfers.\textsuperscript{21} We can conclude:

\textbf{Proposition 3.} Suppose exogenous migration costs are zero, but countries are free to create barriers to migration. Then there exists a $\sigma \in (0,1)$ such that if $\overline{z}_{1c}/\overline{z}_{1c} > \sigma$, the global optimum is implemented through uncoordinated national policies. If $\overline{z}_{1c}/\overline{z}_{1c} \leq \sigma$ and the global optimum is interior, the efficient allocation can only be implemented through a coordinated agreement targeting jointly migration barriers and international transfers.

Proposition 3 follows from Lemma 1. If large core countries must be compensated for not acting unilaterally, their citizens must enjoy higher per capita income, hence migration cannot be free. Migration costs must be set equal to the required differential in per capita income. However, international transfer flows must then be set cooperatively to generate the correct regional densities $n_{iC} = n_{i}^{**} \forall i$. This last point is shown in the Appendix.\textsuperscript{22}

The result, ex post not too surprising, still sheds some light on current discussions in the European Union. As the size of the Union and most importantly its diversity increase, the fundamental tension between centralization of responsibilities and national autonomies is once again at the center of attention. The question of enlargement deserves more discussion in this model and we turn to it now.

4. Enlargement

The reason enlargement should affect the allocation of policy responsibilities follows immediately from Proposition 3.

\textbf{Corollary to Proposition 3.} Suppose countries are free to create barriers to migration, and consider a group of $m$ countries, with $z_{1c} > z_{2c} > \ldots > z_{mc}$ If the differences in core shares are discrete and the global optimum is interior, there exists a finite value $m^{\bar{m}}$ such that for all $m \geq m^{\bar{m}}$ country 1 will refuse full integration.

A Union of sufficiently similar countries can be endangered by the accession of new and more different members. In the European debate national governments appear more than ever jealous of their sovereignty and read the presence in the Union of the accession countries as requiring larger national powers, relative to the centralized institutions of the EU. These institutions on the other hand, and the Commission preeminently among them, see a larger Union as requiring more coordinated actions, exactly as counterpart of its increased diversity.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} It may be possible, especially if information problems are not too severe, to devise decentralized schemes that would implement the social optimum (see, for example, Varian, 1994 or Piketty, 1996). We are making the simpler point that the decentralized equilibrium of the game we are describing would not be efficient.

\textsuperscript{22} Notice that, given $n_{i}^{**}$, lump-sum transfers among any subset of countries are irrelevant from the point of view of the countries’ complement, and, in particular, do not affect their incentive to deviate.

\textsuperscript{23} A summary view of the debate preceding enlargement can be found in the Summer 2002 issue of the CESifo Forum (2002), reporting on the Munich Economic Summit of June 7–8, 2002. Among the official documents, see European Commission (2002) and, making the case for the member states, European Parliament (2002). As for policy actions, the public debate on the interpretation of the Stability Pact as large members have violated the ceiling on government deficit, is clearly indicative of national impatience with EU constraints.
gives qualified support to the Commission’s position: the larger heterogeneity of an enlarged Union indeed requires more coordination, to prevent negative spillovers from the correspondingly more heterogeneous policies of the member states. However, part of any coordinated agreement must be easing the concerns of the prior members, to prevent them from adopting policies that would become serious obstacles to any form of substantial market integration.

The corollary derives from the comparative statics properties of the model and is suggestive of the difficulties brought about by enlargement. But the question of enlargement should be looked at progressively, as a series of probably unanticipated but sequential decisions where the status quo changes—hence, given \( m \) countries, the first question is whether 1 and 2 want to form a Union; then whether they want to include 3, if 3 wants to join; then whether 1, 2, and 3 want to admit 4, etc.\(^{24}\) If countries considered for enlargement have progressively smaller core shares, their entry reduces the mean core share in the Union, and, by Proposition 1, modifies the flow of transfers and migration. In particular, if the joint optimum is interior, convexity in congestion costs continues to require \( n_{ic}^{**}=n_c^{**} \) for all countries belonging to the Union; if in addition, \( n_{ip}^{**}=n_p^{**} \), then we know that different countries in the Union will be sources of international transfers and recipients of immigration or vice versa depending on whether their core share is above or below the Union mean.\(^{25}\) In terms of transfers and migration then, the impact of enlargement will be most obviously felt by those countries that move from below to above the Union mean as a result of the entry of new members: while net receivers of Union’s funds before enlargement, they are asked to become net contributors; while sources of migration abroad before, they are transformed into destination countries for foreign workers. The parallel to Spain or Ireland in the wake of Eastern enlargement is hard to avoid.

Changes in transfer and migration flows do not per se imply changes in per capita income. We do know, however, by Lemma 1, that if the entry of a new country reduces the Union’s core share too much, the old members, acting together, would move to prevent enlargement. This observation is intriguing but incomplete. It ignores both the individual incentives of old members to put obstacles to enlargement (in addition to their possible joint action), and the potential for compensating transfers, here the willingness of new members to accept reduced transfers in exchange for being allowed to join the Union.

To see more concretely how compensation can change the picture, consider the following simple numerical example, whose results are reported in Fig. 4. There are three countries with core shares \( \alpha_{1c}=0.4, \alpha_{2c}=0.375 \) and \( \alpha_{3c}=0.325 \); the three

\(^{24}\) A Union in our model is a group of countries whose policies implement the jointly optimal regional density, either because they choose to allow free migration across their borders or because they have a common agreement on border controls and transfers. Technological spillovers are taken as given, while decisions on policy (here transfers and migration) must be made. The model represents a situation where markets are de facto already integrated, and the question of integrating policies presents itself—a not implausible description of the expansion of the European Union towards the countries of Eastern Europe.

\(^{25}\) The reasoning is identical to the proof of Proposition 1, regardless of the presence of non-Union countries.
countries are linked by regional productivity spillovers and the convexity parameter \( c \) is set equal to 5. Two scenarios are considered: a partial Union formed by countries 1 and 2, and a Union comprising all three countries. The top half of the figure reports the changes in per capita income associated with enlargement; in the first case, starting from a prior situation where all countries are separate and moving to a partial Union; in the second case, moving from the partial to the complete Union. On the left are the results in the absence of compensation: country 1 opposes the partial Union, favored instead by country 2 (and by country 3, although 3 remains outside), and, starting from a partial Union, both 1 and 2 oppose admitting 3. It is clear, however, that, in each case, the perspective member would
gain; indeed, in this example, the gain is always enough to compensate the losing member(s). On the top right side of the figure are the changes in per capita income brought about by enlargement after compensation: When 2 compensates 1 for the formation of a partial Union, 1 must be made at least indifferent—the figure assumes that all remaining surplus is appropriated by 2—but the important point is simply that some surplus remains. When moving from a partial to a complete Union, in the absence of compensation 1 and 2 suffer the same loss (income per capita is equalized by free mobility within the Union), but their threat points differ: because 1 has a larger core share, it finds unilateral deviation from the complete Union more advantageous and needs to be compensated correspondingly more. Again, compensation is possible and all three countries stand to gain from enlargement.

The bottom half of the figure reports international transfers as percentage of each country’s total income. Compensation requires positive migration costs, and if these costs are mostly deadweight losses (think for example of bureaucratic obstacles to free movement), then the efficient allocation in this model has no migration at all. Thus we have used the reference case of no migration for the figure, but nothing substantive depends on it. On the left are international transfers in the absence of compensation; positive values are outgoing transfers, negative values are incoming ones. Countries with core shares larger than the Union’s mean are sources of transfers, and particularly so in the absence of migration. When country 2 moves from being below the mean (in the partial Union) to being above (in the complete Union), its transfers correspondingly turn from negative to positive. The figure reports very large transfer flows: with no migration barriers in place and our parameter values, preventing the entry of workers from country 3 requires international transfers of the order of 10% of 3’s GDP. Of course, the specific number is irrelevant here; what matters is the impact of compensation in reducing the flows. The right side of the figure reports equilibrium transfers when enlargement is beneficial for all members: transfer flows do not change sign, but, as expected, their magnitude is greatly reduced (notice that the scale of the diagram is halved).

The image of enlargement, and of a functioning Union, that emerges when compensation is taken into account seems plausible. Instead of being coerced into accepting a Union that would be too onerous for them, richer countries are induced to favor it by policies that reduce integration just enough to protect their higher standard of living, while allowing new members to reap new benefits. Once again, this would not be possible in the absence of a coordinated agreement.

26 We have also assumed that no compensation comes from 3, although 3 too benefits from the partial Union.

27 In other words, if the only policy choice available to 1 and 2 was whether or not to admit 3, 3 should compensate them both equally, at least to their point of indifference; but, in fact, each country has the additional option of unilateral deviation, and here the potential gains differ. Again, the figure assumes that all remaining surpluses are enjoyed by 3. As noticed in the discussion of Lemma 1, unilateral deviation is more advantageous than joint deviation for country 1 and less advantageous for country 2. In practice, unilateral deviation should be interpreted as recourse to policies that ignore common agreements.
5. Conclusions

The official documents of the European Union base the need for redistribution policy on the large inequality existing among regions of the Union. Individual regions are contained within national borders, but the areas of intervention naturally straddle countries’ frontiers and form an additional overlapping layer between decision-making at the Union level and national jurisdictions. The regions with the lowest standards of living, the main targets of transfers, are located almost invariably at the periphery of the Union, supporting the view that geography matters. This belief is implied or stated repeatedly in the Union’s documents: physical distance from the core of the Union and the most densely populated, urbanized, and industrialized regions located there is costly.

This paper has studied a very simple model that starts from a stylized description of the Union’s view and asks what redistribution policy, if any, should follow logically. The model assumes technological spillovers that are constrained geographically: all firms in the core share the same productivity, as do all firms in the periphery, and because each country is assumed to contain parts of both regions, firms’ productivity can vary within the same country. Thus, the natural “economic borders” are regional, while policy decisions are taken at the national and possibly at the Union level. Countries differ because different shares of their territory belong to the core.

We have found that under plausible conditions efficiency will indeed require both interregional transfers within the same country, and international transfers within the Union (or, identically, international interregional transfers). If countries cannot impose obstacles to labor movements, the desirable transfers do not require a coordinated Union-level policy: they follow immediately from countries internalizing through free migration the external effects of their domestic regional policies—a well-known result in the literature (Myers, 1990). However, if countries can impose obstacles to immigration (whether officially or not), then the need for a coordinated agreement is likely to arise. Countries that would be the main targets of immigration and the main sources of international transfers in the free migration equilibrium will decide, if the asymmetry is large enough, to prevent the free flow of workers into their borders. By doing so, they will also simultaneously distort their choice of internal regional policy—the externalities abroad are no longer fully internalized. Achieving the efficient economic allocation now requires a coordinated agreement: border policies affecting the international flows of workers and international transfers both need to be chosen cooperatively to induce the correct regional density of workers and, at the same time, the differential in per capita income that richer countries demand for remaining in the Union. If enlargement of the Union implies accepting countries that are progressively further away from the Union core, then enlargement increases the likelihood of unilaterally imposed obstacles to free migration, and, therefore, the need for coordinated action. It may be good to remember, however, that part of that coordination is used to reduce the unsustainable uniformity that would be brought about by full integration.

With respect to the actual policies of the European Union, it seems hardly surprising, then, that the transfers toward the Union’s poorer regions are accompanied by other transfers targeting richer areas. Fig. 5 is a map of the regions of the European Union that
qualify for redistributive transfers either because they are poor, or because they experience “structural difficulties”. The contrast to Fig. 1(a) is quite clear.28

The model described in the paper was designed to handle multiple and heterogeneous countries as simply as possible, and thus to address issues related to the enlargement of an existing Union. However, its three-level structure opens naturally questions of political economy that we have not pursued here. The fundamental tension captured by the model is between the two regions, core and periphery, not between richer and poorer countries. Inside any one country, the necessary regional transfers could well generate disagreement, and an interesting issue is whether such internal regional disputes would be exacerbated or reduced by the existence and the expansion of the Union. We can conjecture, for example, that with free migration expansion of the Union should increase regional tensions in larger core countries, whose core regions come to face the extra burden of new international transfers, and reduce them in smaller core countries. However, the possibility of imposing borders barriers, itself, of course, a policy choice the country must make as a whole, may well change the result. A second interesting, and possibly important, question is the

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28 These second flows of funds are much smaller in volume, but if we were to add transfers related to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the point would emerge clearly. In 2000, for example, disbursements under the Guarantee section of the CAP, by far the largest, amounted to 40,467 million ECU vs. 27,585 million for all other redistribution programs. France alone received more than 22% of CAP resources; another 9% went to Belgium, Denmark, and The Netherlands. None of these countries has regions qualifying for transfers because of economic backwardness (if we exclude France’s overseas departments and, temporarily, Corsica). (See: www.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/fin/).
Identification of the correct decision-making unit. If the natural economic borders are regional, does it still follow that the correct political borders are national? We leave both of these points for future research.

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**Appendix**

**Derivation of Fig. 2(a) and (b)**

1. Fig. 2(a) is a correct representation of the decentralized allocation problem if $\gamma$ is large enough for $h(n_c)$ to have an interior maximum, but not so large that $h(n_c) < 0$ at $n_c = 1/\alpha_c$. The lower bound solves $\partial h(n_c)/\partial n_c = 0$ at $n_c = 1/\alpha_c$, and the upper bound solves $h(n_c) = 0$ at $n_c = 1/\alpha_c$, or $\gamma \equiv (\gamma'(\alpha_c), \hat{\gamma}(\alpha_c))$ where $\gamma'(\alpha_c) = 1 + \ln 2/\ln (\alpha_p/\alpha_c)$, and $\hat{\gamma}(\alpha_c)$ solves $\hat{\gamma} = \ln 2/\ln (\alpha_p/\alpha_c) + (\ln \gamma - \ln \alpha_c)/\ln (\alpha_p/\alpha_c)$. It is not difficult to see that the range of acceptable values is not empty for all $\alpha_c > 0$. (If $cV_c$, the equilibria do not change, but $h(n_c)$ is everywhere increasing; if $cNc$, $h(n_c)$ has an interior maximum at some $n_c^e > 2$, but full concentration in the core is not an equilibrium: the three equilibria are then full concentration in the periphery, the symmetrical equilibrium at $n_p = n_c = 1$, and an interior equilibrium at $n_c > n_c^e$ that is dominated by both of the others).

2. Fig. 2(b). The bounds imposed on $\gamma$ in the derivation of Fig. 2(b) are tighter than for Fig. 2(a), and these are the bounds assumed in the text
   (i) **Existence of an interior maximum.** Simple manipulations show that, for all $n_c < 1$, $\partial H/\partial n_c < 0$ if $\gamma > 2$, and $\partial^2 H/\partial n_c^2 > 0$ if $\gamma \in (1,2]$, thus, no interior maximum exists for $n_c < 1$. For $n_c > 1$, $n_c^e$ must satisfy: $4\gamma/\alpha_p = (n_c^e - 1)^{-2}[n_c^e*(1+\gamma) - 1]$; $4 < (n_c^e - 1)^{-2}[n_c^e*(1+\gamma)/2 - 1]$. For an interior maximum, $\gamma$ must be larger than the value that solves the first of these equations at $n_c = 1/\alpha_c$, or: $\gamma \geq \gamma'(\alpha_c)$, where $\gamma'(\alpha_c)$ solves $\gamma = 1 + \ln 2/\ln (\alpha_p/\alpha_c) + 1/\ln (\alpha_p/\alpha_c)[\ln 2 + \ln \gamma - \ln (\alpha_p + \alpha_c)]$ (and $\hat{\gamma}(\alpha_c)$ solves $\hat{\gamma}(\alpha_c) = \gamma'(\alpha_c)$).
   (ii) **Uniqueness.** It is easy to show that if $H(n_c)$ is concave at $n_c^e$, then it is concave at all $n_c > n_c^e$. Thus, if an interior maximum exists, it is unique.
   (iii) **The interior maximum is the global maximum.** If an interior maximum exists, it always dominates full concentration in the core (by (ii)). Thus, it is a global maximum if and only if it dominates concentration in the periphery:
\( H(n^{**}_{i}) > H(0) \). Again, this will depend on \( \gamma \), and requires \( \gamma \) lower than a ceiling \( \gamma(x_c) \), where \( \tilde{\gamma}(x_c) < \gamma(x_c) \). If \( x_c \) is not too small, the interval \([\tilde{\gamma}(x_c), \gamma(x_c)]\) is guaranteed to be not empty. A sufficient condition ensuring that the interior maximum is a global maximum is \( H(1/x_c) > H(0) \), a condition that is easy to check but imposes a tighter upper bound on \( \gamma \) than necessary.

(iv) The interior maximum cannot be an equilibrium of the decentralized problem. If \( \gamma < \tilde{\gamma}(x_c) \), the decentralized problem has a single interior equilibrium, at the symmetrical allocation \( n_p = n_c = 1 \), but this allocation is dominated by concentration into either region.

**Proof of Proposition 1.** The reasoning in the text establishes \( n_{i}^{**} = n_{c}^{**} > 1 \) \( \forall i \). It follows then that, at the optimum, \( h_i = h = n_{i}^{**} - c(n_{c}^{**}) \) and \( h_p = h_p = n_{p}^{**} \) \( \forall i \). Thus, total net income, the central planner’s objective function, becomes \( n_{c}^{**} \sum x_{i}h + (n - n_{c}^{**}) \sum x_{i}h_{p} \), or \( \left[n_{c}^{**} - \overline{x}_c \left(n_{c}^{**} - c(n_{c}^{**})\right) + \left(\frac{1 - n_{c}^{**} - \overline{x}_c}{1 - \overline{x}_c}\right) \right] n_{c}^{**} \). The optimum \( n_{c}^{**} \) depends exclusively on \( \overline{x}_c \). Notice that because \( h_i = h \) and \( h_p = h_p \), per capita taxes in the core \( t_c \) and per capita transfers in the periphery \( \tau_p \) must be equal in all countries. Focus now on the case \( n_{p}^{**} n_{p}^{**} \) \( \forall i \). (i) Country \( i \) is a net disburser of international transfers iff \( \tau_p N_{ip} < t_c N_{ic} \) where aggregate budget balance requires: \( \sum \tau_p N_{ip} = \sum t_c N_{ic} \), or: \( \tau_p = \left(t_c n_c \overline{x}_c\right) / \left(n_p \overline{x}_p\right) \). Substituting this expression in the inequality, we obtain that country \( i \) is a net disburser iff \( x_{ic}/x_{ip} > \overline{x}_c/\overline{x}_p \), or, because \( x_{ip} = 1 - x_{ic} \) and \( \overline{x}_p = 1 - \overline{x}_c \), iff \( x_{ic} > \overline{x}_c \). (ii) Call \( P_{i} \) population in country \( i \), i.e., \( P_i = n_i x_{ic} + n_p x_{ip} \), where, given \( \sum P_i = n, n_p = (1 - n_c \overline{x}_c)/(1 - \overline{x}_c) \). Thus, we can write: \( P_i = [n_c (x_{ic} - \overline{x}_c) + 1 - x_{ic}]/(1 - \overline{x}_c) \). It follows that \( P_i > 1 \iff (n_c - 1)(x_{ic} - \overline{x}_c) > 0 \). But \( n_{c}^{**} > 1 \); hence, country \( i \) is a migration destination iff \( x_{ic} > \overline{x}_c \).

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Consider the case of two countries, where \( P \) is the population in country 1, and \( (2 - P) \) the population of country 2. Begin with the central planner’s problem. The central planner maximizes total net income \( G \), a concave function of \( n_{1c} \) and \( n_{2c} \) (if \( \gamma \equiv (\tilde{\gamma}(x_c), \gamma(x_c)) \)) differentiable everywhere but for \( n_{1c} = 1 \) or \( n_{2c} = 1 \). We know from Proposition 1 that \( n_{1c}^{**} = n_{2c}^{**} > 1 \); hence, we can find the maximum through standard calculus. The central planner solves:

\[
\max_{n_{1c}, n_{2c}, P} G = \alpha_i n_{1c} h_{1}(n_{1c}, n_{2c}) + (P - \alpha_i n_{1c}) h_{1p}(n_{1c}, n_{2c}, P) + \alpha_2 n_{2c} h_{2}(n_{1c}, n_{2c}) + (2 - P - \alpha_2 n_{2c}) h_{2p}(n_{1c}, n_{2c}, P)
\]

The first order conditions are given by:

\[
\frac{\partial G}{\partial n_{1c}} = \alpha_i h_{1} + \alpha_i n_{1c} \frac{\partial h_{1}}{\partial n_{1c}} - \alpha_i h_{1p} + (P - \alpha_i n_{1c}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial n_{1c}} + \alpha_2 n_{2c} \frac{\partial h_{2}}{\partial n_{1c}} + (2 - P - \alpha_2 n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial n_{1c}} = 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial G}{\partial n_{2c}} = \alpha_i n_{1c} \frac{\partial h_{1}}{\partial n_{2c}} + (P - \alpha_i n_{1c}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial n_{2c}} + \alpha_2 h_{2} + \alpha_2 n_{2c} \frac{\partial h_{2}}{\partial n_{2c}} - \alpha_2 h_{2p} + (2 - P - \alpha_2 n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial n_{2c}} = 0
\]
\[
\frac{\partial G}{\partial P} = h_{1p} + (P - \alpha_{1c}n_{1c}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial P} - h_{2p} + (2 - P - \alpha_{2c}n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial P} = 0 \tag{3}
\]

Now consider the individual countries’ problem. As in the one-country analysis, each national policymaker has direct control over the density in his national core region (through the use of internal transfers); the complication is that population is not fixed, but determined endogenously via migration. Migration occurs unless per capita incomes are equalized, and is thus influenced by regional densities and by international transfers. As noticed by Myers (1990), the analysis should allow for endogenous international transfers, with the constraint that countries can only choose to make nonnegative transfers abroad. Each national policymaker maximizes per capita income in his own country \((g_1\) and \(g_2\)). Calling \(T\) the net international transfers per capita from country 1 to country 2, we can write country 1’s problem as following:

\[
\max_{\{n_{1c}, T\}} g_1 = [\alpha_{1c}n_{1c}h_{1}(n_{1c}, n_{2c}) + (P - \alpha_{1c}n_{1c})h_{1p}(n_{1c}, n_{2c}, P)] \frac{1}{P} - T
\]

subject to (C1): \((1/P)[\alpha_{1c}n_{1c}h_{1}+(P-\alpha_{1c}n_{1c})h_{1p}] - T = 1/(2-P) [\alpha_{2c}n_{2c}h_{2}+(2-P-\alpha_{2c}n_{2c})h_{2p}] + TP/(2-P)\)

\(\text{(C2): } T \geq 0\)

Notice that (C1) can also be written more concisely as \(g_1 - T = g_2 + TP/(2-P)\). Ignoring (C2) for now, we derive the first order conditions

\[
\frac{\partial g_1}{\partial n_{1c}} = \left[\alpha_{1c}h_{1} + \alpha_{1c}n_{1c} \frac{\partial h_{1}}{\partial n_{1c}} - \alpha_{1c}h_{1p} + (P - \alpha_{1c}n_{1c}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial n_{1c}} + \frac{\partial P}{\partial n_{1c}} \right] \frac{1}{P} = 0
\]

\(\frac{\partial g_1}{\partial T} = \left[\frac{\partial P}{\partial T} \left(h_{1p} + (P - \alpha_{1c}n_{1c}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial P} - g_1\right) - \frac{1}{P}\right] = 0\)

We can obtain \(dP/dn_{1c}\) by totally differentiating (C1), holding \(T\) constant:

\[
dn_{1c} \left[\left(\alpha_{1c}h_{1} + \alpha_{1c}n_{1c} \frac{\partial h_{1}}{\partial n_{1c}} - \alpha_{1c}h_{1p} + (P - \alpha_{1c}n_{1c}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial n_{1c}}\right) \frac{1}{P} \right. \\
- \left(\alpha_{2c}n_{2c} \frac{\partial h_{2}}{\partial n_{1c}} + (2 - P - \alpha_{2c}n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial n_{1c}}\right) \frac{1}{2-P} \right] \\
\left. + \left(\frac{g_1 - h_{1p} - (P - \alpha_{1c}n_{1c}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial P}}{\frac{1}{P}} \right) \right]
\]

\(\text{Or, substituting from Eq. (4) and simplifying,}\)

\[
\frac{\partial G}{\partial P} = h_{1p} + (P - \alpha_{1c}n_{1c}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial P} - h_{2p} + (2 - P - \alpha_{2c}n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial P} = 0
\]
with respect to country 2’s problem leads to replicating Eq. (2), the central planners’ first order condition

\[
\text{regions and per capita income are determined uniquely. In the symmetrical equilibrium}
\]

\[
\text{which we can write as:}
\]

\[
\frac{\text{d}P}{\text{d}n_{1c}} = \frac{\alpha_{2c}n_{2c} \frac{\partial h_2}{\partial n_{1c}} + (2 - P - \alpha_{2c}n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial n_{1c}}}{h_{2p} - (2 - P - \alpha_{2c}n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial P} - g_1}
\]

We follow the same procedure to obtain \(\frac{\text{d}P}{\text{d}T}\). Totally differentiating (C1), holding \(n_{1c}\) constant, and substituting Eq. (5), we derive:

\[
\frac{\text{d}P}{\text{d}T} = \frac{P}{h_{2p} - (2 - P - \alpha_{2c}n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial P} - g_1}
\]

Hence we can write (5) as:

\[
h_{2p} - (2 - P - \alpha_{2c}n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial P} = h_{1p} + (P - \alpha_{1c}n_{1c}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial P}
\]

Finally, substituting this last expression and Eq. (8) in Eq. (4), we obtain:

\[
\alpha_{1c}h_1 + \alpha_{1c}n_{1c} \frac{\partial h_1}{\partial n_{1c}} - \alpha_{1c}h_{1p} + (P - \alpha_{1c}n_{1c}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial n_{1c}} + \alpha_{2c}n_{2c} \frac{\partial h_2}{\partial n_{1c}} + (2 - P - \alpha_{2c}n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial n_{1c}} = 0
\]

Eqs. (10) and (11) replicate Eq. (1) and (3), the central planner’s first-order conditions with respect to \(P\) and to \(n_{1c}\). Following identical logic, it is possible to show that solving country 2’s problem leads to replicating Eq. (2), the central planners’ first order condition with respect to \(n_{2c}\) (we leave this step to the reader). The two countries’ uncoordinated equilibrium replicates the central planner’s allocation. Notice that the density in the core regions and per capita income are determined uniquely. In the symmetrical equilibrium where \(n_{1p} = n_{2p}\), \(P\) is also determined (as are, correspondingly, international transfers. See Proposition 1). However, as discussed in the text, there also exist asymmetrical equilibria where, as long as \(n_{ip} \leq 1, i = \{1, 2\}\), only two out of the three variables \(\{n_{1p}, n_{2p}, P\}\) are determined by the maximization problem. This indeterminacy is irrelevant for production efficiency, congestion costs and welfare, but extends to the level of transfers. It is not difficult to verify that for all \(n_{1p}/n_{2p} \leq (\alpha_{1c} \alpha_{2c})/(\alpha_{2c} \alpha_{1p})\) (a ratio larger than 1), equilibrium transfers from country 1 to country 2 are positive, and the analysis above applies: country 1 will set the transfers so as to obtain the optimal allocation. If \(n_{1p}/n_{2p} > (\alpha_{1c} \alpha_{2c})/(\alpha_{2c} \alpha_{1p})\), the selected equilibrium has transfers flowing in the opposite direction, and the relevant first order condition will be obtained from country 2’s problem. In all equilibria, per capita taxes and transfers in each region must be equalized across countries. In the core, the result follows because core densities must be equalized; if per capita taxes differed across
countries, congestion costs would differ, a suboptimal outcome given costs’ convexity. In  the periphery, in all equilibria, congestion costs are zero; because productivity is equal everywhere, if transfers differed workers would migrate. In the case of \( n \) countries, the analysis is more cumbersome, but conceptually nothing changes (as shown formally by Myers, 1990). Each country chooses the level of transfers it disburses to each other country, taking as given the transfers by others. Notice once again the strength of the free migration hypothesis: any temptation to free ride is immediately checked by the realization that all disparities in per capita income would give rise to migration. Suppose a country were to shirk on its foreign obligations, counting on other governments taking up the needed transfers; if the decline in transfers implied an increase in per capita income for the country’s citizens, immigration would follow, until incomes were again equalized. There is a unique core density that maximizes per capita income, conditional on no migration in equilibrium; to maintain that core density, the new immigrants would be shifted to the periphery, and the savings in international transfers would evaporate in increased domestic transfers. □

**Proof of Proposition 3.** We must show that country \( i \) will choose the efficient core density \( n_{c}^{**} \) and achieve required per capita income \( g_{i} \) in the presence of migration costs \( c_{i}^{**} \) and international transfers \( T_{i}^{**} \). Consider a two-country world, where country 1 requires compensation. Its problem becomes:

\[
\max_{n_{1c}} g_{1} = \left[ x_{1c}n_{1c}h_{1}(n_{1c}, n_{2c}) + (P - x_{1c}n_{1c})h_{1p}(n_{1c}, n_{2c}, P) \right] \frac{1}{P} - T
\]

subject to \((C1')\): \( \frac{1}{P} \left[ x_{1c}n_{1c}h_{1c} + (P - x_{1c}n_{1c})h_{1p} \right] - T - c^{**} = \frac{1}{2 - P} \left[ x_{2c}n_{2c}h_{2c} + (2 - P - x_{2c}n_{2c})h_{2p} \right] + \frac{TP}{2 - P} \)

\((C2')\): \( T = T^{**} \)

The first-order condition Eq. (4) is unchanged, but Eq. (8) becomes:

\[
\frac{dP}{dn_{1c}} = \frac{x_{2c}n_{2c} \frac{\partial h_{2c}}{\partial n_{1c}} + (2 - P - x_{2c}n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial P}}{h_{2p} - (2 - P - x_{2c}n_{2c}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial P} - g_{1} + c^{**}}
\]

Comparing Eqs. (1) and (4), we obtain that optimality then requires:

\[
c^{**} = h_{1p} - h_{2p} + (P - x_{1c}n_{1c}^{**}) \frac{\partial h_{1p}}{\partial P} - (2 - P - x_{2c}n_{2c}^{**}) \frac{\partial h_{2p}}{\partial P}
\]

where \( P \) is set equal to \( P^{**} \), the solution of Eq. (3) at \( n_{1c}^{**}, n_{2c}^{**} \). \( T^{**} \) must then be defined by the solution to \((C1')\), again at \( P = P^{**} \). With our functional forms there is a range of values for \( P \) that satisfy optimality, but to each of these values corresponds a specific \( T^{**}(P) \). □.
References


