Wage Compression and Relative-Wage Concerns Under Collective Bargaining*

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Abstract

Many countries set wage floors by occupation for both low- and high-skill workers. Changes in these wage floors can induce wage compression within firms and reduce the skill premium. We examine the effects of this institution in the Tunisian banking sector, where a 2014 national collective bargaining agreement resulted in wage compression in some branches. We find modest overall employment effects masking substantial heterogeneity by age and skill level. Hires of young workers increase. High-skill young workers separate and move to banks with higher skill premia, suggesting they quit. Survey results confirm that young high-skill workers are more sensitive to wage compression. We interpret our results through a model of monopsony with binding wage floors and relative-wage concerns. Our results challenge the view that occupation-specific wage floors are the cause of high levels of youth unemployment in settings like Tunisia and highlight a novel channel through which they shape labor market dynamics.

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1 Introduction

Minimum wages are typically studied in the context of low-wage workers (Dube and Zipperer, 2024), but many countries set wage floors by occupation, resulting in minimum wages for low- and high-skill workers.[1] What are the effects of occupation-specific wage floors? The study of minimum wages has a long and rich history in labor economics but has generally focused on direct effects on low-wage jobs, and its treatment of higher-wage workers has focused on spillover effects (Card and Krueger, 1994; Autor et al., 2016; Cengiz et al., 2019; Engbom and Moser, 2022; Dustmann et al., 2022; Derenoncourt and Weil, 2025). Occupation-specific wage floors in contrast also set minima for high-skill jobs. Moreover, changes in these wage floors can induce compression within firms and exogenously change firm-level skill premia (the gap between high- and low-skill wages). This wage-setting institution thus allows us to study how wage floors in the high-skill part of the wage distribution impact high-skill employment.

In this paper, we leverage a large increase to wage floors in Tunisia's banking sector to ask: how does wage floor-induced compression shape high-skill worker flows? The banking sector is a favorable setting to study this question: high-skill workers make up 62% of banking employees in the country (National Institute of Statistics, 2012), and wage floors for all occupations experienced large collectively bargained increases after 2014, affecting 20,000 workers. These increases were larger in percentage terms for relatively low-skill occupations, reducing the skill premium, and allowing us to study the relationship between wage compression and labor market flows.[2] We focus on the effects of this wage compression on young workers, who have been shown to exhibit higher job mobility (Topel and Ward, 1992) and for whom adjustments in the labor supply are thus more salient.

We find that branches comply with the wage floor increases, on average. An additional standard deviation (2 pp) in branch exposure is associated with 2% higher mean worker earnings in 2015, and 5-8% higher mean worker earnings over 2014-2021. The effect is precisely estimated and robust. Moreover, we see responses in earnings of both skill and age groups, confirming the relevance of wage floors for

[1] Countries that set occupation-specific wages include Costa Rica, South Africa, Brazil, India, Mauritius, Belgium, France, Gabon, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Togo. See International Labour Organization (2014) for a comprehensive list.

[2] Occupations in the banking sector generally all require some level of skill. In this paper, we use "low-skill" to refer to relatively lower-skilled workers.

both low- and high-skill workers.

We find little evidence of overall disemployment effects, but find substantial heterogeneity by age group. While the overall employment effect is -3%, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. However, for young workers, we find a decrease in the number of retained workers of 9 percent. At the same time, hires increase by 16 percent. The replacement rate in levels is below one-for-one, suggesting that within-young substitution is unlikely to explain our results. Notably, the finite employment elasticity and hiring increases for young workers following wage hikes suggest an imperfectly competitive labor market. Covariance of employment effects with a proxy for employer labor market power further supports this conclusion.

Within the young group, increases in separation are concentrated among high-skill workers, and are suggestive of quits. Despite receiving earnings increases, young high-skill workers separate more from their branches. These separations are mostly followed by transitions to new workplaces. The number of workers who find another job is 3 percent higher in strongly exposed branches, on average.

We show quantitative and qualitative evidence suggesting that quits of high-skill workers reflect a labor supply adjustment due to relative-wage concerns. First, high-skill workers move to firms that have a higher skill premium. We rule out that other correlates of a higher skill premium explain the moves: high-wage-inequality workplaces do not have higher pay, on average, and workers do not go on to earn higher salaries. Second, survey evidence is consistent with relative-wage concerns. We conduct a survey of 165 bank employees in Northeast and West Tunisia and present a series of hypothetical wage floor increase scenarios to elicit workers' quit responses to wage compression. Conditional on worker demographics, we find a positive relationship between wage compression and quit likelihood for young workers. Moreover, a large share of young respondents agree that percent increases in wage floors should be proportional to skill.

In light of our survey evidence, we rationalize our findings through a model of monopsony with binding wage floors and relative-wage concerns. We extend the textbook monopsony model (Manning, 2003) to a two-skill labor market with binding wage floors. At baseline, the wage floor binds and employment lies below the competitive level. We model labor supply with a discrete-choice framework (where workers have idiosyncratic tastes for different workplaces) (Card et al., 2018) and add relative-wage as an amenity. The policy raises wage floors and reduces the skill premium. In the model, for low-skill workers, a higher floor induces a movement along their labor-supply curve. For high-skill workers, while their own floor also moves them along supply, the lower skill premium shifts their labor supply inward, and this shift dominates. The model yields comparative statics by skill group that match our empirical results.

To track worker movement over time and employers in response to the 2014 shock, we use new administrative data on employers and employees in Tunisia. The employee social security data from the National Social Security Agency [CNSS] consists of employee payroll records for the period 2008-2021. We mainly use this data to study the effects on earnings and worker flows.

While wage floor increases were uniform for all banks nationwide, we rely on variation across bank branches in actual wages to define exposure to the policy, and compare strongly and weakly treated branches in a difference-in-differences framework. Branches were affected differently depending on the local wage distribution and their own occupational composition. For example, branches in high cost-of-living areas may pay their workers more than the wage floor. Since floors bind less for these branches, they faced a smaller wage bill shock in percentage terms. To capture this variation, we adapt an exposure measure used in the minimum wage literature (Card, 1992; Dustmann et al., 2022; Derenoncourt and Weil, 2025). To calculate exposure, we first predict worker occupation and match workers with their wage floor. We then measure the gap between a branch's wage bill prior to the increase and what it would pay to be compliant with the increase. This gap defines a branch's exposure to the policy. To estimate the causal effect of wage floors on wages and employment, we use our measure of exposure in a dynamic difference-in-differences at the branch-level, comparing branches with varying levels of exposure to treatment before and after 2014.

Our finding that wage floors matter for high-skill workers contributes to the literature on the effects of collective bargaining agreements on wages (Dolado et al., 1997; Cardoso and Portugal, 2005; Bhuller et al., 2022). This literature generally finds that firm-level negotiation reduces the relevance of collectively bargained wages for high-skill workers.[3] Dolado et al. (1997) show that centrally negotiated floors bind only for low-skill employees. Bhuller et al. (2022) show that in Scandinavia, local

[3]Recent work on collective bargaining is reviewed in the Handbook of Labor Economics (Jäger et al., 2025).

bargaining in addition to central floors provides flexibility, generating within-industry variation in wage drifts. In comparison, we examine wage effects in an emerging-market banking sector where every employee sits in a wage cell, including high-skill ones, and show that earnings of incumbent high-skill workers closely track increases in their wage floors.

Our finding that high-skill workers quit in response to disproportionate wage floor increases contributes to research on the employment effects of collective bargaining (Magruder, 2012; Martins, 2021; Card and Cardoso, 2022; Fanfani, 2023). Magruder (2012), Martins (2021), and Fanfani (2023) find strong negative employment effects in Portugal, South Africa, and Italy, respectively. None of these three papers distinguishes between high- and low-skill workers. Our paper adds to the limited body of evidence from developing countries and studies detailed flows by age and skill subgroups. We find overall and heterogeneous employment effects that are not consistent with the standard labor market model. The closest paper to ours, Card and Cardoso (2022), looks at the employment effects of different demographic subgroups in Portugal and finds no strong evidence of disemployment effects. The result is partly explained by the adjustment of "wage cushions" (difference between floor and actual wage) for educated workers when floors rise. Our overall average employment results are consistent with the findings in that paper. Our contribution is to highlight heterogeneous employment effects from wage floor compression and a novel labor market adjustment: when wage floors compress the skill premium, high-skill workers quit.[4]

The result that high-skill young workers are sensitive to wage compression contributes to the literature on peer comparisons and wages (Sauer and May, 2017; Dube et al., 2019; Storer and Reich, 2021). These studies show that within-firm comparisons matter: they determine what workers perceive they deserve to be paid (Sauer and May, 2017), and drive worker quits in response to changes in own wages (Dube et al., 2019). While these two studies document comparisons to higher-paid peers, the idea that workers also compare themselves to lower-paid colleagues also

[4]We also relate to the literature on the reallocation effects of minimum wages (Berger et al., 2022; Dustmann et al., 2022). Dustmann et al. (2022) find that minimum wages trigger reallocation of low-wage workers toward more productive firms, with no effects on high-wage workers. Our findings of no disemployment effects are consistent with that paper. We differ from that paper in two ways: first, high-wage workers in our research design are not controls, rather, they are affected by wage floors that apply to them. Second, we document a different type of reallocation: young high-skill workers move to workplaces with higher wage inequality but no higher average pay, showcasing that relative-wage concerns can also drive worker reallocation.

appears in the sociology literature. Storer and Reich (2021) find that higher minimum wages reduce job satisfaction among workers who have higher tenure/status. We provide direct empirical evidence in line with this idea and show that wage compression induces quits among high-skill workers.[5]

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the collective bargaining institutions in Tunisia and the policy shock we leverage for identification. Section 3 describes our data sources and analysis sample. Section 4 details our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents our empirical findings. Section 6 lays out a conceptual framework. Section 7 presents robustness checks. Finally, Section 8 concludes.

2 Institutional Details

We begin with a discussion of how collective bargaining sets wage floors in Tunisia. We then describe the policy shock, first discussing the economic context surrounding the 2014 increases, then detailing their sequence and scope.

2.1 Collective Bargaining and Wage Floors

Collective bargaining agreements (CBA) in Tunisia are negotiated at the sector level between central employer and employee representatives. For banks, the Tunisian Professional Association of Banks and Financial Institutions [APTBEF], the employer representative for banks, negotiates with the Tunisian General Labor Union [UGTT]'s General Federation of Banks and Financial Institutions. Government statutes have extended these CBAs to all employers and workers in the sector, regardless of union status (Official Journal Of The Tunisian Republic, 2014).[6]

In this setting, there are wage floors throughout the income distribution: CBAs set wage floors for all standard job types in the sector, including high-skill ones, and wage floors constitute the base wage for all workers.[7] The floors are set for each occupation and seniority level. In the US and other contexts studied in the bulk of the literature on minimum wages, only workers below the minimum wage are legally bound by a

[5]At the same time, our results on wage and hires increases add to the growing body of evidence on monopsony in developing countries (Naidu et al., 2016; Felix, 2021; Bassier, 2022; Sharma, 2023; Haque and Delgado, 2024). Results consistent with monopsony in Tunisia can also be found in Ali et al. (2025b), where firm-specific average wages increased in response to a certification program for startups that included a wage subsidy.

[6]The banking CBA applies to all banks with the exception of the central bank.

[7]The CBA also specifies the number of working hours per week at the sector level (40) and defines educational requirements by broad occupation group.

minimum wage hike. In contrast, in this setting, as in collective bargaining systems in European countries, all workers are affected by increases in wage floors.

CBA renegotiation mainly updates wage floor tables, setting increases for each of the table's five broad occupational categories, including high-skill ones. The wage floors are not indexed to the national minimum wage, and the amounts by which they are revised are discretionary.[8] The five categories are service staff, operations 1 staff, operations 2 staff, supervisory staff, and management.[9] According to the CBA, the educational requirements for operations 2 staff, supervisory staff, and management are completion of two years of university education, a Bachelor's degree, or a Master's degree and above. These occupations include analysts, portfolio managers, IT specialists, and administrative and financial officers, and require technical expertise. Accordingly, the average base salary for the financial industry of TND 1305 (USD 435) in 2012 is much higher than the average base salary of TND 535 (USD 178)(National Institute of Statistics, 2015).[10]

2.2 Policy Shock

2.2.1 Economic Context

The 2011 uprising bolstered the role of the worker union, and difficult economic conditions accelerated demands for wage increases. The economy was marked by sluggish growth and elevated inflation. Between 2015 and 2019, Tunisia's real GDP averaged 2.2%, and total unemployment remained high, hovering around 16%, on average (National Institute of Statistics, 2024). The inflation rate over 2011-2019 was at a high 8%, on average (National Institute of Statistics, 2024). UGTT leveraged its expanded influence after the uprising to organize sit-ins and strikes to demand wage increases across sectors.

At the same time, international policy institutions argued that wage floors

[8]In addition to raising wage floors, amendments involve retroactive pay, which is generally backdated to May 1 of the preceding year. Retroactive implementation of CBAs is common due to delays in renewals and is encountered in other settings (e.g., Fanfani (2023)). CBA amendments do not specify the timeline or modality of back-pay disbursement. According to the social security office, back-pay is generally given out following the new wage table publication in the form of installments.

[9]Each broad occupational category has a detailed occupation (an occupation-grade combination). The detailed breakdown is as follows: service staff (service agents (4), tracking agents (4)), operations 1 staff (office agents (4), secretaries (3), principal secretaries (3)), operations 2 staff (section heads (2), document officers (3)), supervisory staff (principal document officer (1), deputy department heads (2), department heads (2)), and management (administrator (1), deputy director (1), associate director (1), directors (3)). The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of grades in each occupation type.

[10]Throughout the paper, we use the average exchange rate over the period of TND 3 per USD 1.

exacerbate the unemployment of university graduates, an issue that remains one of Tunisia's most pressing economic challenges. On average, it takes six years for university graduates, who are typically in their early to mid twenties, to secure stable employment, and by age 35, half remain unemployed (Gatti et al., 2014). Although the exclusion of educated youth was a key grievance in the 2011 uprising, employment prospects have not improved in the aftermath. In 2013, 30% of the labor force with an advanced level of education were unemployed (International Labour Organization, 2024).

2.2.2 Wage Floor Increases in Banking

The banking sector has two features that make it a favorable setting to examine the empirical link between wage floors and high-skill worker flows: it has a high-skill worker composition and it raised wage floors considerably after a period of minimal changes. According to data from the labor force survey, 62% of workers in banking were university graduates in 2013 (National Institute of Statistics, 2012). While UGTT and the employer unions negotiated yearly new wage tables in other sectors, the banking sector left wage floors mostly unchanged between 2008 and 2014.[11] Figure 1 shows the cumulative percent increase in nominal wage floors for this sector over time. We plot the percent change in the 1-year seniority wage floor for the lowest-skill occupation group (service) and the highest-skill occupation group (management). Wage floors were largely unchanged between 2008 and 2013 because the "master" CBA was under revision. In addition, the increases in wage floors starting in 2014 were of sizable magnitude.[12] Although banks are generally considered high-paying employers, persistent inflation in the early post-uprising period and the wage floor freeze steadily eroded real wages. As a result, the sector, like others across the country, faced strikes to demand wage increases. Negotiations resulted in a revised CBA with a new wage table that came into effect in 2014. The increases covered all banking employees, which were numbered at approximately 20,000 in 2014.[13]

[11] Revisions across sectors occur during regular rounds of "national social negotiations." The negotiations culminate in amendments published in the Official Journal of the Tunisian Republic [JORT]. Generally, the amendment comes into effect from the date of publication in JORT, and wage increases apply retroactively.

[12] Although an agreement for the increases was reached in November 2012, it was not formalized (signed) until November 2013, and the official Minister of Social Affairs decision to amend the CBA was not published in JORT until February 2014.

[13] The negotiation frequency and increase amounts also varied after 2014. At first, sectors followed a yearly negotiation. Later, as shown in Figure 1, for each of 2017, 2019, and 2022, two wage tables were agreed in a single negotiation round, effectively enacting two increases in the wage floor. Larger

Another noteworthy feature of banking sector increases is that they compressed the wage floor distribution. Wage floors in 2014 were raised by 192 dinars (33-35%) for service staff, 228 for operations 1 staff (30-33%), 287 for operations 2 staff (30-31%), 336 for supervisory staff (30-32%), and 379 for management (28-30%). Figure 2 illustrates this wage compression: on average, low-skill occupations in the CBA saw larger percent increases, with a difference of up to 5 percentage points.

3 Data

To study banking sector wage floor increases, we leverage new matched employer-employee data. We build a novel dataset by linking administrative employee and employer data from the National Institute of Statistics [INS] to data from collective bargaining agreements. We use the matched data to identify bank branches, calculate the increase in an employer's wage bill, and study the effects on earnings and worker flows. In this section, we detail our data sources and describe our analysis sample.[14]

3.1 Employee Social Security Data

Employee data from the National Social Security Agency [CNSS] contains employee payroll records for the period 2008-2021. In this dataset, the employer is identified by a unique identifier. Gross quarterly earnings for each employee are reported by the employer in each quarter for the purposes of payroll taxes. The base wage (wage floor) and other components of pay are not reported separately; we discuss adjustment of the earnings variable for mapping to occupations (which we describe in 3.3) in Appendix A. Demographic employee characteristics include age, sex, the social security office in which the worker is registered, and labor market experience.[15]

Wage Positions as Proxy for Skill Given that our employee data does not include information on education, we use wage position within the firm as a proxy for skill.

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magnitudes in these years reflect those "double increases." These changes came at a time of relatively robust economic growth for the banking sector: over 2015-2021, it grew at 9%, on average (National Institute of Statistics, 2024).

[14] Analysis of these data was conducted at the INS/RNE offices by Ali between December 2022-February 2025.

[15] Informal employment is not recorded in this dataset. We have reason to believe that informal employment is less relevant in this formal and structured sector: In the labor force survey, no respondents with banking sector work experience report moving into or out of informal employment (National Institute of Statistics, 2012).

We define a worker with wage below (above) the firm median as low- (high-) skill. Our justification for this approach is the following. First, as we discussed in section 2 and show in section 5.1 below, wages tend to be highly regimented: the base wage for each worker is the wage floor for their occupation and seniority. Even in branches that pay above the base wage, within-branch ranks (based on earnings) are still informative. This, paired with the fact that the CBA specifies higher degree requirements for "higher" occupations in the wage table, implies that within-branch wages are a useful proxy for skill.[16] Henceforth, we refer to low- (high-) wage workers as low- (high-) skill workers, and to the ratio between the wages of high- and low-skill workers as the skill premium.

Worker Registration Office as Proxy for Branch Given that we observe banks, but not branches, in our administrative data, we use the worker's social security registration office as a proxy for the branch location. Tunisia is divided into 24 governorates and 264 delegations. The offices are more granular than governorates and coarser than delegations. There can be one or many offices per governorate, depending on its size and population (the average is four). Upon joining the firm, each worker is registered in one of 55 social security offices by their employer. This registration process identifies employees within the social security system and establishes their insured status. The employer's address determines which social security office to register the worker in. We consider a bank-social-security-office pairing as a "branch", and plot the number of resulting units across boundaries delineated by social security offices in Panel (a) of Figure 3. Unsurprisingly, we see more branches in big cities such as Ariana and Tunis. However, we still have coverage in other regions, and as we explain more in section 4, we include stringent controls in our specification to compare branches within the same broad region.[17]

[16] Labor force survey data supports this assumption. Appendix Figure A1 plots the occupational mix within wage bins for the banking sector. We discuss cleaning of the labor force data in Appendix section A. Workers in occupations that require university degrees (operations 2, supervisory, and management) are primarily concentrated in the upper half of the wage distribution. In contrast, the second half is mainly composed of service/operations 1 roles, which require up to a high-school degree.

[17] We use the term "branch" for exposition purposes. As multiple physical branches may share the same registration office, our branch measure is not meant to be a one-to-one mapping to all bank branches in Tunisia. Rather, it is a measure of a "local employment cluster" of a bank, akin to the commuting zone in Derenoncourt and Weil (2025). Indeed, it is coarser than the true branch network (around 1,894 branches over 2008-2021 (World Bank, 2025)). In section 4, we discuss our use of stringent controls in the main specification to address potential error in branch identification.

3.2 Other Data Sources

Collective Bargaining Agreement Data We create a novel database of wage tables for the banking sector in Tunisia, allowing us to measure employer exposure to wage floor increases. Using the master document, we identify the 4-digit Tunisian Activity Nomenclature [NAT] sector codes covered by this CBA. We collect all amendments over 2008-2021 and digitize the yearly wage tables. As we discussed in 2.1, in the wage table, every employee sits in a wage cell depending on their occupation and seniority. The wage floor table for the banking sector specifies wage floors by 34 detailed occupations (occupation-grade) and 19 levels of seniority (corresponding to 1 or 2 year increments).[18] In Appendix Figure A2, we show the wage table in effect in 2014 for the banking sector.[19] Wage floors are listed in Tunisian dinars, with a comma denoting the decimal separator (e.g., 739,106 represents 739 dinars and 106 millimes). We calculate the level increases in each wage floor in 2014. After mapping workers to occupations (which we describe in 3.3), we use the occupation-specific increases to calculate the new law-mandated salary for the worker and the resulting wage bill increase for the employer.

Survey Data on Relative-Wage Concerns To provide evidence on how wage compression influences quits and to document views on pay equity in the Tunisian banking sector, we surveyed bank employees. We partnered with a local survey firm to conduct in-person interviews in five Northeast and Northwest governorates of Tunisia in September 2025.[20] Our sample of 165 workers consisted of incumbent employees in 15 private banks across both low- and high-skill occupations. We collected information on age, sex, seniority, and occupation and asked about perceptions around wage floor increases. In a series of hypothetical scenarios, we varied the magnitude of wage compression and elicited the quit response of workers in high-skill occupations.

3.3 Mapping Workers to Occupations

Given that we do not observe worker occupation in the worker data, to calculate employer exposure to the policy, we use information on earnings and seniority to

[18] Per the CBA, seniority is counted from the employee's first day of work at the institution.

[19] Rows classify workers by occupation and grade, while columns organize them by seniority at the employer.

[20] The governorates are Tunis, Ariana, Ben Arous, Manouba, and Kef.

map workers to occupations.[21] Our assignment rule is as follows. In their first year at the employer, we compare each worker's earnings to the entry-level wage floors. We record the highest wage floor that falls below the worker's earnings and assign each worker to the corresponding broad occupation category. We provide additional details in Appendix A. In section 7, we discuss the possible measurement error associated with this exercise and present a robustness check to test the sensitivity of our results to alternative mappings. We only use workers' predicted broad occupations to calculate treatment exposure.

To validate our occupational mapping, we benchmark the resulting composition against survey data. Our mapping yields a distribution that is reasonably similar to that reported in the 2012 Employment and Salaries Survey (ESS) for the financial sector in Tunisia (National Institute of Statistics, 2015): 33% in service/operations 1 (ESS estimate is 17%), 27% in supervisory/operations 2 (ESS estimate is 34%) and 40% in management (ESS estimate is 49%).[22] Moreover, our overall estimate of 67% of high-skill (operations2, supervisory, and management) workers is consistent with the share of banking sector workers who are university graduates in the labor force survey (62%, National Institute of Statistics (2012)).

3.4 Analysis Sample and Outcomes

We clean the matched employer-employee data, constructing a sample of 259 branches for the analysis. We keep only workers who ever work at a bank. To eliminate the small number of marginally attached workers who are uncovered by the CBA (e.g. interns), we keep workers aged between 22-69 years old. We also drop employees paid less than the national minimum wage for four consecutive quarters at any time in the panel (1% of the sample) and workers whose annual earnings are less than the salary resulting from a 40-hour workweek at the national minimum wage.[23] We only keep branches with at least five employees in every year in the pre-period. We exclude

[21]Several studies have tried to link groups of workers to wage floors in OECD countries (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005; Card et al., 2014; Deelen and Euwals, 2014; Díez-Catalán and Villanueva, 2014). This paper uses a new approach.

[22]To enable comparison, we harmonize our five categories to the occupational nomenclature used in the survey. In particular, we map service/operations 1 to "employees and workers", operations 2/supervisory to "middle professions", and management to "managers."

[23]Tunisia also has a separate, national minimum wage for non-agricultural workers (salaire minimum interprofessionnel garanti [SMIG]). This wage applies to the handful of sectors that do not have their own collective bargaining agreement. The SMIG is always lower than wage floors set in CBAs.

branches whose head-count ever exceeds 200 employees.[24] We provide further details on data cleaning in Appendix section A. We refer to the sample of branches seen for the full period of our analysis as the Balanced Sample. Our Balanced Sample consists of 21 banks (two public banks and 19 private banks) and 259 branches.

Summarizing Worker Flows To capture worker flows for our branch-level analysis, we generate intermediary indicators at the worker level and aggregate them into branch-level outcomes. We tag a worker as "retained" if they work at the employer in years $t-1$ and t; as "hired" if they join the employer in year t. We define a worker as "switcher" if they move to a new branch in the next period, and as "leaver" if they are absent from the dataset for at least the next two consecutive years. We interpret the latter as unemployment. We define a young worker as one younger than the median age in our sample (45 years old). For each branch, we sum the number of retained workers, hires, switchers, and leavers by age and skill groups. Log(1+) of these counts are our main outcomes in our empirical analysis.

Summary Statistics We report summary statistics from the matched employer-employee data for our analysis sample of 259 balanced branches. Table 1 presents summary statistics based on data in 2013. We report means for key characteristics and main outcomes of interest at the branch level. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The majority of branches fall into the medium- and large-sized categories: 9% of branches have fewer than 9 employees, 12% have 10–30 employees, 30% fall within the 30–49 employee range. Branches with 50 or more employees account for 49% of the sample. Although branches are concentrated in the north, we have substantial coverage throughout the country: 71% are in the north (32% of all branches are in Tunis), 21% are in the center, and 8% are in the south. In Section 4, we show that treatment intensity is not entirely explained by branch location, lending support to the identification assumptions of our difference-in-differences research design. The average nominal monthly salary in 2012 is TND 2046 (USD 1310). There is variation in mean earnings across branches, as shown by the large standard deviation of TND 442 (USD 283). Worker mobility in this formal and structured sector at baseline is moderate. On average, 19 workers are retained and 1.7 workers are hired. Labor market exits are limited, at 1.4 workers on

[24] All such observations are located in Tunis. If employees belong to branches outside of Tunis but are registered in the capital for convenience, we may inflate the size of Tunis branches and blurring cross-branch differences. To remove this source of measurement error, we drop these outliers.

average.[25] Men and older workers disproportionately account for the branch average workforce: branches have 5 young workers, 16 older workers, 15 men, and 6 women at baseline, on average.

4 Empirical Strategy

We leverage variation in treatment exposure across branches in our empirical strategy. This section outlines the treatment measure and estimation equation. To capture variation across branches in exposure to the 2014 increase, we adapt the exposure measure used in the minimum wage literature (Card, 1992; Dustmann et al., 2022; Derenoncourt and Weil, 2025; Corseuil et al., 2024). We assign each worker the increase corresponding to their broad occupational category from the 2014 policy. We then measure the gap between a branch's wage bill prior to the policy and its wage bill after the increase.

4.1 Constructing the Exposure Measure

We leverage differences in local wage levels and occupational compositions to obtain variation in policy exposure across branches. Branches in high cost-of-living areas may pay their workers more than the base wage and wage amenities stipulated in the CBA. To capture exposure to the policy, we calculate, at the branch level, the percent increase in the wage bill required to make the branch compliant with the 2014 increase. We first average worker earnings over 2008-2013 to smooth out transitory shocks to wages. We then give each worker the level increase in the wage floor for 2014 corresponding to their occupation category. Finally, we sum over all workers at the employer:

$$Exposure_j = \frac{\sum_i (\overline{W}_{ijo(i),2008-2013} + \Delta WF_{o(i),2014})}{\sum_i \overline{W}_{ijo(i),2008-2013}} - 1 \quad (1)$$

where i is worker index, j is branch index, $o(i)$ is occupation index from {service, operations 1, operations 2, supervisory, management}. $\Delta WF_{o(i),2014}$ is the amount increase in occupation $o(i)$'s wage floor in 2014.[26]

We use stringent fixed effects to controls for factors that differ between highly and weakly exposed branches and correlate with wage and employment outcomes.

[25] Gatti et al. (2014) report higher mobility rates in Tunisia overall; however, their analysis includes all sectors, where many activities are low-value-added.

[26] In section 7, we test the robustness of our results to using *average* wage floor changes for occupation $o(i)$ in the post period to define exposure.

Highly exposed firms may face differential demand for their services, belong to less productive banks, or be subject to confounding time-varying regional shocks. To address this concern, first, we include broad region-by-year fixed effects in all specifications. Second, we note that geography does not perfectly predict exposure. Panel (b) of Figure 3 maps the median treatment measure by office, with darker shades indicating stronger exposure. Crucially, there is no clear rich-poor or inland-coast segmentation in exposure: branches in the northeast (Tunis, Zaghouan) and the coast (Monastir, some Sfax delegations) are highly exposed despite being in relatively prosperous regions.

There is variation in treatment, indicating power in our research design. Figure 4 presents the distribution of our exposure measure across branches. The mean raw exposure measure, reported in Table 1, is 17%, and the standard deviation is 2 pp. The large exposure value is consistent with the large 2014 increase, which was partly adjusting for an average inflation of 5% per year over 2008-2014. We standardize the gap to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

4.2 Using the Exposure Measure in a DID

We use the resulting treatment measure in a dynamic difference-in-differences (DID) specification, comparing strongly and weakly exposed branches. We run a regression at the branch-level:

$$y_{jS} = \sum_{k \neq -1}^{T} \beta_k \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t - 2014 = k] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jS} \quad (2)$$

Where y_{jS} include the branch's log mean worker earnings and log employment in period t, α_j and δ_t are branch and year fixed effects, and $\psi_{x(j),t}$ are broad region (North, Center, South) by year fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the branch level. Given that the treatment variable is continuous and standardized, the coefficient interpretation is that a one standard deviation increase in exposure is associated with a $\beta_k \times 100$ percent change in average level outcomes. As we detailed in 3.4, to decompose the employment effect into effects on retention and hires, we also use as outcomes the log counts of retained workers, hires, employer-switchers, sector-switchers, and leavers. We weigh all regressions by employment in the pre-period to make the estimates representative of the average worker.[27]

[27] Our design defines 2014 as the start of wage floor increases, and we use details on the subsequent increase timelines to help interpret the event study dynamic effects. The implication of repeated wage

A general lack of pretrends for our key outcomes supports the standard assumption of parallel trends, and our results are robust to relaxing the "strong" parallel trends assumption underlying the use of a continuous treatment measure. As we show in section 5 below, the lack of pretrends close to event time allows us to interpret changes in earnings or employment trajectory as being only explained through the branches' differential exposure to the policy. However, our design also invokes the "strong" parallel trends assumption (Callaway et al., 2024), which restricts treatment effect heterogeneity and makes it possible to compare units with different 'treatment dosage.' Specifically, we assume that high-exposure units, if given low exposure instead, would have had the same treatment effects from an incremental increase in exposure as the low-exposure units. In section 7, we conduct a robustness check with a binary exposure variable to relax this assumption.

Branches have discretion over wage-setting, allowing us to compare strongly and weakly treated branches within the same bank and to control for bank-wide confounding policies. While time FEs control for global shocks and branch FEs account for time-invariant characteristics, there may be year-specific shocks that are shared by all branches of the same bank, such as a bank-wide policy change or performance shock. We first implement the baseline regression for overall earnings and employment then explore how the coefficients change when we include a bank by year fixed effect. In this augmented specification, the coefficients β_k identify changes in outcomes associated with a 1 sd-larger gap relative to the bank-year average in 2013. As we show in section 5, we find that an initial large disemployment effect is not robust to the inclusion of these controls. Therefore, we adopt the more stringent regression in the remainder of our analysis.[28]

To provide granular evidence on wage compression for incumbents and to characterize the destinations of young high-skill workers who separate from their branches, we estimate worker-level regressions. We estimate a version of regression (2) at the worker level:

$$y_{jit} = \gamma \times Exposure_{ji} \times \mathbf{1}[t - 2014 \geq 0] + \eta_i + \alpha_t + \Omega_{x(ij),t} + \epsilon_{jit} \tag{3}$$

floor increases (Figure 1) for our analysis is that earnings changes in a given year after 2014 can reflect both the wage floor increase for that year and the continuing effect from previous increases. We test the robustness of our results to using *average* wage floor changes for occupation $o(i)$ in the post period to define exposure (section 7).

[28] This specification has the added advantage of addressing the potential error in branch identification we discussed in 3.4.

Where y_{jit} are various worker-level outcomes including the worker's within-branch-age-group rank (based on earnings) and the worker's wage gap relative to low-skill workers. The term $Exposure_{ji}$ is the branch-level treatment as defined in (1). The parameters η_i and α_t are worker and year fixed effects, and $\Omega_{x(ij),t}$ are broad region (North, Center, South) by year and bank by year fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the branch level. With worker fixed effects, γ identifies the additional effect of the policy on the within-worker outcome in strongly treated firms. For example, it compares the change in a strongly treated worker's rank (relative to own rank in the preperiod) to the change in a less-treated worker's rank.

5 Results

5.1 Descriptive Evidence on Binding Wage Floors

We use labor force survey data to show that many wages cluster around the bargained floor. The assumption that wage floors matter for both low- and high-skill workers is important for our research design, yet, to our knowledge, there is no existing direct micro-level empirical evidence on the validity of this assumption in Tunisia.[29] In the labor force survey dataset, we observe occupation and can match respondents to their wage floors. To increase power and external validity, we use data from all sectors. We detail our cleaning procedure of this data in Appendix section A. Appendix Figure A3a shows a histogram of the ratio of the actual wage to the wage floor. A sharp spike around 1.15 indicates that many wages bunch close to the bargained floor, consistent with binding floors.

We also use our administrative data for the banking sector to show that minima extend throughout the entire earnings distribution in this setting. Appendix Figure A3b plots the distribution of monthly earnings (in dinars) in quarter 2 of 2014 against wage floors for the banking sector. We plot, as vertical dashed lines, wage floors for the highest grade in each of three groups: i) service and operations, ii) supervisory staff, and iii) management, in addition to the maximum wage floor. We choose the 4-year seniority wage floor to capture permanent employees.[30] We restrict the sample to male incumbent workers over 2010-2014 (N=5,767). Two features in the figure are worth

[29]Indirect evidence consistent with binding floors can be found in Ali et al. (2025a). In contrast with results in the literature showing positive effects of exporting on wages, that paper finds that, despite an increase in export activity, wages in this setting do not respond to reduced export costs.

[30]In Tunisia, a temporary contract can be renewed for up to four years (Tunisian Labor Code, 2003).

noting. First, unlike with standard minimum wage settings, where floors typically sit at the left tail of wages, wage floors here cut deep into the earnings distribution. Second, despite the mass of workers paid outside the wage table, we still see some evidence of bunching to the right of wage floors.

As wage floors in this setting constitute the base wage for workers, by increasing the wage floor, the shocks in 2014 and subsequent years applied to all workers. In Appendix Figure A4, we plot histograms of nominal average monthly earnings (in dinars) in the banking sector by year, using worker-level social security data on earnings. The vertical line, which is fixed across all panels, shows the lowest wage floor for 2014. Consistent with the comprehensive nature of wage floors, rather than seeing shifts in only the left tail of the wage distribution over the years, we see a rightward shift in the entire distribution.

5.2 Regression Results

Having established that wage floors in this setting matter for both low- and high-skill workers, we now present the effects of new bargained wages on mean earnings and employment flows.

5.2.1 Mean Worker Earnings and the Skill Premium

The pre-period coefficients from the event study serve as validation of the parallel trends assumption. Panel (1) of Figure 5 shows the dynamic effects on branch log mean worker earnings using the Balanced Sample of 259 branches from the baseline regression (2), while Panel (2) shows the results from the regression with bank by year FE to probe coefficient stability. Coefficients β_k from regression 2 are plotted with 95% confidence intervals. Leads of more than four years prior to the event show some differential trends. However, these are in the opposite direction of our treatment effects, making our estimates of the increase in earnings due to the policy conservative. Between periods -4 and -2, the leads are all statistically indistinguishable from zero. We report corresponding estimates with pooled pre and post periods in Table 2. In each column, we report the coefficient on an interaction between $Exposure_j$ and an indicator for the post period. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The "Mean dep. var." row reports the pre-period mean in levels. The first column includes branch, year, and broad region by year fixed effects. The second column adds bank by year fixed effects.

Worker earnings respond to increases in bargained wage floors. An additional standard deviation (2 pp) in branch exposure is associated with 2% higher mean worker earnings in 2015, and 5-8% higher mean worker earnings over 2014-2021. The effect is precisely estimated, significant at the 1% level, and robust: the magnitude increases slightly as we saturate the specification. Notably, our estimated coefficient suggests strict compliance with the policy. Moreover, Figure 6 shows an increase in earnings for both young (Panel (1)) and old (Panel (2)) workers, confirming that 2014 increases apply to all employees.

Growth in mean earnings for more strongly treated branches involves substantial dynamic effects. Rather than seeing a one-time persistent increase in Panel (1) of Figure 5, we see a rise in magnitude over time. The pattern of multiple discrete jumps aligns broadly with the policy timeline. Larger magnitudes of the coefficients in these later periods is consistent with the increasing amounts of changes to wage floors in some later years.

Within-firm ranks of incumbent young high-skill workers fall, suggesting a reduction of the skill premium. To remove composition effects, we use only incumbent workers in the branch during 2008-2021. For young workers at baseline, we calculate, in period t, the within-branch-age-group rank, scaling it to be between (0,1]. In Table A1, we report the results of regression 3 on this outcome for low- and high-skill workers separately, using for each the samples of workers in the Balanced (branch) sample seen in the labor market over the entire analysis period (6,595 and 6,274 workers, respectively). In 1-sd-higher-treatment branches, the high-skill worker rank falls by 2 pp (col (2), significant at the 10 percent level), consistent with wage compression.[31]

5.2.2 Overall Employment

We found that branches comply with the increases by raising worker earnings and reducing the skill premium. How does employment adjust in response to these changes?

We find little evidence of overall disemployment effects. In Panel (3) of Figure 5, we show the dynamic effects on employment from the baseline specification (without bank by year fixed effects). The average effect from this initial specification is -5%. As

[31] It surprising that we do not see an increase in the rank for low-skill workers (col 1). One reason could be that, while we condition on age and skill, the ranks could be changing differentially across seniority, leading to an overall null effect for low-skill workers.

we add controls, however, the effect on employment attenuates, falling to -3% (Panel (4)). While the point estimate is negative, we do not reject the null of no change at standard confidence levels. The effect is also economically small: on net, an employer with one standard deviation higher exposure loses, on average, 0.6 additional worker after the policy (the baseline mean, reported in Table 2, is 21). Dividing the coefficient on log employment by that on log mean earnings, we estimate an average conditional labor demand elasticity of -0.42 (column 2 of Table 2). The elasticity more than halves in magnitude, compared to column 1. Given that the initial large disemployment effect is not robust to the inclusion of bank by year controls, we adopt the more stringent regression in the remainder of our analysis.

5.2.3 Worker Flows, by Age

Overall employment masks important heterogeneity by worker flows and age group: young workers separate more. In Figure 7, we report results from our preferred specification for three outcomes: employed workers, retained workers, and hires, separately by age group. We use the log(1+) transformation of counts. In Table 3, we report the corresponding pooled estimates and baseline level means. The point estimate for employment of young workers is negative but imprecise, at -3% (Panel (1)). Panel (2) shows a clear downward trend with large retention falls for young workers, beginning in 2015 and persisting thereafter.[32] The overall effect is -9 percent relative to a baseline mean of 10 workers (Table 3) and is significant at the 10 percent level. Panel (3) presents effects on hires. For young workers, hires rise by 16 percent on average, though the effects in levels are economically smaller than those on retention. The event study coefficients are noisier than those for retention, reflecting limited statistical power to detect subgroup-by-time variation in hires. This is partly explained by the smaller baseline mean of hires.

In contrast, older worker employment is unchanged. The estimate on employment is positive but statistically insignificant at 3% (Panel (4)). Panel (5) shows no meaningful change in retention for older workers (the ATT, at 0.04, is statistically insignificant). For older worker hires, the coefficients in Panel (6) show a modest downward trend; the average post-period effect is negative at -3 percent. While statistically significant, it is economically small given the low baseline mean of

[32]Because the indicators retained and hired are defined relative to year $t-1$, no effects are estimated in 2008, the first year in our sample, leading to a smaller number of observations for regressions using these outcomes.

1.14 hires. Given that separations are concentrated in young workers, we focus on these workers for the rest of the analysis.

5.2.4 Worker Flows, by Skill

First, we find an increase in hires in response to higher wages, suggesting an imperfectly competitive labor market. In Figure 8, we show the effects on earnings, retention, and hires by skill. Panels (1) and (2) confirm that earnings increase for both groups within young workers. Nevertheless, hires (Panels (5) and (6)) increase for both low- and high-skill workers, with similar magnitudes (8 percent and 11 pct, respectively). This pattern is consistent with predictions of monopsonistic labor market models (Manning, 2003). To probe further, we explore whether employment gains covary with a measure of labor market power. Table 4 reports results from a triple-difference specification based on regression 2, where we also interact the main interaction term with the branch's share of local banking employment at baseline. Employment effects are *positive* and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for branches with a high measure of labor market power (share of local banking employment higher than sample 90th percentile). We return to this result when we lay out our conceptual framework in section 6.

Second, we document divergence in the retention effects within young workers. The declines in retention are concentrated among high-skill workers: the number of retained workers goes down by 17 pct, in comparison to 2 percent for low-skill workers (Panels (3) and (4)). Do these separations correspond to layoffs or quits? We track separating workers to answer this question.

5.2.5 Tracking Separating Workers, by Skill

The declines in retention for young high-skill workers are followed mainly by re-employment, suggesting quits. We examine whether young high-skill workers transition to another job or exit the labor market altogether (go into unemployment). Panel (b) of Figure 9 plots the ATTs and 90 percent confidence intervals from regression 2 on the x-axis, using post-separation outcomes as dependent variables. First, we discuss the effects on the log(1+) number of workers who switch workplaces or leave the labor market. The number of workers who find another job increases by 3 percent, on average. Crucially, we see no evidence of an increase in unemployment: the change, at 1 pct, is small and statistically insignificant. Low-skill workers (Panel (a)) exhibit no transitions, consistent with the lack of effects on separations for this group of workers, and suggesting a skill-specific friction in the labor market.

Strikingly, young high-skill workers disproportionately move to workplaces with a larger skill premium, without necessarily accruing higher pay. The overall increase in high-skill separations raises the following question: Why do these workers leave their branches despite receiving wage floor increases? We discuss the effects on the log(1+) number of workers who switch sectors, switch to higher-pay workplaces, switch to higher-wage-inequality (skill premium) workplaces, or switch to higher salaries. In Panel (b) of Figure 9, the number of young high-skill workers who move to higher-wage-inequality workplaces goes up by 3 percent. At the same time, the coefficient on the number of workers who switch to higher-paying workplaces is statistically indistinguishable from zero.

We check for whether switching to larger-skill-premium workplaces reflects pursuit of other correlates of the skill premium, such as higher pay or status, finding little evidence of this. We disaggregate switchers by those to higher or lower salaries, and find that, on average, the switching is not driven by moves to higher salaries. For more granular evidence, we use worker-level regressions and focus on young switchers in the Balanced Sample (516 workers). Table A2 shows two findings. First, the worker's rank at the destination firm is unchanged (col (2)), consistent with no change in status. However, the gap between the worker's own wage and the firm's young low-skill mean wage increases by 9 percent (col (1), significant at the 10 percent level). Overall, the patterns suggest that the salient destination characteristic is not a higher wage but the more unequal pay structure.

5.2.6 Survey Evidence

We hypothesize that when the policy compressed wage floors, high-skill workers perceived a decline in utility. We have documented that when the policy raised wage floors of low-skill workers by more in percentage terms, high-skill quits increased, as evidenced by the ability of high-skill workers to find employment after separation. We further saw that workers disproportionately move to workplaces with a larger skill premium, suggesting they choose to separate in search of positions that preserve their relative-wage. This finding is consistent with a "zero-sum" cognitive framework, whereby individuals perceive others' gains as being at their own expense

(Chinoy et al., 2025).[33]

Survey analysis shows that higher compression pushes younger workers toward quitting, suggesting they have relative-wage concerns. We elicit the quit sensitivity to wage compression of respondents in high-skill occupations (operations 2, supervisory, and management roles, per the banking CBA). In a series of hypothetical scenarios, we vary the magnitude of wage compression and elicit respondents' likelihood of quitting. We ask: *Suppose that service staff receive a +6% wage increase, while managers receive a +4% wage increase. On a scale from 1 to 4, how would you rate the probability of leaving your current job?* We repeat the question for service staff increases of +8% and +10%. We estimate a logit specification for the survey subsample of 58 young high-skill workers:

$$\text{Quit}_i = \mu + \beta\, Compression_i + \gamma\, gov_i + \delta\, female_i + \theta\, seniority_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{4}$$

where the dependent variable Quit_i collapses the four–point Likert measure of quit intention (1 = "certainly not quit", 4 = "certainly quit") into a binary indicator. The key regressor $Compression_i$ measures the difference between service and management wage floor increases (2, 4, or 6 percentage points), with higher values corresponding to more wage compression. All specifications include controls for governorate, gender, and seniority. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Coefficient β captures how stronger compression changes the probability of choosing to quit. In Table 6, we report the results. The estimated effect is positive and significant: a 1 pp increase in wage compression raises the probability of quitting by 2 pp for young workers. These findings are in line with organizational behavior research showing that perceptions about wage fairness impact real work outcomes (e.g. effort in Bennett (2005)).

5.2.7 Possible Confounders

We rule out four competing explanations for the increase in separations for high-skill workers. One possibility is that firms lay off high-skill workers. However, a labor demand response would also predict that firms reduce hiring. Instead, we see hires of high-skill workers increase, consistent with firms replacing voluntary separations. A second possibility is that firms offset higher labor costs by cutting back on other components of compensation, similar to the wage cushion compression documented

[33] That paper also documents that younger people have a more zero-sum view than older cohorts.

by Card and Cardoso (2022) in Portugal. First, minimum benefits (e.g., monthly transportation, "bank representation" allowance) and other non-wage amenities (sick leave, vacation days, etc.) are set in the CBA, leaving little scope at the branch-level for downward adjustment on this margin. Second, a reduction in wage cushions that offsets an increase in the wage floor is inconsistent with the growth in overall earnings we have documented for young high-skill workers (Figure 8). A third possibility is substitution: firms replace young high-skill workers with low-skill ones. Two facts make this unlikely. First, we would expect this if cost-minimizing firms shift toward the now relatively more expensive group. However, the policy raised wage floors of low-skill labor by more than those of high-skill labor. Second, the worker flows are inconsistent with one-to-one replacement: multiplying the coefficients in cols 6 and 7 in Panel A of Appendix Table 5 by the sample means, we see about 0.08 additional low-skill hires for 0.68 high-skill separations (i.e., 0.12 hires per high-skill worker lost). A fourth possibility is that workers leave not for higher wage inequality but to work in a more meritocratic environment. However, the fact that workers are willing to take a pay cut is inconsistent with this explanation: a high-skill worker who is concerned only about meritocracy should care about maintaining their wage.

6 Conceptual Framework

We lay out a conceptual framework of how firms and workers of different skill groups respond to exogenous changes in wage floors and skill premia in a setting with monopsony and binding wage floors. The finite employment elasticities in response to a wage increase we have documented thus far are inconsistent with the standard model of a competitive labor market.[34] Moreover, the hires increases further suggest that employers have monopsony.[35] As with our analysis, we focus on young workers. We adapt the textbook monopsony framework (Manning, 2003) to model the labor market for each skill group with binding wage floors. At baseline, workers are paid the binding wage floor, and employment is below the competitive level. We model the labor supply of workers through a discrete-choice framework (Card et al.,

[34] The model of a perfectly competitive labor market assumes that the labor supply facing an individual firm is perfectly elastic (Manning, 2003).

[35] Employer power in the product market would not explain our results. The ability of firms to change product prices can attenuate the comparative statics in the labor market (Kroft et al., 2025). However, it would not reverse them. Therefore, it is difficult to rationalize hiring increases with that model.

2018) with relative-wage considerations. Workers have idiosyncratic tastes for different workplaces. The policy changes both wage floors and the skill premium. For both low- and high-skill workers, the increase in wage floors induces a movement along the labor supply curve. For high-skill workers, in addition, the reduction in the skill premium induces a *shift* in the labor supply curve. Our simple framework generates distinct comparative statics by group that line up with the empirical findings we have presented.

6.1 General Monopsony Set-up with Binding Wage Floor

We start with the textbook monopsony framework (Manning, 2003). Assume the firm is a simple monopsonist that pays a single wage to all workers of a given type $T \in \{L, H\}$ (low-skill and high-skill). Given that we rule out substitution (as discussed in section 5.2.7), we consider labor markets for the two different skills as separate. The firm faces an upward-sloping labor supply curve $N(w)$, with inverse supply $w(N)$. Total labor cost is $w(N)N$. The firm has a revenue function $Y(N)$ and chooses N to maximize profits:

$$\pi(N) = Y(N) - w(N)N. \tag{5}$$

The first-order condition is:

$$Y'(N) = w(N) + w'(N)N. \tag{6}$$

The marginal cost of labor (MCL) has two components: the wage paid to the marginal worker (the average cost) and the additional cost of raising the wage for all incumbents.

The monopsonist hires less than in a competitive market. The elasticity of the labor supply facing the firm is

$$\varepsilon_{Nw} = \frac{w \cdot N'(w)}{N}. \tag{7}$$

Using 6 and 7, the MCL can be written as

$$\text{MCL}(w) = \left(1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{Nw}}\right)w. \tag{8}$$

Under perfect competition ($\varepsilon_{Nw} \to \infty$), $MCL = w$, the firm sets w^c, the competitive wage, equal to the marginal revenue product:

$$Y'(N) = w^c.$$

With finite ε_{Nw}, MCL exceeds w: the monopsonist pays w^m, a markdown on the marginal revenue product.[36]

6.2 Labor Supply

To capture the intuition that high-skill workers care not only about their wage in levels but also as it relates to that of their low-skill colleagues, we micro-found the labor supply function in our framework using a discrete-choice model (Card et al., 2018). We presented evidence that when the policy raised wage floors of low-skill workers by more in percentage terms, high-skill employees quit. We incorporate this relative-wage concern by augmenting the utility function in the Card et al. (2018) framework with an additional term: the firm-specific skill premium. This allows for different margins of adjustment across skill groups.

There are $\mathcal{J}$ firms. Each firm $j \in \mathcal{J}$ posts a pair (w_{jL}, w_{jH}) of skill-specific wages that workers observe at no cost. Firms have differentiated work environments over which workers have heterogeneous preferences. In general, the indirect utility from working at firm j for worker i of type $T \in \{L, H\}$ is

$$U_{ijS} = \eta \ln w_{jS} + \alpha_S \ln\left(\frac{w_{jS}}{w_{jS'}}\right) + a_{jS} + \epsilon_{ijS}.$$

We assume that the outside option is 0. The parameter ϵ_{ijS} captures idiosyncratic preferences for working at firm j (relating, for example, to non-wage match factors such as firm location) and are independent draws from a Type-I extreme value distribution with scale 1. The parameter a_{jS} is a firm-specific amenity common to all workers of type S.

Because young low-skill wages are anchored to binding floors and higher-grade

[36] With a wage floor, employment and wages are higher than the monopsony outcome but lower than the competitive level. Assume the wage floor binds

$$w^m < \bar{w}_1 \leq w^c,$$

then employment is pinned down by supply at the floor:

$$N_1 = N(\bar{w}_1).$$

pay is not observable to this group, we set $\alpha_L = 0$, making the relative-wage consideration bind only for high-skill workers. We henceforth drop the subscript on α.

For low-skill workers:

$$U_{ijL} = \eta \ln w_{jL} + a_{jL} + \epsilon_{ijL}. \tag{9}$$

For high-skill workers:

$$U_{ijH} = \eta \ln w_{jH} + \alpha \ln\Big(\frac{w_{jH}}{w_{jL}}\Big) + a_{jH} + \epsilon_{ijH}. \tag{10}$$

The relative-wage is an amenity for high-skill workers. In equilibrium, these workers accept their positions not only because of the wage, but also because the relative-wage is reflective of their status within the firm.

Given the wages, workers are free to choose any firm. Following McFadden (1972), the probability that worker i chooses firm j is the probability that j delivers the highest utility among all available choices:

$$P_{ij} = \Pr\Big(j = \arg\max_{k\in\mathcal{J}} U_{ik}\Big).$$

With Type-I Extreme Value errors, this probability has the closed-form multinomial logit expression:

$$P_{ij|H} = \frac{\exp\Big(\eta \ln w_{jH} + \alpha \ln\big(\frac{w_{jH}}{w_{jL}}\big) + a_{jH}\Big)}{\sum_{k\in\mathcal{J}} \exp\Big(\eta \ln w_{kH} + \alpha \ln\big(\frac{w_{kH}}{w_{kL}}\big) + a_{kH}\Big)}.$$

We follow the simplification in Card et al. (2018) and assume that there are many firms, such that the utility from each individual job is trivial in the total sum. The choice probabilities are approximated by the exponential probabilities:

$$P_{ij|H} \approx \lambda_H \exp\Big(\eta \ln w_{jH} + \alpha \ln\big(\frac{w_{jH}}{w_{jL}}\big) + a_{jH}\Big),$$

Where λ is a constant common to all firms in the market. The supply of high-skill workers facing firm j is given by:

$$\ln N_{jH} \approx \ln(M_H \lambda_H) + \eta \ln w_{jH} + \alpha \ln\big(\frac{w_{jH}}{w_{jL}}\big) + a_{jH}.$$

Where M_H is the total number of workers S in the market. The elasticities are given by:

$$\frac{\partial \ln N_{jH}}{\partial \ln w_{jH}} = \eta + \alpha \tag{11}$$

$$\frac{\partial \ln N_{jH}}{\partial \ln w_{jL}} = -\alpha \tag{12}$$

Comparative Statics: Low-skill Workers Given equation (9), the supply of low-skill workers is only a function of their own wage:

$$\ln N_{jL} \approx \ln(M_L \lambda_L) + \eta \ln w_{jL} + a_{jL}.$$

Let the initial floor be $\bar{w}_L^1$. The policy raises the floor to $\bar{w}_L^2 > \bar{w}_L^1$ with $\bar{w}_L^2 \leq w_L^c$. Earnings rise with the higher floor. Equilibrium employment increases:

$$N_L(\bar{w}_L^2) > N_L(\bar{w}_L^1).$$

We illustrate this prediction in Figure 10, writing the supply function in levels:

$$N_{jL} = c_L \cdot w_{jL}^{\eta}$$

where $c_L = M_L \lambda_L + \exp(a_{jL})$.

Comparative Statics: High-skill Workers Given equation (10), the supply of high-skill workers is a function of both their own wage and the skill premium. Let the initial floor be $\bar{w}_H^1$. The policy raises the floor to $\bar{w}_H^2 > \bar{w}_H^1$ with $\bar{w}_H^2 \leq w_H^c$. Earnings rise with the higher floor. The policy also raises w_{jL}. From (12), with $\alpha > 0$, the supply shifts inward. When this shift dominates, equilibrium employment decreases:[37]

$$N_H(\bar{w}_H^2, \bar{w}_L^2) < N_H(\bar{w}_H^1, \bar{w}_L^1).$$

We illustrate this prediction in Figure 11, writing the supply function in levels:

$$N_{jH} = \frac{c_H}{w_{jL}^{\alpha}} \cdot w_{jH}^{\eta}$$

[37]The shift dominates iff $\alpha > \frac{\Delta ln w_{jH}}{\Delta \ln w_{jL} - \Delta \ln w_{jH}} \eta$. We recover η from our regression estimates for low-skill workers. Our regression effectively instruments the endogenous wage with the exposure measure. η is approximately 0.4. This is the ratio of the effect on employment (0.02 in Panel A, col (3) of Table 5) to that on mean worker earnings (0.05 in Panel A, col (1)).

where $c_H = M_L \lambda_H + \exp(a_{jH})$.

7 Robustness

Our results are robust to various alternative definitions of the treatment variable.

Robustness to Alternative Occupational Mapping Our results are robust to worker reassignment to lower-grade occupations. Because the treatment intensity is based on predicted occupations, misclassification can bias estimates. When a worker earns well above the base for their true occupation, our adjustment of earnings to bring them closer to the base may not fully remove the wage cushion. In such cases, matching a worker to the highest wage floor below their pay could assign them to an artificially high occupation. This may overstate treatment intensity, making it appear as if the employer faced a stronger treatment per worker than was actually the case. When the true effect of treatment is positive, this misclassification attenuates the estimated coefficients toward zero. We conduct a robustness check in Table A3. To bound the treatment measure, we assign the worker to each possible alternative occupation (other wage floor below their earnings). Specifically, as indicated by the "occ. mapping" row in the Table, we downgrade each worker by x occupations and recompute the treatment variable. We find that the main findings on employment and earnings are broadly qualitatively similar up to 6 reassignments. As expected, the coefficients on earnings in the first Panel vary with our redefined exposure. However, there is no consistent evidence of an adverse employment effect; the coefficient is generally around -0.04 and statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Robustness to Using Binary Exposure Our results are robust to replacing our continuous exposure with a binary exposure measure. Recent work has highlighted caveats with using a TWFE regression with a continuous treatment variable (Callaway et al., 2024).[38] As a first attempt to address these issues, we split the sample of branches at the median exposure measure (17%) and use a binary treatment variable (=1 for gaps higher than median value; 0 otherwise) instead in our regression 2. We reproduce the overall wage and employment result in Appendix Figure A5. The magnitude for earnings is stable, and the employment effect increases

[38] Callaway et al. (2024) show that, under the standard parallel trends assumption, comparing high and low-dose units involves selection bias terms for both the level (the causal effect of experiencing the treatment dose) and slope (the response to a marginal change in the treatment dose) parameters.

in magnitude but remains statistically zero. Overall, the qualitative patterns remain unchanged.

Robustness to Using Exposure Over All Events after 2014 Our results are robust to replacing our exposure with a measure that takes into account the *average* change in wage floors between 2014 and 2021. We recalculate $\Delta WF_{o(i),2014}$ in the exposure measure (1) to be the mean wage floor increase for occupation $o(i)$ over the entire post period. We report the coefficients on overall wages and employment in Table A4. Our results are unchanged.

8 Conclusion

Occupation-specific wage floors are a common wage-setting institution. By setting a wage floor for all workers, including high-skill ones, they may compress the skill premium and have different effects from standard minimum wages. The novelty of this paper is to test this conjecture in a setting with binding wage floors for high-skill workers and large plausibly exogenous shocks to wage floors.

We find a response in worker earnings to wage-floor increases and a lack of aggregate employment changes that masks heterogeneous worker flows. Young low-skill workers are hired more, and young high-skill workers are more likely to separate. These separations appear to be voluntary: young high-skill workers transition to other workplaces with larger skill premium and do not go into unemployment. We find that young workers are more sensitive to wage compression, suggesting that separations are driven by relative-wage concerns.

Our evidence of no meaningful increase in unemployment among young workers has policy implications. It contrasts with policy reports in Tunisia arguing that high wage floors hurt employment prospects of young graduates. We show that wage floors affect the hiring and separations of young workers but do not contribute to their unemployment. Instead, we find scope for wage floors to redistribute rents from branches to workers. Earnings of incumbents rise and no branches close.

How the Arab Spring may have raised career aspirations among young workers, and whether such attitudes contribute to keeping young high-skill workers out of the labor market through supply rather than demand channels, remain open questions for future research.

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9 Figures

Figure 1. **Cumulative Percent Change in Wage Floors**



Notes: Figure shows the cumulative percent change in the 1-year seniority wage floor for the least skilled occupation group (service, blue) and the most skilled occupation group (management, red). Data on wage floors is from the banking sector CBAs.

Figure 2. **Average Wage Floor Percent Increase by Suboccupation**



Notes: Figure shows the average (across seniority) 2014 percent increase in the wage floor by sub-occupation. Low-skill occupations are those which do not require a university degree, per the CBA. Data on wage floors is from the 2014 banking sector CBA.

Figure 3. **Variation Across Bureaus**



(a) **No. of Branches**

(b) **Bite of Increase**

Notes: Figure shows in Panel A the distribution of bank branches across bureaus. Panel B shows the distribution of the median treatment measure defined in Equation 1 across bureaus. Each worker is registered in one of 47 social security offices by their employer when they first join the labor market. The employer's registered office address determines which CNSS office to register the worker in. We consider a bank-social-security-office pairing as a "branch."

Figure 4. **The Exposure Measure**



Notes: Figure shows in the distribution of the standardized version of the treatment measure defined in (1) for the Balanced Sample. $Exposure_j = \frac{\sum_i (\overline{W}_{ijo(i),2008-2013} + \Delta WF_{o(i),2014})}{\sum_i \overline{W}_{ijo(i),2008-2013}}$ where i is worker index, j is branch index, $o(i)$ is occupation index from {service, operations 1, operations 2, supervisory, management}. $\Delta WF_{o(i),2014}$ is the amount change in occupation $o(i)$'s wage floor in 2014.

Figure 5. **Effects on Log Mean Earnings and Employment**



Notes: Figure plots the coefficients and 95 pct confidence intervals from regression $y_{jt} = \sum_{k\neq-1}^{T} \beta_k \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t-2014 = k] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$ for the Balanced Sample. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Outcome is log mean monthly worker earnings in Panels (1) and (2), log Employment in Panels (3) and (4). α_j and δ_t are branch and year fixed effects, and $\psi_{x(j),t}$ are broad region (North, Center, South) by year fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the branch level. Regressions plotted in Panels (1) and (2) do not include bank by year fixed effects. Regressions plotted in Panels (3) and (4) include bank by year fixed effects.

Figure 6. **Effects on Log Mean Earnings by Age Group**



Notes: Figure plots the coefficients and 95 pct confidence intervals from regression $y_{jt} = \sum_{k \neq -1}^{T} \beta_k \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t - 2014 = k] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$ for the Balanced Sample. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Outcome is log mean monthly worker earnings. α_j and δ_t are branch and year fixed effects, and $\psi_{x(j),t}$ are broad region (North, Center, South) by year fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the branch level. We define a young worker as a worker younger than the median age in our sample of 45.

Figure 7. **Heterogeneous Effects on Employment Flows, by Age**



Notes: Figure plots the coefficients and 95 pct confidence intervals from regression $y_{jt} = \sum_{k\neq -1}^{T} \beta_k \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t - 2014 = k] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$ for the Balanced Sample with bank by year fixed effects. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Outcomes are log sums of various subgroups, as indicated by the panel headings. α_j and δ_t are branch and year fixed effects, and $\psi_{x(j),t}$ are broad region (North, Center, South) by year fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the branch level. We define a young worker as a worker younger than the median age in our sample of 45. We define the outcome "retained" or "hired" as 1 if a worker was retained or hired relative to last year.

Figure 8. **Heterogeneous Effects on Earnings and Employment Flows for Young Workers, by Skill**



Notes: Figure plots the coefficients and 95 pct confidence intervals from regression $y_{jt} = \sum_{k\neq-1}^{T} \beta_k \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t-2014 = k] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$ for the Balanced Sample with bank by year fixed effects. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Outcomes are log mean worker earnings or log sums of various subgroups, as indicated by the panel headings. α_j and δ_t are branch and year fixed effects, and $\psi_{x(j),t}$ are broad region (North, Center, South) by year fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the branch level. We define a young worker as a worker younger than the median age in our sample of 45. We define the outcome “retained” or “hired” as 1 if a worker was retained or hired relative to last year.

Figure 9. **Tracking Separating Young Workers, by Skill**



(a) **low-skill**



(b) **high-skill**

Notes: Figure plots the coefficients and 90 pct confidence intervals from regression $y_{jt} = \sum_{k\neq-1}^{T} \beta_k \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t - 2014 = k] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$ for the Balanced Sample with bank by year fixed effects. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Outcomes are log sums of various subgroups, as indicated by the labels. α_j and δ_t are branch and year fixed effects, and $\psi_{x(j),t}$ are broad region (North, Center, South) by year fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the branch level. We define a young worker as a worker younger than the median age in our sample of 45. We define a "switcher" as a worker employed at a new branch in the next period relative to the current one, and "leave LM" as a worker absent from the dataset for at least the next two consecutive years. A high-skill worker is a worker paid more than the branch median wage.

Figure 10. **Monopsony for low-skill Workers**



Notes: Figure illustrates labor market effects for young low-skill workers. S is given by $N_{jL} = c_L \cdot w_{jL}^{\eta}$, where $c_L = M_L \lambda_L + \exp(a_{jL})$. The firm initially operates at point E1 under a binding wage floor. The policy raises wage floors for both low-skill and high-skill workers, but only low-skill wages determine supply. The comparative statics imply a move from E1 to E2: wages are higher and employment expands.

Figure 11. **Monopsony with Relative-Wage Amenity for High-skill Workers**



Notes: Figure illustrates labor market effects for young high-skill workers. S is given by $N_{jH} = \frac{c_H}{w_{jL}^{\alpha}} \cdot w_{jH}^{\eta}$ where $c_H = M_L \lambda_H + \exp(a_{jH})$. The firm initially operates at point E1 under a binding wage floor. The policy raises wage floors for both low-skill and high-skill workers. As a result, there is a leftward shift in the inverse labor supply. The comparative statics imply a move from E1 to E2: wages are higher and employment falls.

10 Tables

Table 1. **Summary Statistics**

	Mean/SD
Branch Size: 5-9	0.09
	(0.29)
Branch Size: 10-29	0.12
	(0.33)
Branch Size: 30-49	0.30
	(0.46)
Branch Size: 50+	0.49
	(0.50)
Mean earnings (TND)	2045.68
	(441.58)
Gap, non-standardized	0.17
	(0.02)
N retained	19.45
	(18.21)
N hired	1.72
	(2.85)
N leavers	1.36
	(2.22)
N young	5.14
	(7.70)
N old	16.03
	(15.07)
N male	15.13
	(14.07)
N female	6.04
	(7.08)
Mean bonus share	1.22
	(0.33)
Tunis	0.32
	(0.47)
North	0.71
	(0.45)
Centre	0.21
	(0.41)
South	0.08
	(0.27)
N	259

Notes: Table shows means of variables for the Balanced Sample. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Source is social security data for 2013. Worker-level earnings are winsorized at the 10% level. "Gap, non-standardized" refers to the exposure measure defined in 1. We tag a worker as "retained" if they work at the employer in years $t-1$ and t; as "hired" if they join the employer in year t. We define a young worker as one younger than the median age in our sample (45 years old). We sum the number of retained workers and hires by age and skill group at the branch level. N row reports the number of branches.

Table 2. **Earnings and Employment, Pooled time periods**

	(1)	(2)
	Log Mean Earnings	
Exposure × Post	0.05***	0.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
R2	0.95	0.97
Clusters	259	259
N	3626	3626
year FE	Y	Y
branch FE	Y	Y
bank x year FE		Y
Mean dep. var. (levels, pre)	2462.45	2462.45
	Log Employment	
Exposure × Post	-0.05*	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)
R2	0.93	0.97
Clusters	259	259
N	3626	3626
year FE	Y	Y
branch FE	Y	Y
bank x year FE		Y
Mean dep. var. (levels, pre)	20.66	20.66
Elasticity	-1.03	-0.43

Notes: Table reports the coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regression $y_{jt} = \beta \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t \geq 2014] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$, using the Balanced Sample. Regressions are weighted by pre-period employment. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Dependent variable means are for levels (not logs).

Table 3. **Earnings and Employment, Pooled time periods, by Age**

	(1)	(2)
	young employed	**old employed**
Exposure × Post	-0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Clusters	259	259
N	3626	3626
year FE	Y	Y
branch FE	Y	Y
bank x year FE	Y	Y
Mean dep. var. (levels, pre)	11	12
	young retained	**old retained**
Exposure × Post	-0.08*	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Clusters	259	259
N	3367	3367
year FE	Y	Y
branch FE	Y	Y
bank x year FE	Y	Y
Mean dep. var. (levels, pre)	10	12
	young hires	**old hires**
Exposure × Post	0.16***	-0.04**
	(0.05)	(0.02)
Clusters	259	259
N	3367	3367
year FE	Y	Y
branch FE	Y	Y
bank x year FE	Y	Y
Mean dep. var. (levels, pre)	2	1

Notes: Table reports the coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regression $y_{jt} = \beta \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t \geq 2014] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$, using the Balanced Sample. Regressions are weighted by pre-period employment. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). We tag a worker as "retained" if they work at the employer in years $t-1$ and t; as "hired" if they join the employer in year t. We define a young worker as one younger than the median age in our sample (45 years old). We sum the number of retained workers and hires by age and skill group at the branch level and use log transformations as outcomes in our regressions. Dependent variable means are for levels (not logs).

Table 4. **Heterogeneous Effects on Employment by Employer Share of Local Banking Employment**

	(1)	(2)
	Log Employment	
Exposure × Post	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Exposure × Post × 1[High share of regional emp.]	0.16**	
	(0.07)	
Exposure × Post × Share of regional emp.		0.12
		(0.15)
Clusters	259	259
N	3626	3626
Branch FE	X	X
Year FE	X	X
regionxYear FE	X	X
BankxYear FE	X	X
Mean dep. var. (levels, pre)	21	21

Notes: Table reports the coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from triple DID version of regression $y_{jt} = \sum_{k \neq -1}^{T} \beta_k \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t - 2014 = k] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$ with pooled time periods in pre and post, using the Balanced Sample. Regressions are weighted by pre-period employment. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Share of regional employment is branch's share of regional (bureau-level) employment in the banking sector, at baseline.

Table 5. **Earnings, Employment, Retention, Hires, Pooled time periods, By Age and Skill**

	(1) Earnings low-skill	(2) Earnings high-skill	(3) Emp. low-skill	(4) Emp. high-skill	(5) Retained low-skill	(6) Retained high-skill	(7) Hires low-skill	(8) Hires high-skill
				Panel A: Young				
Exposure × Post	0.05***	0.07***	0.02	-0.10*	-0.02	-0.17***	0.08*	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Clusters	259	254	259	259	259	259	259	259
N	3328	3116	3626	3626	3367	3367	3367	3367
year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
branch FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
bank x year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean dep. var. (levels, pre)	1731	2907	6	4	5	4	1	0
				Panel B: Old				
Exposure × Post	0.10***	0.09***	-0.00	0.07	0.01	0.06	-0.02	-0.02*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Clusters	253	259	259	259	259	259	259	259
N	3185	3522	3626	3626	3367	3367	3367	3367
year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
branch FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
bank x year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mean dep. var. (levels, pre)	1812	3256	4	7	4	7	0	0

Notes: Table reports the coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regression $y_{jt} = \beta \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t \geq 2014] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$, using the Balanced Sample. Regressions are weighted by pre-period employment. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). We tag a worker as "retained" if they work at the employer in years $t-1$ and t; as "hired" if they join the employer in year t. We define a young worker as one younger than the median age in our sample (45 years old). We sum the number of retained workers and hires by age and skill group at the branch level and use log transformations as outcomes in our regressions. Panel A and B show outcomes for young and old workers, respectively. Dependent variable means are for levels (not logs).

Table 6. **Effect of Compression on Quit Likelihood**

	(1) **Quit Likelihood**
Compression	0.02**
	(0.01)
R2	0.13
Clusters	58
N	174
Controls	Y

Notes: Table reports the coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regression $\text{Quit}_i = \mu + \beta\, Compression_i + \gamma\, gov_i + \delta\, female_i + \theta\, seniority_i + \varepsilon_i$, where the outcome is a binary indicator for intending to quit (collapsed from a four-point Likert scale). The coefficient on compression is the change in $\Pr(\text{quit} = 1)$ for a one-unit increase in wage compression. Sample is 58 young (<45) high-skill (Operations 2, Supervisory, Management) banking workers. Controls: gender, tenure, and governorate; standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Source: original survey data.

11 Appendix

Figure A1. **Occupation mix within the banking sector wage distribution**



Notes: Figure shows the average occupational mix within the banking sector wage distribution. Source: labor force data for 2014, 2015, and 2017. Sample is 300 banking and financial institutions workers. We match the five banking sector categories to the occupational nomenclature used in the survey (the INS's Professional Category Nomenclature): we map service/operations 1 to "employees", operations 2/supervisory to "middle professions", and management to "managers."

Figure A2. **Wage Table Effective 2014, Banking Sector**

19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	التربص			الدرجة
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1				مدة البقاء بالدرجة
33	31	29	27	25	23	21	19	17	15	13	11	9	7	5	4	3	2	1			الأقدمية الفعلية
																			المرتبة	الرتبة	الصنف
831,386	826,676	821,966	817,256	812,546	807,836	800,626	795,916	791,206	786,496	781,786	777,076	769,866	765,156	760,446	755,736	751,026	746,316	739,106	3	عون خدمات	أعوان التنفيذ والخدمات
835,596	830,886	826,176	821,466	816,756	812,046	807,336	800,126	795,416	790,706	785,996	781,286	776,576	769,366	764,656	759,946	755,236	750,526	745,816	2		
839,806	835,096	830,386	825,676	820,966	816,256	811,546	806,836	799,626	794,916	790,206	785,496	780,786	776,076	768,866	764,156	759,446	754,736	750,026	1		
842,946	838,236	833,526	828,816	824,106	819,396	814,686	809,976	802,766	798,056	793,346	788,636	783,926	779,216	774,506	767,296	762,586	757,876	753,166	رئيسي		
842,946	838,236	833,526	828,816	824,106	819,396	814,686	809,976	802,766	798,056	793,346	788,636	783,926	779,216	774,506	767,296	762,586	757,876	753,166	3	عون تتبع	
847,156	842,446	837,736	833,026	828,316	823,606	818,896	814,186	809,476	802,266	797,556	792,846	788,136	783,426	778,716	774,006	766,796	762,086	757,376	2		
851,366	846,656	841,946	837,236	832,526	827,816	823,106	818,396	813,686	808,976	801,766	797,056	792,346	787,636	782,926	778,216	773,506	766,296	761,586	1		
855,576	850,866	846,156	841,446	836,736	832,026	827,316	822,606	817,896	813,186	808,476	801,266	796,556	791,846	787,136	782,426	777,716	773,006	765,796	رئيسي		
1 036,486	1 030,706	1 024,926	1 019,146	1 013,366	1 007,586	1 001,806	996,026	990,246	984,466	978,686	972,906	964,626	958,846	953,066	947,286	941,506	933,226	927,446	4	عون مكتب	أعوان الإنجاز
1 041,766	1 035,986	1 030,206	1 024,426	1 018,646	1 012,866	1 007,086	1 001,306	995,526	989,746	983,966	978,186	972,406	964,126	953,346	952,566	946,786	941,006	932,726	3		
1 047,046	1 041,266	1 035,486	1 029,706	1 023,926	1 018,146	1 012,366	1 006,586	1 000,806	995,026	989,246	983,466	977,686	971,906	963,626	957,846	952,066	946,286	940,506	2		
1 052,326	1 046,546	1 040,766	1 034,986	1 029,206	1 023,426	1 017,646	1 011,866	1 006,086	1 000,306	994,526	988,746	982,966	977,186	968,906	963,126	957,346	951,566	945,786	1		
1 070,446	1 063,596	1 056,746	1 049,896	1 043,046	1 036,196	1 029,346	1 022,496	1 015,646	1 008,796	1 001,946	995,096	988,246	981,396	974,546	965,196	958,346	951,496	944,646	3	كاتب	
1 076,796	1 069,946	1 063,096	1 056,246	1 049,396	1 042,546	1 035,696	1 028,846	1 021,996	1 015,146	1 008,296	1 001,446	994,596	987,746	980,896	974,046	964,696	957,846	950,996	2		
1 083,146	1 076,296	1 069,446	1 062,596	1 055,746	1 048,896	1 042,046	1 035,196	1 028,346	1 021,496	1 014,646	1 007,796	1 000,946	994,096	987,246	980,396	973,546	964,196	957,346	1		
1 094,846	1 087,996	1 081,146	1 074,226	1 067,446	1 060,596	1 053,746	1 046,896	1 040,046	1 033,196	1 026,346	1 019,496	1 012,646	1 005,796	998,946	992,096	985,246	978,396	971,546	3	كاتب رئيسي	
1 101,196	1 094,346	1 087,496	1 080,646	1 073,796	1 066,946	1 060,096	1 053,246	1 046,396	1 039,546	1 032,696	1 025,846	1 018,996	1 012,146	1 005,296	998,446	991,596	984,746	977,896	2		
1 107,546	1 100,696	1 093,846	1 086,996	1 080,146	1 073,296	1 066,446	1 059,596	1 052,746	1 045,896	1 039,046	1 032,196	1 025,346	1 017,896	1 011,646	1 004,796	997,946	991,096	984,246	1		
1 334,396	1 327,546	1 320,696	1 313,846	1 306,996	1 300,146	1 293,296	1 286,446	1 279,596	1 272,746	1 265,896	1 259,046	1 252,196	1 245,346	1 238,496	1 231,646	1 224,796	1 217,946	1 211,096		رئيس قسم	
1 340,746	1 333,896	1 327,046	1 320,196	1 313,346	1 306,496	1 299,646	1 292,796	1 285,946	1 279,096	1 272,246	1 265,396	1 258,546	1 251,696	1 244,846	1 237,996	1 231,146	1 224,296	1 217,446		رئيس قسم خارج المرتبة	
1 346,026	1 339,176	1 332,326	1 325,476	1 318,626	1 311,776	1 304,926	1 298,076	1 291,226	1 284,376	1 277,526	1 270,676	1 263,826	1 256,976	1 250,126	1 243,276	1 236,426	1 229,576	1 222,726	3	محرر	أعوان التسيير الإداري والإشراف
1 352,376	1 345,526	1 338,676	1 331,826	1 324,976	1 318,126	1 311,276	1 304,426	1 297,576	1 290,726	1 283,876	1 277,026	1 270,176	1 263,326	1 256,476	1 249,626	1 242,776	1 235,926	1 229,076	2		
1 358,726	1 351,876	1 345,026	1 338,176	1 331,326	1 324,476	1 317,626	1 310,776	1 303,926	1 297,076	1 290,226	1 283,376	1 276,526	1 269,676	1 262,826	1 255,976	1 249,126	1 242,276	1 235,426	1		
1 522,076	1 515,226	1 508,376	1 501,526	1 494,676	1 487,826	1 480,976	1 474,126	1 467,276	1 460,426	1 453,576	1 446,726	1 439,876	1 433,026	1 426,176	1 419,326	1 412,476	1 405,626	1 398,776		محرر رئيسي	
1 528,426	1 521,576	1 514,726	1 507,876	1 501,026	1 494,176	1 487,326	1 480,476	1 473,626	1 466,776	1 459,926	1 453,076	1 446,226	1 439,376	1 432,526	1 425,676	1 418,826	1 411,976	1 405,126	2	كاهية رئيس مصلحة	
1 540,126	1 533,276	1 526,426	1 519,576	1 512,726	1 505,876	1 499,026	1 492,176	1 485,326	1 478,476	1 471,626	1 464,776	1 457,926	1 451,076	1 444,226	1 437,376	1 430,526	1 423,676	1 416,826	1		
1 551,826	1 544,976	1 538,126	1 531,276	1 524,426	1 517,576	1 510,726	1 503,876	1 497,026	1 490,176	1 483,326	1 476,476	1 469,626	1 462,776	1 455,926	1 449,076	1 442,226	1 435,376	1 428,526		رئيس مصلحة	
1 563,526	1 556,676	1 549,826	1 542,976	1 536,126	1 529,276	1 522,426	1 515,576	1 508,726	1 501,876	1 495,026	1 488,176	1 481,326	1 474,476	1 467,626	1 460,776	1 453,926	1 447,076	1 440,226		رئيس مصلحة رئيسي	
1 763,926	1 757,076	1 750,226	1 743,376	1 736,526	1 729,676	1 722,826	1 715,976	1 709,126	1 702,276	1 695,426	1 688,576	1 681,726	1 674,876	1 668,026	1 661,176	1 654,326	1 647,476	1 640,626		مفوض السلطة	
1 786,326	1 779,476	1 772,626	1 765,776	1 758,926	1 752,076	1 745,226	1 738,376	1 731,526	1 724,676	1 717,826	1 710,976	1 704,126	1 697,276	1 690,426	1 683,576	1 676,726	1 669,876	1 663,026		كاهية مدير	
1 803,376	1 796,526	1 789,676	1 782,826	1 775,976	1 769,126	1 762,276	1 755,426	1 748,576	1 741,726	1 734,876	1 728,026	1 721,176	1 714,326	1 707,476	1 700,626	1 693,776	1 686,926	1 680,076		مدير مساعد	
1 820,426	1 813,576	1 806,726	1 799,876	1 793,026	1 786,176	1 779,326	1 772,476	1 765,626	1 758,776	1 751,926	1 745,076	1 738,226	1 731,376	1 724,526	1 717,676	1 710,826	1 703,976	1 697,126	3	مدير	
1 832,126	1 825,276	1 818,426	1 811,576	1 804,726	1 797,876	1 791,026	1 784,176	1 777,326	1 770,476	1 763,626	1 756,776	1 749,926	1 743,076	1 736,226	1 729,376	1 722,526	1 715,676	1 708,826	2		
1 843,826	1 836,976	1 830,126	1 823,276	1 816,426	1 809,576	1 802,726	1 795,876	1 789,026	1 782,176	1 775,326	1 768,476	1 761,626	1 754,776	1 747,926	1 741,076	1 734,226	1 727,376	1 720,526	1		

Notes: Figure shows the wage table in effect in 2014 for the banking sector. Wage floors are listed in Tunisian dinars, with a comma denoting the decimal separator (e.g., 739,106 represents 739 dinars and 106 millimes). Rows classify workers by occupation and grade, while columns classify them by seniority at the employer. Source: Official Journal of the Tunisian Republic [JORT].

Figure A3. **Descriptive Evidence on Wage Floors**



(a) **Bunching Around Wage Floors**



(b) **Wage Floors Extend Throughout Earnings Distribution**

Notes: Panel (a) shows the distribution of the ratio of actual wages to bargained wage floors. We use the employment module of the 2012 and 2015 waves of the National Survey of Population and Employment (ENPE), restricting the sample to non-agricultural wage employees with a contract who have remained in the same job for the past three months. Monthly earnings are winsorized at the top 10% within sector to reduce the influence of outliers. Panel (b) plots the distribution of monthly earnings (in dinars) in quarter 2 of 2014 against selected wage floors for the banking sector. We use CNSS data, restricting the sample to 5767 incumbent male workers observed between 2010 and 2014, aged less than 45. We plot, as vertical red lines, the four-year-seniority wage floors for the highest grade in each of three broad groups: service/operations, management, and supervisors, as well as the maximum wage floor. Monthly earnings are computed as quarterly earnings divided by three and winsorized at the top 10% within sector to reduce the influence of outliers. The bin width is 100 dinars. Source for wage floors is collective bargaining agreements.

Figure A4. **Shift in Entire Earnings Distribution**



Notes: Figure plots histograms of nominal average monthly earnings (in Tunisian dinars) in the banking sector by year. Monthly earnings are computed as quarterly earnings divided by three and winsorized at the top 10% within sector to reduce the influence of outliers. Vertical line is lowest minimum wage for 2014. Data is at the worker-level. Sample is 20,703 workers. Source: social security data.

Figure A5. **Effects on Log Mean Earnings and Employment (Binary Treatment Variable)**



Notes: Figure plots the coefficients from version of regression $y_{jt} = \sum_{k\neq -1}^{T} \beta_k \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t-2014 = k] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$ with a binary treatment indicator (above/below median sample exposure). Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Outcome is log mean monthly earnings in top Panel, log Employment in bottom Panel. Regressions include bank by year FE.

Table A1. **Pooled time periods, Effects on Worker Rank**

	(1) **Within-branch Rank low-skill**	(2) **Within-branch Rank high-skill**
Exposure × Post	-0.01	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
R2	0.73	0.69
Clusters	197	197
N	6595	6274
Worker FE	X	X
Year FE	X	X
regionxYear FE	X	X
BankxYear FE	X	X
Mean dep. var.	0.36	0.78

Notes: Table reports the coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regression $y_{jit} = \gamma \times Exposure_{ji} \times \mathbf{1}[t - 2014 \geq 0] + \eta_i + \alpha_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jit}$, separately for low-skill and high-skill workers, using for each the samples of workers in the Balanced (branch) sample seen in the labor market over the entire analysis period. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. For young workers at baseline, we calculate, in period t, the within-branch-age-group rank, scaling it to be between (0,1].

Table A2. **Pooled time periods, Effects on Worker Gap and Rank for Switchers**

	(1) **Own Gap Relative to Within-firm low-skill wage**	(2) **Within-firm Rank**
Exposure × Post	0.09*	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)
R2	0.97	0.95
Clusters	50	50
N	516	516
Worker FE	X	X
Year FE	X	X
regionxYear FE	X	X
BankxYear FE	X	X
Mean dep. var. (levels, pre)	0.23	0.50

Notes: Table reports the coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regression $y_{jit} = \gamma \times Exposure_{ji} \times \mathbf{1}[t - 2014 \geq 0] + \eta_i + \alpha_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jit}$, using the Switcher Worker Sample. Switcher Worker Sample is sample of workers who switch at least once in the post period. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.

Table A3. **Earnings and Employment, Pooled time periods, Robustness to Different Occupational Mapping**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Log Mean Earnings	
Exposure × Post	0.124***	0.052***	0.060***
	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.010)
R2	0.97	0.97	0.98
Clusters	259	261	271
N	3626	3654	3794
year FE	Y	Y	Y
branch FE	Y	Y	Y
bank x year FE	Y	Y	Y
		Log Employment	
Exposure × Post	-0.039	-0.047*	-0.042
	(0.059)	(0.028)	(0.028)
R2	0.97	0.97	0.96
Clusters	259	261	271
N	3626	3654	3794
year FE	Y	Y	Y
branch FE	Y	Y	Y
bank x year FE	Y	Y	Y
occ. mapping	2	4	6
Elasticity	-0.31	-0.91	-0.71

Notes: Table reports the coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regression $y_{jt} = \beta \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t \geq 2014] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$, using the Balanced Sample. Regressions are weighted by pre-period employment. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Dependent variable means are for levels (not logs). To bound the treatment measure, we iteratively assign the worker to a lower occupation. Specifically, for each "occ. mapping" x, we downgrade each worker by x occupations and recompute the treatment variable.

Table A4. **Earnings and Employment, Pooled time periods, Robustness to Using Average Post Period Wage Floor Increases**

	(1)
	Log Mean Earnings
Exposure × Post	0.08***
	(0.01)
R2	0.97
Clusters	259
N	3626
year FE	Y
branch FE	Y
bank x year FE	Y
	Log Employment
Exposure × Post	-0.04
	(0.03)
R2	0.97
Clusters	259
N	3626
year FE	Y
branch FE	Y
bank x year FE	Y
Mean dep. var. (levels, pre)	
Elasticity	-0.47

Notes: Table reports the coefficients (and standard errors in parentheses) from regression $y_{jt} = \beta \times Exposure_j \times \mathbf{1}[t \geq 2014] + \alpha_j + \delta_t + \psi_{x(j),t} + \epsilon_{jt}$, using the Balanced Sample. Regressions are weighted by pre-period employment. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Balanced Sample is branches seen for the full period of our analysis (2008-2021). Dependent variable means are for levels (not logs). We redefine exposure using changes in wages floors from the years after 2014. Specifically, we recalculate $\Delta WF_{o,2014}$ in 1 to be the mean wage floor increase for that occupation over the entire post period.

A Data Cleaning

We describe our data sources and cleaning in this section.

Overview of CNSS Data Employee data from the National Social Security Agency [CNSS] contains employee payroll records for the period 2008-2021. The CNSS administers pensions, disability, and family benefits. We restricted the CNSS data to workers who ever work at an employer covered by the banking CBA. For workers missing the CNSS bureau, we first assigned them a governorate based on the zip-code of their residential address, then assigned them the modal CNSS bureau for their governorate in the sample.

Sample Restrictions We dropped 45 workers with more than 1 employer per quarter. We dropped 855 employees (2% of the sample) whose annual earnings (over four quarters) are ever below the annual earnings implied by the national minimum wage. In order to reduce measurement error from backing out the monthly salary from quarterly earnings (for example, a worker can join the employer in December, so a simple division by 3 will underestimate their monthly salary), we dropped the first and last quarters that the worker is seen at their employer, to ensure quarterly earnings cover full 3 months.[39] We dropped the negligible share (0.15%) of workers with an implausible joining date (i.e. joined the firm before 15 years old). One employer in our sample was previously a leasing institution and became a bank in 2015 (ilBoursa, 2017). We considered this employer to be covered by the banking CBA throughout our panel to increase the Balanced Sample size for analysis.

Mapping to Occupations We collapsed earnings at the year level. We winsorized average monthly earnings at the top 10% within sector to reduce the influence of outliers. Earnings comprise the base wage, bonuses, insurance fees, and payroll taxes; the components are not reported separately. For occupational mapping, we adjusted earnings using sector-level data on the gross wage bill and base salary wage bill from the 2012 Employment and Salaries Survey [Enquête Emploi et Salaires, ESS] conducted by the National Institute of Statistics [INS]. Specifically, we calculated the median ratio of base to gross salary at the 2-digit-NAT level and deflated reported

[39] This led to the removal of workers with only 1 quarter at an employer, approximately 2% of the sample.

earnings by this ratio.[40] We used adjusted earnings for comparisons to wage floors and used the non-adjusted variable for our analysis. We calculated worker tenure at the employer for workers who are hired after 2008, our first year of data. For workers already seen at the employer in 2008, we assumed an upper bound for tenure and set it equal to their labor market experience. We compared each worker's earnings to the entry-level wage floors or to those for their tenure if they joined before 2008. We recorded the highest wage floor that fell below the worker's earnings and assigned each worker to the corresponding broad occupation category.

Constructing Exposure For the exposure measure, we restricted the sample to 2008-2013. We only kept workers seen at the employer for all pre-period years. We calculated average (rescaled) wages over this period for each worker. We computed the wage bill gap for a branch as the percent increase implied by the 2014 policy. Specifically, we divided the sum of amount increases in base wages for all workers (as determined by their individual predicted broad occupation category) by the branch wage bill (the sum of mean wages over the pre-period).

Overview of Labor Force Data We use the employment module of the 2012 and 2015 waves of the National Survey of Population and Employment (ENPE). We restrict the sample to non-agricultural wage employees with a contract who have remained in the same job for the past three months. We winsorize wages at the top 5% to limit the influence of outliers. For Figure A1, we match the five banking sector categories to the occupational nomenclature used in the survey: we map service/operations 1 to "employees", operations 2/supervisory to "middle professions", and management to "managers." For Figure A3a, we harmonize occupational categories from the ENPE's 1-digit National Nomenclature of Professions to three broad occupation groupings used in most CBAs: "employees", "middle professions," and "managers." We restrict our attention to the lowest wage floor for each broad occupation. We match workers to the lowest wage floor that applies to their broad occupation at the time of the survey.

[40] The sector–level median base-to-gross ratio is 0.72. While limited in precision, this rescaling is necessary. In absence of this rescaling, we may fail to capture workers in low-wage-floor occupations.