

“Asymptotically Optimal Control of a Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities”

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Audience Q&A

1) Q Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn: You motivated the two-type model with the two data points you wanted to match. I was wondering what are other salient data points one would want to match, and which additional types this would motivate?

2) Q Yashodhan Kanoria: To what order do your upper and lower bounds match? Just in the leading $n \ln n$ term or also in the order n term?

To match the bounds in order n you can't just take $P(\text{match}) = 1$, I imagine...

A Marty Reiman: We only prove leading order.

3) Q Itai Ashlagi: Imbalance markets make things simpler? Say sellers arrive in $(1+\epsilon)\lambda$.

A Marty Reiman: Larry will talk bit about the imbalanced case later.