LAN NGUYEN

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Education:

2020 (expected)	Ph.D.	Economics	Columbia University
2017	M.Phil.	Economics	Columbia University
2016	M.A.	Economics	Columbia University
2013	B.A. *Honors - Class I*	Economics	University of Queensland

Honors and Awards:

2019 – 2020	Dissertation Fellowship, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2014 – 2019	Dean's Fellowship, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University
2017 – 2018	Trudy and Paul Woodruff Fellowship, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University
2013	University Medal, University of Queensland
	Bachelor of Economics Honors Scholarship, School of Economics, University of Queensland
	Synergies Economic Consulting Honors Prize
	Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Economics Honors Prize
2012	Summer Research Scholarship, University of Queensland
	Dean's Honor Roll, Faculty of Business, Economics and Law, University of Queensland
2010 – 2012	Bachelor of Economics Scholarship, School of Economics, University of Queensland

Fields of Specialization:

Industrial Organization, Economics of Education, Market Design, Applied Microeconomics

Job Market Paper:

Predicting the Effect of Affirmative Action Plans in New York City Elite Public High Schools

In recent years, there have been concerns about the lack of diversity in schools, especially elite schools that select students based on exams. This paper studies the impact of two possible affirmative action plans in New York City by estimating students' underlying preferences and then simulating their actions under the two proposed plans. There is a trade-off between

promoting diversity and maintaining student quality in elite schools. A tier-based plan similar to that in Chicago does little to increase the overall racial diversity of this sector, but it preserves the quality of incoming students. In contrast, a plan to guarantee elite school seats to students who placed in the top seven percent (by academic performance) of each public middle school causes substantial exchanges of students between the elite and regular sectors, thereby giving more access to Black and Hispanic students at the cost of lower student quality. The two plans also change the distribution of diversity across schools in different ways. The Chicago plan reduces the differences among schools within the elite sector, while the Top 7% plan bridges the gap in diversity between the two sectors even as it increases within-sector dispersion. Both plans result in considerable changes in school assignments in the regular school sector.

Working Paper:

Price Staggering in Cartels (with Heiko Gerlach)
[Revised and Resubmitted to International Journal of Industrial Organization]

In this paper we investigate the optimal organization of staggered price increases in cartels. Staggered price increases impose a cost during cartel formation as the price leader initially loses sales. We show that for intermediate discount factors, staggered price increases can only be sustained when the increase is neither too low nor too high. When a cartel executes two consecutive price increases, the choice between using the same leader or alternating leadership depends on the initial price level in the industry. We also discuss the allocation of price leadership in the presence of cost asymmetry, product differentiation and consider the effect of strategic buyers on price staggering.

Works in Progress:

Matching and Learning – An Experimental Study (with Guillaume Haeringer and Silvio Ravaioli)

We use a lab experiment to study the patterns and effects of learning in centralized matching mechanisms widely used in school choice and other real-world settings. We adopt a 2x2 design, with two matching mechanisms (between-subjects) and two treatments (within-subjects). The two mechanisms are Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Boston Immediate Acceptance (IA) algorithms. Each experimental session is divided into two parts for the two different treatments: with and without priority zones. Within each part, there are 8 rounds, each consisting of 5 periods. The distinction between rounds and periods allows for two types of learning: about the environment (unchanged within each round), and the mechanism (unchanged across rounds). Our preliminary analysis of pilot data shows that (i) a higher fraction of participants are truthful under the DA mechanism, (ii) average payoffs are higher under the IA mechanism, (iii) the fraction of participants who satisfy truncated truthfulness increases over time across the different rounds within each session for DA, but not for IA, and (iv) Across periods within a round, truncated truthfulness decreases over time for both mechanisms, although payoffs remain relatively stable.

Does Preparation for the Entrance Examination Matter for Performance in College? Evidence from Vietnam

Presentation:

2018	45th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE 2018)

Research Assistantships:

2016 – 2017	Mike Riordan, Department of Economics, Columbia University
2012 – 2014	Heiko Gerlach, School of Economics, University of Queensland

Teaching Assistantships:

Spring 2019	Market Design (Undergraduate), Guillaume Haeringer, Columbia University
Fall 2018	Principles of Economics (Undergraduate), Prajit Dutta, Columbia University
Spring 2018	Market Design (Undergraduate), Guillaume Haeringer, Columbia University
Spring 2016	Industrial Organization (Undergraduate), Mike Riordan, Columbia University
Fall 2015	Principles of Economics (Undergraduate), Nicola Zaniboni, Columbia University
2012 – 2013	Industrial Economics (Undergraduate), Heiko Gerlach (two semesters), University of Queensland
2012 – 2013	Benefit-Cost Analysis & Project Evaluation (Undergraduate & Master), Richard Brown (two semesters), University of Queensland
2013	Behavioural and Evolutionary Economics (Undergraduate), Paul Frijters, University of Queensland
2012	Quantitative Economic & Business Analysis B (Undergraduate), Do Won Kwak (two semesters), University of Queensland

Personal:

Citizenship: Vietnam
Languages: Vietnamese (native), English (fluent), French (passive)
Programming and Software: Python, Stata, R, Mathematica, Matlab

References:

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