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PRODID:-//Department of Economics at Columbia University - ECPv4.6.23//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
X-WR-CALNAME:Department of Economics at Columbia University
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://econ.columbia.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Department of Economics at Columbia University
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20180504T140000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20180504T160000
DTSTAMP:20260422T132322
CREATED:20180426T194413Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200402T191515Z
UID:8604-1525442400-1525449600@econ.columbia.edu
SUMMARY:PER Mini-Course: Rajiv Vohra\, "Coalitional Games and Farsightedness" (Part II)
DESCRIPTION:PER Mini-Course: Rajiv Vohra\, “Coalitional Games and Farsightedness”\n \nPart I:\nThursday\, May 3\, 2018\n2:00pm-4:00pm\n1027 International Affairs Building\n\n\nPart II:\nFriday\, May 4\, 2018\n2:00pm-4:00pm\n1101 International Affairs Building\nRSVP here for planning purposes\n\n\n\nThis course will explore recent developments that incorporate farsighted behavior in coalitional games\, which are designed to model rational behavior when groups have the ability to make binding agreements.  Applications include cartel formation\, public goods provision and political party formation.  In the presence of externalities this approach is particularly useful in analyzing conditions under which efficiency may (or may not) arise in equilibrium (even though binding agreements are feasible).  While coalitional games\, in principle\, have the advantage of abstracting away from the details of the negotiation process\, incorporating farsightedness poses some conceptual challenges that these lectures will explore.\n\n
URL:https://econ.columbia.edu/event/per-mini-course-rajiv-vohra-coalitional-games-and-farsightedness-part-ii/
LOCATION:1101 IAB\, 420 West 118th Street\, New York\, NY\, 10027\, United States
CATEGORIES:PER,PER Events,PER Mini Courses
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://sites.asit.columbia.edu/econdept/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2018/04/RVohra-17.jpg
ORGANIZER;CN="PER%20-%20Stephanie%20Cohen":MAILTO:sc3867@columbia.edu
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