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X-WR-CALNAME:Department of Economics at Columbia University
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://econ.columbia.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Department of Economics at Columbia University
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20180420T103000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20180420T120000
DTSTAMP:20260424T085701
CREATED:20180411T143621Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200402T191104Z
UID:8463-1524220200-1524225600@econ.columbia.edu
SUMMARY:PER Distinguished Lecture: Vincent P. Crawford
DESCRIPTION:PER Distinguished Lecture: Vincent P. Crawford\, “Efficient Mechanisms for Level-k Bilateral Trading” \nFriday\, April 20\, 2018\n10:30am-12:00pm\nDeutsches Haus\, Columbia University\nPress here to RSVP for planning purposes. \nProfessor Vincent P. Crawford revisits Roger Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite’s (1983; “MS”)\nanalysis of mechanism design for bilateral trading\, replacing equilibrium with a non-equilibrium\n“level-k” model that predicts initial responses to games\, and focusing on direct mechanisms.\nThe revelation principle fails for level-k models. However\, if only level-k- incentive-compatible\nmechanisms are feasible\, and if traders’ levels of reasoning are observable\, MS’s\ncharacterization of incentive-efficient mechanisms generalizes\, with one novel feature. If\ntraders’ levels are unobservable\, only posted-price mechanisms are level-k- incentive-compatible\nand -incentive- efficient. By contrast\, if non-level- k-incentive- compatible direct mechanisms are\nalso feasible\, level-k- incentive-efficient mechanisms may differ more extensively from\nequilibrium-incentive- efficient mechanisms. \nAbout Vincent P. Crawford \nVincent Crawford is the Drummond Professor of Political Economy\, University of Oxford; a Fellow of All Souls College; and Distinguished Professor Emeritus and Research Professor\, University of California\, San Diego. He holds an A.B. Summa cum Laude from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society\, the Guggenheim Foundation\, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences\, the British Academy\, and Academia Europea. He has served as co-editor of the American Economic Review and on the boards of Econometrica and several other journals; and he is currently one of the editors of Games and Economic Behavior and on the boards of several other journals. \nCrawford is best known for his work on game-theoretic microeconomic theory\, particularly on bargaining and arbitration\, strategic communication\, matching markets\, learning\, and coordination. He has given many mini-courses and invited lectures in these areas around the world\, including an Arne Ryde Symposium Keynote address\, the Royal Economic Society’s Economic Journal Lecture\, and a John von Neumann Distinguished Lecture at Brown University’s 250th Anniversary Symposium. His current research is on behavioral and experimental game theory and behavioral economics more generally\, and is the basis for a five-year European Research Council Advanced Grant\, “Behavioural Economics and Strategic Decision Making: Theory\, Empirics\, and Experiments”. \n
URL:https://econ.columbia.edu/event/per-distinguished-lecture-series-vincent-p-crawford/
LOCATION:Deutsches Haus\, 420 West 116th Street\, New York\, NY\, 10027\, United States
GEO:40.806158;-73.960225
X-APPLE-STRUCTURED-LOCATION;VALUE=URI;X-ADDRESS=Deutsches Haus 420 West 116th Street New York NY 10027 United States;X-APPLE-RADIUS=500;X-TITLE=420 West 116th Street:geo:-73.960225,40.806158
CATEGORIES:PER,PER Distinguished Lecture Series,PER Events
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://sites.asit.columbia.edu/econdept/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2018/04/IMG_0892.jpg
ORGANIZER;CN="PER%20-%20Stephanie%20Cohen":MAILTO:sc3867@columbia.edu
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