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PRODID:-//Department of Economics at Columbia University - ECPv4.6.23//NONSGML v1.0//EN
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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X-WR-CALNAME:Department of Economics at Columbia University
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://econ.columbia.edu
X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Department of Economics at Columbia University
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20160324T180000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20160324T193000
DTSTAMP:20260405T032110
CREATED:20160324T153633Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20200402T183102Z
UID:10333-1458842400-1458847800@econ.columbia.edu
SUMMARY:Giorgio Coricelli - "Strategizing and Attention in Games"
DESCRIPTION:I will present the results of two related experimental studies (work in collaboration with Luca Polonio) in which we used eye-tracking to measure the dynamic patterns of visual information acquisition in games. In a first study\, participants played one-shot two-player normal-form games in which either\, neither\, or only one of the players had a dominant strategy. Our method allowed us to predict whether the decision process would lead to equilibrium choices or not\, and to attribute out-of-equilibrium responses to limited cognitive capacities or social motives. Our results suggest the existence of individually heterogeneous-but-stable patterns of visual information acquisition based on subjective levels of strategic sophistication and social preferences. In a second study we used eye-tracking technique to test whether players’ actions are consistent with their expectations of their opponent’s behavior. Participants played a series of two-player 3 by 3 one shot games and stated their beliefs about which actions they expect their counterpart to play (first-order beliefs) or about which actions their counterparts expect them to play (second-order beliefs). Using eye-tracking study we could identify a larger consistency between actions and stated beliefs compared with previous studies\, and we could characterize the behavioral rules associated with choice-beliefs inconsistency. Implications for the theories of bounded rationality will be discussed. \n
URL:https://econ.columbia.edu/event/giorgio-coricelli-strategizing-and-attention-in-games/
LOCATION:326 Uris Hall
CATEGORIES:Cognition and Decision Seminar Series
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