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Danyan Zha
Job Market Candidate
Fields: Development Economics, Microeconomics


CV


Welcome! I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at Columbia University.

I will be available for interviews at the

  • EEA European Job Market in Naples (December 2018);
  • CICE China Job Market in Beijing (December 2018);
  • ASSA Meetings in Atlanta (January 2019).

Please visit my Personal Website.


Job Market Paper
Abstract:

This paper analyzes how education distribution affects the marriage market, by exploiting a massive primary school construction program in Indonesia in the late 1970s as a quasi-natural experiment. Using the variation across regions in the number of schools constructed and the variation across birth cohorts, I show that in densely populated areas, primary school construction did not affect primary school attainment rate. More surprisingly, the program decreased secondary school attainment rate for both men and women due to a crowding out of teacher resources. With this change in the education distribution as a source of variation, I find a woman marries earlier and spousal age gap increases when average education of other women decreases. I then rationalize this finding by developing a two-to-one dimensional matching model with Transferable Utilities in an OLG framework, in which the marital surplus allows complementarity between male education and both characteristics of women: education and younger age.


Research

Working Papers:

“Multidimensional Matching: Hukou Status in the Marriage Market”. 

Abstract: Following P. Chiappori et al. (2012), I develop a two-dimensional matching model on the marriage market in China, where individuals differ in a continuous attribute (e.g. socioeconomic status) and a discrete attribute (hukou status). Surplus gain from marriage depends on the discrete characteristic with the rationale that an urban hukou is much more valuable than a rural hukou, it’s harder for a husband to move to the wife’s place and a limited quota of hukou change is available upon marriage. I first derive some general properties of the stable matching, then characterize the closed-form solutions by specifying a quadratic surplus function. Using China 1990 1% sample census and proxying socioeconomic status by educational attainment, the model predictions are validated. There are fewer across-hukou type marriages and even fewer rural husband – urban wife match. Matching is assortative on education within each marriage type. Urban husbands with rural wives have on average fewer schooling years than those with urban wives.

Work in Progress:

“Gender Norm, Labor Supply and Marriage Market”.

Abstract: Previous studies have found a sharp mass decline to the right of 1/2 in the probability density function of wife income share within household. Incorporating this gender norm into a household model, I found a testable prediction on labor supply: male labor supply is decreasing with wife’s wage when her potential wage is lower than his, however, it’s going to increase with wife’s wage when her potential wage is higher than his. With this micro-founded marital surplus, I then introduce a matching model on potential wages, which still predicts positive assortative matching on wages.

“What I Missed: Marriage Outcomes of Sent-Down Youth in China”, with Lu Liu.

Abstract: During 1966 and 1978 in China, 17 million youth were sent down to countryside. Using a dataset on monozygotic twins in China, we analyzed the impact of this experience on their future marriage outcomes.
We found an insignificant impact on females but for males: three years’ sent-down experience increased first marriage age by 0.384 years and decreased spousal consumption share by 30%.

“The Hong Kong Marriage Market in the Past Three Decades”, with So Yoon Ahn and Edoardo Ciscato

 


Teaching

Columbia University 

Spring 2018ECON UN3211: Intermediate Microeconomics, TA for Professor Anna Musatti

Fall 2017ECON GU4020: Economics of Uncertainty and Information, TA for Professor Pierre-André Chiappori

Spring 2017ECON GU4260: Market Design, TA for Professor Guillaume G. Haeringer

Spring 2016ECON W4260: Market Design: TA for Professor Yeon-Koo Che

Fall 2015ECON G6211: Microeconomics Analysis I (Graduate), TA for Professors Pierre-André Chiappori and Pietro Ortoleva

University of Maryland, College Park

Summer 2013Economic Statistics, Instructor

 

 

1022 International Affairs Building (IAB)
Mail Code 3308  
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
Ph: (212) 854-3680
Fax: (212) 854-0749
Business Hours:
Mon–Fri, 9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m.

1022 International Affairs Building (IAB)

Mail Code 3308

420 West 118th Street

New York, NY 10027

Ph: (212) 854-3680
Fax: (212) 854-0749
Business Hours:
Mon–Fri, 9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m.