I present an investment environment wherein investors demand an asset based on perfectly informative signals, but face uncertainty about the timing of their information acquisition. I show that this reduces the demand and price for every period but that in the limit price as number of periods increases price converges to the true value of the asset. By introducing a concept of confidence over the time in which they receive a signal, I show that the impact of uncertainty can be exaggerated in either a negative or positive direction, with the limit price reflecting the true value of the asset depending on the type of confidence under consideration.
Working Paper: Stackelberg oligopoly with positional uncertainty
Abstract: In a Stackelberg oligopoly setting two firms set quantity without knowing whether they are the first or second in the market. I find that with a common prior positional uncertainty always leads to a more competitive level of quantity. This finding is exacerbated when firms do not share a common prior and the sum of their prior beliefs of moving first exceeds unity. Even in the presence of a common prior and many identical firms as the number of firms increases the equilibrium quantity in the presence of positional uncertainty can exceed that of perfect competition.
I have served as a Teaching Assistant for the following courses:
- ECON UN1105: Principles of Economics (Summer 2013, Fall 2013, Summer 2014, Spring 2015, Fall 2015, Spring 2016), Columbia University
- ECON UN3211: Intermediate Microeconomics (Fall 2016, Spring 2016), Columbia University
- ECON GR6211: Microeconomic Analysis I (Graduate; Fall 2014), Columbia University
- ECON W4020: Economics of Uncertainty and Information (Spring 2014), Columbia University