I received my PhD degree from Columbia in May of 2018, supervised by Navin Kartik. I have also worked extensively with Joseph Stiglitz on a variety of projects. Currently I am a visiting assistant professor at the department of economics at the University of Pittsburgh.
My main research interests are in game theory, mainly in information economics (strategic communication, information provision and design, and persuasion) as well as the implications of memory and rationality, broadly understood, on strategic behavior. Aside from that I am also interested in repeated games, experimental economics, and the neuroscience of learning and memory.
I am on the economic job market and will be available for interviews at the 2019 AEA/ASSA meetings in Atlanta, GA.
We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after observing the signal generated by the first two players. We characterize sufficient conditions for information revelation, compare outcomes with and without a mediator and provide comparative statics with regard to the preferences of the sender and the mediator. We also provide novel conceptual and computational insights about the set of feasible posterior beliefs that the sender can induce, and use these results to obtain insights about equilibrium outcomes. The sender never benefits from mediation, while the receiver might. The receiver benefits when the mediator's preferences are not perfectly aligned with hers; rather the mediator should prefer more information revelation than the sender, but less than perfect revelation.
- [Job Market Paper] Mediated Persuasion (October 2018)
- Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information (February 2018)
- Characterization, Existence and Pareto Optimality in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information with Endogenous and Asymmetric Disclosures: Revisiting Rothschild-Stiglitz (with Joseph E. Stiglitz and Jungyoll Yun; NBER Working Paper No. 24711, February 2018). Older version: Equilibrium in a Competitive Insurance Market under Adverse Selection with Endogenous Information (with Joseph E. Stiglitz and Jungyoll Yun; NBER Working paper No. 23556, June 2017)
- Things Left Unsaid: The Belief-Payoff Monotonicity Refinement (June 2018)
- In the spring 2019 semester I will teach both sections of ECON 1200: Game Theory at Pitt, as well as BMKT 2032: Applied Behavioral Economics at Pitt’s Katz Graduate School of Business. Course materials will be available for registered students on Courseweb.
- During the summer 2018 semester I was the instructor for Econ 2001: Intro to Math Methods (“math camp” for economics PhD students) at Pitt.
Previously I have been a teaching assistant for a number of courses in many areas of economics and at various levels. The most recent teaching evaluations are below.
- Spring 2016. “Perspectives on Economic Studies”, first year required PhD course, instructor Joseph E. Stiglitz. Evaluation
- Fall 2015. “Financial Crises”, upper-level undergraduate course, instructor Jose Scheinkman. Evaluation
- Spring 2015. “Historical Foundations of Modern Economics”, upper-level undergraduate course, instructor Andre Burgstaller. Evaluation
- Fall 2014. “Financial Crises”, instructor Jose Scheinkman. Evaluation