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Agnieszka Dorn
Job Market Candidate
Fields: Labor Economics, Macroeconomics
Sponsor(s): Andres Drenik and Jon Steinsson


CV



Job Market Paper
Abstract:

I estimate the cyclicality of real wages for job stayers, hires from employment and from unemployment, using an administrative matched employer-employee dataset from Germany. I find that the wages of new hires appear to be less procyclical than the wages of job stayers. I propose an explanation based on countercyclical selection on match quality: when aggregate productivity is low, worker-firm matches have to be unusually productive to warrant job creation. The presence of the match quality selection effect is supported by the relationship between the initial aggregate conditions and subsequent risk of separation: jobs started when unemployment is high are at a decreased risk of ending with a separation to unemployment, which suggests that they are positively selected. Finally, I show that a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model with match-specific productivity and turnover costs is consistent with empirical findings.


Research

Pre-Separation and Post-Transition Dynamics of Wages

 


Teaching

Fall 2017 – Introduction to Econometrics, TA for Prof. Seyhan Erden, Columbia University
Spring 2017 – Behavioral Finance, TA for Prof. Harrison Hong, Columbia University
Fall 2016 – Intermediate Macroeconomics, TA for Prof. Xavier Sala-I-Martin, Columbia University
Spring 2016 – Intermediate Macroeconomics, TA for Prof. Irasema Alonso, Columbia University
Fall 2015 – Introduction to Econometrics, TA for Prof. Seyhan Erden, Columbia University
Spring 2015 – Introduction to Econometrics, TA for Prof. Seyhan Erden, Columbia University
Fall 2014 – Principles of Economics, Fall 2014, TA for Prof. Anna Musatti, Columbia University

1022 International Affairs Building (IAB)
Mail Code 3308  
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
Ph: (212) 854-3680
Fax: (212) 854-0749
Business Hours:
Mon–Fri, 9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m.

1022 International Affairs Building (IAB)

Mail Code 3308

420 West 118th Street

New York, NY 10027

Ph: (212) 854-3680
Fax: (212) 854-0749
Business Hours:
Mon–Fri, 9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m.