Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values

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December 6, 2015

Abstract

We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and correlated asset values. A trade of one asset (or lack thereof) can provide information about the value of other assets. The information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined in equilibrium. We show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria when the correlation between asset values is sufficiently high. The equilibria are ranked in terms of both trade volume and efficiency. We study the implications for policies that target market transparency as well as the market’s ability to aggregate information. Total welfare is higher in any equilibrium of a fully transparent market than in a fully opaque one. However, both welfare and trading activity can decrease in the degree of market transparency. If traders have asymmetric access to transaction data, transparency levels the playing field, reduces the rents of more informed traders, but may also reduce total welfare. Moreover, even in a fully transparent market, information is not necessarily aggregated as the number of informed traders becomes arbitrarily large.

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1 Introduction

In many markets, asset values are positively correlated and sellers often have (correlated) private information about the value of their asset. For example, sellers of homes on the same street have information about the desirability of the location and neighborhood trends. Similarly, venture capital firms that own a stake in similar start-ups have information about the challenges faced to make these companies succeed. Or, consider two banks who own different tranches of an asset-backed security, but have similar information about the underlying collateral. Importantly, in all these environments, trade of one asset can be informative about the value of other related assets. Thus, transaction transparency can be important for both informational efficiency and the efficiency with which assets are reallocated. Indeed, the empirical literature has documented that the degree of market transparency matters, and there is an ongoing policy debate about whether to require transactional transparency for a variety of asset classes in financial markets.¹

Our goal in this paper is to develop a theoretical framework which aims to understand the role of information spillovers and transparency in such markets. The basic model involves two sellers \((i\) and \(j)\), each with an indivisible asset that has a value which is either low or high. Asset values are positively correlated and each seller is privately informed about the value of her asset, but does not know the value of the other seller’s asset. There is common knowledge of gains from trade, but buyers face a lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970). Trading takes place via a competitive decentralized market over the course of two periods. In the first period, potential buyers can approach a seller and make offers. If a seller rejects all offers in the first period, then she can entertain more offers from new buyers in the second period. In this setting, inefficiencies can arise from delays in trade or a failure to trade altogether.

In addition to asset correlation, the key novel ingredient of the model is that if seller \(i\) (\(j\)) trades in the first period, then with probability \(\xi \in [0, 1]\), the trade is observed by potential buyers of seller \(j\)’s (\(i\)’s) asset, prior to them making offers in the second period. We refer to \(\xi\) as the degree of market transparency, where \(\xi = 0\) corresponds to a fully opaque market and \(\xi = 1\) corresponds to a fully transparent market.

Provided that there is at least some degree of transparency, a trade of one asset can provide information to buyers about the value of the other asset. Importantly, the information content of observed trading behavior is endogenous and interacts with the degree of market transparency. For example, suppose that, in the first period, seller \(j\) trades with a high probability if she owns a low-value asset and does not trade if she owns a high-value asset. Then, because the asset values are correlated, observing whether seller \(j\) trades has information content about

¹See, for example, Asquith et al. (2013) or Goldstein et al. (2007), who study the effects of increased transparency due to the introduction of TRACE in the corporate bond market.
the value of seller $i$’s asset and the degree of market transparency plays a role in determining $i$’s trading strategy and therefore its information content. On the other hand, if seller $j$ plans to sell the asset in the first period regardless of its value, then observing a trade by this seller is completely uninformative about the quality of seller $i$’s asset and the degree of market transparency is irrelevant.

An important first result (Proposition 2) is that because the quality of information is endogenously determined by trading behavior, there must be positive probability of trade in each period. This result is in contrast to Daley and Green (2012, 2015), who show that when quality of information is exogenous, the unique equilibrium involves periods of no trade in which both sides of the market wait for more news to be revealed. The intuition for our result is that if there was no trade, then there would be no news and hence nothing to wait for.

In equilibrium, low-value assets are more likely to trade in the first period, and therefore observing a transaction of one asset in the first period is “bad news” about the other asset. This introduces an interdependence in the sellers’ strategies that can be decomposed into two separate effects, which we refer to as a bad news effect and a good news effect. The bad news effect is that, as seller $j$ trades more aggressively, it becomes more likely from seller $i$’s perspective that bad news will be revealed, which induces seller $i$ to trade more aggressively. The good news effect is that, conditional on not observing a trade by seller $j$, the market beliefs about seller $i$ are more favorable, which leads to higher prices and induces seller $i$ to trade less aggressively. Because these two effects push in opposite directions, the optimal trading behavior of seller $i$ is non-monotonic in seller $j$’s behavior. These two opposing forces lie behind our main result (Theorem 1), which shows that when asset values are sufficiently correlated, a high degree of transparency leads to multiple equilibria.

To provide more intuition as to why this multiplicity obtains, consider the case in which the assets are perfectly correlated and the market is fully transparent. Suppose that the low-type seller $j$ trades with probability one in the first period and the high-type seller $j$ trades with probability zero. If seller $i$ delays trade in the first period, then her type will be perfectly revealed by whether seller $j$ trades. Conditional on observing a trade by seller $j$ in the first period, buyers will correctly infer that seller $i$ has a low value asset and offer a low price in the second period. Therefore, a low-type seller $i$ has no incentive to delay trade and strictly prefers to trade in the first period. Hence, there exists an equilibrium in which both low-value assets trade with probability one in the first period.

Next, suppose that the low-type seller $j$ trades with some intermediate probability in the first period. From seller $i$’s perspective, there is still positive probability that her type will be

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2This feature is common in dynamic models with adverse selection and often referred to as the “skimming” property.
revealed if buyers observe a trade by seller $j$ (the bad news effect), but there is also some chance that seller $j$ does not trade, in which case buyers correctly infer that seller $i$ is more likely to have a good asset making them willing to offer a high price in the second period (the good news effect). The potential for getting a high price in the second period makes seller $i$ indifferent between trading in the first period, and hence she is willing to trade with some intermediate probability. Thus, there also exists an equilibrium in which both low-value assets trade with an intermediate probability in the first period.

In fact, we show there can exist three equilibria of the model, all of which are symmetric. The equilibria are ranked both in terms of the volume of trade that takes place and the total welfare. The higher is the volume of trade in the first period, the more efficiently assets are reallocated and the higher is the total welfare. Three equilibria exist provided that asset values are sufficiently correlated and the market is sufficiently transparent. When either of these conditions breaks down, the (expected) information content revealed by seller $j$'s trade is insufficient to induce the moderate or high-volume equilibrium and only the low-volume equilibrium exists. Therefore, both the correlation of asset values and the degree of market transparency can impact total welfare.

We analyze the welfare implications in more detail by conducting comparative statics on both the degree of transparency and correlation of asset values. Provided the adverse selection problem is severe enough to prohibit the first-best outcome (i.e., the lemons condition holds), some degree of transparency ($\xi > 0$) always weakly increases welfare relative to a fully opaque market. However, starting from $\xi \in (0, 1)$, increasing transparency is not guaranteed to increase welfare. For instance, welfare can be decreasing in $\xi$ in the moderate-volume equilibrium and is independent of $\xi$ in the low-volume equilibrium. Furthermore, if the lemons condition does not hold, then the unique equilibrium in a fully opaque market is efficient, while there exist inefficient equilibria in a transparent market.

We extend the model to a setting with an arbitrary number of assets, $N > 1$, where the correlation across assets is driven by an unknown underlying aggregate state (low or high). Conditional on the aggregate state, asset values are independently drawn, but they are more likely to be of high value in the high state. This extension serves not only as a robustness check, but allows us to investigate the model’s implications for whether transparency facilitates information aggregation about the underlying aggregate state. We first show that indeed our results are robust to an arbitrary $N$; there exist multiple equilibria that are ranked in terms of trading volume and welfare. Second, we ask whether traders are able to learn the underlying state.

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3This extension bears several interpretations. The number of assets can be interpreted literally as the number of relevant correlated assets in the marketplace. Alternatively, $N$ can be interpreted as the degree of market integration: the number of different assets regarding which traders can have information (e.g., the number of assets that trade on a given platform).
aggregate state by observing trading behavior as $N \to \infty$. Interestingly, we show there are natural conditions under which information aggregation is impossible. While the number of sources of information grows with $N$, the likelihood of trade and thus the informativeness of each source declines fast enough so as to limit the informativeness of the overall market, despite full transparency. When these conditions do not hold, there exists an equilibrium in which information is successfully aggregated; however there can be other equilibria, in which information aggregation fails. These results suggest a limitation of (even fully) transparent markets. They also point to the importance of studying how information is generated in markets, as the extent of market informativeness can depend on the expectations of market participants.

1.1 Policy Implications

Our findings help contribute to the debate on mandatory transaction transparency, which has received significant attention from policy makers in recent years. In July 2002, the corporate bond market underwent a significant change when FINRA (then NASD) mandated that prices and volume of completed transactions be publicly disclosed. Since then, TRACE has been expanded to include other asset classes including Agency-Backed Securities and some Asset-Backed Securities. There are also ongoing efforts by regulators to increase transparency in the markets for numerous derivatives (Title VII of Dodd-Frank) and European corporate bonds (Learner, 2011).

Opponents have objected to mandatory transparency arguing that it is unnecessary and potentially harmful. For example, if price transparency reduces dealer margins, dealers will be less willing to commit capital to hold certain securities thereby reducing liquidity. There is mixed empirical evidence as to whether increased transparency can reduce liquidity. Asquith et al. (2013) find that increased transparency led to a significant decline in trading activity for high-yield bonds. This is in contrast to a controlled study by Goldstein et al. (2007), who find no conclusive evidence that increased transparency causes a reduction in trading activity. Our theoretical framework helps to reconcile these findings. For example, we show that increasing transparency can increase or decrease trading activity depending on the initial degree of transparency, asset correlation, and which equilibrium is played.

Regulators such as FINRA are strong proponents of mandated transparency. They argue that it “creates a level playing field for all investors” (NASD, 2005). To investigate this claim, we extend our model to a setting where some traders have access to transaction data (e.g., broker-dealers) and some do not (e.g., retail or institutional investors). We confirm that a policy of mandatory transparency indeed reduces the trading profits of broker-dealers, which may help

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4In a letter to the SEC, the Bond Market Association argued that adverse effects of mandatory transparency are likely to be exacerbated for lower-rated and less frequently traded bonds.
explain their resistance to the proposed changes. Mandated transparency also mitigates the trading losses of investors who are naive about the fact that they face competition from traders with access to better information (e.g., retail investors). However, if investors are sophisticated (e.g., institutional), then mandatory disclosure has no effect on their welfare and can lead to an overall reduction in efficiency (relative to an opaque market) if traders coordinate on the low-trade equilibrium. Thus, “leveling the playing field” can come at a cost and the desirability of such a policy depends on the composition of market participants.

1.2 Related Literature

Our work is related to Daley and Green (2012, 2015), who study a setting in which information is exogenously revealed to uninformed buyers. They show that when information (or news) quality is exogenous, the unique equilibrium involves periods during which liquidity completely dries up and no trade occurs. In contrast, we show that when information is endogenously revealed by the trading behavior of other market participants, there can exist multiple equilibria all of which require trade to occur with strictly positive probability in each period.

The role of transparency in offers has been studied by Nöldeke and van Damme (1990), Swinkels (1999), Hörner and Vieille (2009) and Fuchs et al. (2015). The two most important differences with respect to these papers are that: first, we consider the transparency of transactions while they all consider the transparency of offers. Second, we explore the strategic considerations of multiple sellers whose assets have correlated values, which are inherently absent in previous work. These two considerations are crucial for understanding trading behavior since they induce complementarities in the sellers’ strategies and can lead to multiple equilibria.

In contemporaneous work, Duffie et al. (2014) analyze the role of published benchmarks (e.g., LIBOR), which reveal a signal about dealers’ cost of supplying a good. In our setting, executed trades play a similar role to benchmarks. As in Duffie et al. (2014), we find that more transparent markets can yield higher welfare by reducing information asymmetries among markets participants. Our framework also suggests another important consideration regarding the use of benchmarks, which is that the informational content of the benchmark may change once they are introduced. Due to this feedback effect, benchmarks may reveal more or less information than expected and can have additional consequences for trading behavior. Thus, when considering the introduction of a benchmark, it is important to understand the extent to which its information content is endogenous.

The usefulness of aggregate indicators for information transmission depends critically on the extent to which they aggregate information that is dispersed in the economy. Thus, our paper is also related to a literature, initiated by Hayek (1945), that studies information ag-
gregation in ‘large’ markets. Early papers in this literature include Grossman (1976), Wilson (1977), and Milgrom (1979). More recent contributions have been made by Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997), Kremer (2002), Lauermann and Wolinsky (2013, 2015), Siga (2013), Bodoh-Creed (2013), Axelson and Makarov (2014), Ostrovsky (2012) derives conditions under which information aggregation obtains in a dynamic setting with a single security, an uninformed market maker, and heterogeneously informed traders. We contribute to this literature by showing that in a dynamic model with heterogeneous but correlated assets, information aggregation can (and under some conditions must) fail because the information revealed is endogenous to trade. Furthermore, whether information aggregates can depend on the equilibrium on which agents coordinate.

There is also a large literature within accounting and finance studying the effect of public disclosure of firm specific information. Healy and Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) provide surveys of both the theoretical and empirical work in this area. One key difference is that this literature takes the information to be disclosed as given and studies the effects of whether, when, how much and how frequently it is made public.

Kaya and Kim (2015) look at a model with a single seller in which sequential buyers receive a private signal about the value of the asset. Instead, our focus is on the two-way interaction between trade and the information generated by it. The idea of a two-way feedback between trading activity and market informativeness is also present in Cespa and Vives (2015). They study a noisy rational expectations model and find that multiple equilibria can arise when noise-trader shocks are sufficiently persistent and informed buyers care only about their short-term returns. While our approaches are substantially different, their model also delivers equilibria that have high trading volume and market informativeness as well as equilibria in which trading volume and informativeness are low.

Finally, Drugov (2010, 2015) considers the related problem of information externalities among two bargaining pairs. There are two important differences with respect to this work. First, he considers a different market structure where there is only one buyer per seller rather than competing buyers. Second, in his model the value of the seller is independent of the value of the buyer while in ours the values are correlated giving rise to a lemons problem.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the basic framework and conduct preliminary analysis. In Section 3, we characterize the equilibria of the model. In Section 4, we analyze the welfare implications. Section 5 considers the model with an arbitrary number of assets. Section 6 analyzes the redistributive effects of transparency when some buyers have access to transaction data and others do not. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model

In this section, we present the basic ingredients of the model, which feature two indivisible assets with correlated values that can be traded in a decentralized market.

There are two sellers, indexed by $i \in \{A, B\}$. Each seller owns one indivisible asset and is privately informed of her asset’s type, denoted by $\theta_i \in \{L, H\}$. Seller $i$ has a value $c_\theta$ for a type $\theta$ asset, where $c_L < c_H$. Each seller has multiple potential trading partners, which we refer to as buyers. The value of a type-$\theta$ asset to a buyer is $v_\theta$ and there is common knowledge of gains from trade, $v_\theta > c_\theta$, which can be motivated by, for example, liquidity constraints or hedging demands.

There are two trading periods: $t \in \{1, 2\}$. In each period, two or more buyers make simultaneous price offers to each seller. A buyer whose offer is rejected gets a payoff of zero and exits the game.\footnote{The assumption that buyers can make only a single offer simplifies the analysis by eliminating the possibility of experimentation.} The payoff to a buyer who purchases an asset of type $\theta$ at price $p$ is given by

$$v_\theta - p.$$  

Sellers discount future payoffs by a discount factor $\delta \in (0, 1)$. The payoff to a seller with an asset of type $\theta$, who agrees to trade at a price $p$ in period $t$ is

$$(1 - \delta_t^{-1}) c_\theta + \delta_t^{-1} p.$$  

If the seller does not trade at either date, his payoff is $c_\theta$. All players are risk neutral.

A key feature of our model is that asset values are positively (but imperfectly) correlated. To model this correlation, let the unconditional distribution of $\theta_i$ be given by $\mathbb{P}(\theta_i = L) = 1 - \pi \in (0, 1)$.\footnote{We have adopted this convention so that higher $\pi$ (or beliefs) corresponds to more favorable beliefs.} The distribution of $\theta_i$ conditional on $\theta_j$ is then $\mathbb{P}(\theta_i = L | \theta_j = L) = \lambda \in (1 - \pi, 1)$.\footnote{With perfect correlation (i.e., $\lambda = 1$), the set of equilibria is sensitive to the specification of off-equilibrium path beliefs. Nevertheless, in Proposition 10 (see the Appendix), we show that the set of equilibria with perfect correlation is the limit of the set of equilibria as $\lambda \to 1$.}

Importantly, asset correlation introduces the possibility that trade in one market contains relevant information about the asset in another market. We capture information spillovers across markets as follows. Buyers who can make offers to seller $i$ are distinct from those who can make offers to seller $j$ and henceforth we refer to market $i$ and market $j$ to clarify this distinction. This allows us to capture a feature of decentralized markets; a trader may not observe trades that take place on other platforms. To capture the degree of transparency across markets, we assume that there is a probability $\xi \in [0, 1]$ that a transaction in market $i$ at $t = 1$ is observed by buyers in market $j$ prior to them making offers in the second period.
refer to the parameter $\xi \in [0, 1]$ as the degree of market transparency, where $\xi = 1$ stands for fully transparent markets and $\xi = 0$ for fully opaque ones. For simplicity, we assume that offers are made privately; a rejected offer is not observed by other buyers within or across markets. Our primary interest is to explore how the correlation of asset values ($\lambda$) and transparency across markets ($\xi$) affect equilibrium trade dynamics. To do so, we focus on primitives which satisfy the following assumptions.

**Assumption 1.** $\pi v_H + (1 - \pi)v_L < c_H$.

**Assumption 2.** $v_L < (1 - \delta)c_L + \delta c_H$.

The first assumption, which we refer to as the “lemons” condition, asserts that the adverse selection problem is severe enough to rule out the first-best efficient equilibrium in which both sellers trade in the first period with probability one (w.p.1) regardless of their type. If the lemons condition does not hold, then the first-best equilibrium exists regardless of the degree of transparency. Without transparency, this is the unique equilibrium outcome. With sufficient transparency, there can exist another equilibrium in which trade is not fully efficient. Thus, transparency can distort an otherwise efficient market by introducing the possibility of learning and provide incentives for the high type to wait for a better price.

The second assumption rules out the fully separating equilibrium in which the low type trades in the first period w.p.1 and the high type trades in the second period w.p.1. Together, these two conditions rule out trivial equilibria in which information spillovers are irrelevant for equilibrium behavior.

### 2.1 Strategies, information sets, and “news”

A strategy of a buyer is a mapping from his information set to a probability distribution over offers. In the first period (i.e., at $t = 1$), a buyer’s information set is empty. In the second period, buyers in market $i$ know that seller $i$ did not trade in the first period. They also observe a noisy signal about whether seller $j$ traded in the first period. This signal or “news” is commonly observed across all buyers in market $i$ and is denoted by $z_i \in \{b, g\}$ (the reason for this notation will become apparent in Section 2.3.2). If $z_i = b$, then a trade occurred in market $j$ and was revealed to participants in market $i$. If $z_i = g$ then either no trade took place.

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*Fuchs et al. (2015) show that this specification is without loss in a setting with a single asset.*

*This finding is similar to results in Daley and Green (2012) in which the introduction of exogenous news can reduce overall efficiency.*

*Strictly speaking, to rule out fully separating equilibria we only need $v_L < (1 - \delta)c_L + \delta v_H$; this stronger condition simplifies exposition without affecting our main results.*

*If seller $i$ trades at $t = 1$ then buyers in market $i$ do not make offers at $t = 2$.*

*We could easily extend the model to allow for the transaction price to be part of buyers’ information set. In equilibrium, no additional information is revealed by the transaction price in the first period.*
in market $j$, or (if $\xi < 1$) trade occurred in market $j$, but it was not observed by players in market $i$ due to lack of transparency.

The strategy of each seller is a mapping from her information sets to a probability of acceptance. Seller $i$’s information includes her type, the set of previous and current offers as well as the information set of buyers in market $i$.

### 2.2 Equilibrium Concept

We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) as our equilibrium concept. This has three implications. First, each seller’s acceptance rule must maximize her expected payoff at every information set taking buyers’ strategies and the other seller’s acceptance rule as given (Seller Optimality). Second, any offer in the support of the buyer’s strategy must maximize his expected payoff given his beliefs, other buyers’ strategy and the seller’s strategy (Buyer Optimality). Third, given their information set, buyers’ beliefs are updated according to Bayes rule whenever possible (Belief Consistency).

### 2.3 Preliminary Analysis

It is convenient to establish some basic properties all equilibria must satisfy. Because there are multiple buyers, their individual offers are not uniquely pinned down by PBE. We refer to the bid in market $i$ at time $t$ as the maximal offer made across all buyers in market $i$ at time $t$.

Let $V(\tilde{\pi}) \equiv \tilde{\pi}v_H + (1 - \tilde{\pi})v_L$ denote buyer’s expected value for an asset given an arbitrary belief $\tilde{\pi}$. Let $\pi \in (\pi, 1)$ be such that $V(\pi) = c_H$, and let $\pi_i$ denote the probability that buyers in market $i$ assign to $\theta_i = H$ just prior to making offers in the second period. In equilibrium, $\pi_i$ is determined by belief consistency and the realization of news (see Section 2.3.2). Taking these beliefs as given, equilibrium play at $t = 2$ corresponds to that of the familiar static market for lemons.

**Lemma 1** Suppose that trade does not occur in market $i$ at $t = 1$. Then, in market $i$ at $t = 2$:

(i) If $\pi_i < \tilde{\pi}$, then the bid is $v_L$ and only the low type seller accepts.

(ii) If $\pi_i > \tilde{\pi}$, then the bid is $V(\pi_i)$ and both types accept.

(iii) If $\pi_i = \tilde{\pi}$, then the bid is $c_H = V(\pi_i)$ with some probability $\phi_i \in [0, 1]$ and $v_L$ otherwise.

A high-type seller will only accept a bid greater than $c_H$. Therefore, when the expected value of the asset is below $c_H$ (i.e., $\pi_i < \tilde{\pi}$), there is no way for a buyer to attract a high-type seller without making a loss. Thus buyers will trade only with the low types and competition
pushes the bid price to $v_L$, implying (i). When the expected value is above $c_H$ (i.e., $\pi_i > \bar{\pi}$), competition between buyers forces the equilibrium offer to be the expected value, implying (ii). In (iii), the expected value of the asset is exactly $c_H$ and hence buyers are indifferent between offering $c_H$ and trading with both types or offering $v_L$ and only trading with the low type.

### 2.3.1 Continuation Values

It follows from Lemma 1 that for a given belief and buyer mixing probability in market $i$, $(\pi_i, \phi_i)$, the payoff to a high-type seller $i$ in the second period is

$$F_H (\pi_i, \phi_i) \equiv \max \{c_H, V(\pi_i)\} \quad (1)$$

and a low-type’s payoff in the second period is given by

$$F_L(\pi_i, \phi_i) \equiv \begin{cases} v_L & \text{if } \pi_i < \bar{\pi} \\ \phi_i c_H + (1 - \phi_i) v_L & \text{if } \pi_i = \bar{\pi} \\ V(\pi_i) & \text{if } \pi_i > \bar{\pi}. \end{cases}$$

Notice that if $\pi_i = \bar{\pi}$, the low-type seller’s payoff is not uniquely pinned down as it depends on the likelihood that $c_H$ is offered. Hence $F_L$ can take values in the interval $[v_L, c_H]$ at $\pi_i = \bar{\pi}$. On the other hand, $F_H$ is independent of the probability that $c_H$ is offered.

![Figure 1: The set of second period payoffs of the seller as they depend on $\theta_i$ and $\pi_i$.](image)

Given her information set in the first period, the seller’s payoff in the second period is stochastic because buyers’ beliefs will depend on news arriving from market $j$ and because buyers may be mixing over offers. Fixing a candidate equilibrium, the expected continuation
value from rejecting the bid in the first period of a type $\theta$ seller in market $i$ is

$$Q^i_\theta = (1 - \delta) \cdot c_\theta + \delta \cdot \mathbb{E}_\theta\{F_\theta(\pi_i, \phi_i)\}.$$  \hfill (2)

**Lemma 2** In any PBE, the expected continuation value for the high type is strictly greater than that for the low type: $Q^i_H > Q^i_L$.

This is due to: (i) $F_H \geq F_L$, (ii) the flow payoff to a high type from delay is higher, and (iii) a high type rationally believes it is less likely that bad news will arrive and thus she expects a (weakly) better distribution of price offers in the second period. Note that (iii) is true regardless of the first-period trading strategies used by the seller in the other market. That is, any “good” news from market $j$ is more likely to arrive in market $i$ if $\theta_i = H$ than if $\theta_i = L$ and conversely.

Consider now the seller’s decision in the first period. The strict ranking of continuation values implies that if a high type is willing to accept the bid in the first period, then a low type will strictly prefer to accept. Given Assumption 1, buyers’ prior beliefs are sufficiently pessimistic to rule out an offer weakly above $c_H$; if the bid was $c_H$ or above, even if all the high types traded, the winning buyer would not break even. Thus, buyers will make offers below $c_H$ and trade only with the low types. Competitive forces again drive the bid to $v_L$.

**Lemma 3** The equilibrium outcome at $t = 1$ in market $i$ satisfies the following.

(i) Buyers’ bid is $v_L$.

(ii) High type seller rejects the bid, while the low type accepts with probability $\sigma_i \in [0, 1)$.

To see why $\sigma_i$ must be strictly less than 1, suppose to the contrary that $\sigma_i = 1$. Then conditional on rejecting the offer, belief consistency requires that buyers believe the seller is a high type w.p.1 (regardless of any information revealed from market $j$) and thus the bid must be $v_H$ in the second period (by Lemma 1). But, then a low-type seller would get a higher payoff by not trading in the first period (see Assumption 2), violating optimality of the seller’s strategy. Thus, it must be that $\sigma_i \in [0, 1)$.

2.3.2 Updating

As highlighted above, buyers’ beliefs in the second period determine equilibrium play. There are two ways in which the prior is updated between the first and second periods. First, conditional on rejecting the offer in the first period, buyers’ interim belief is given by

$$\pi_{\sigma_i} \equiv \mathbb{P}(\theta_i = H | \text{reject at } t = 1) = \frac{\pi}{\pi + (1 - \pi)(1 - \sigma_i)}$$ \hfill (3)
Second, it is the key feature of our model that, before making their offers in the second period, buyers may learn that there was trade in the other market. Since asset values are positively correlated and only low types trade in the first period, news that there was trade in the other market (i.e., \( z_i = b \)) will lead to negative revision in beliefs and \( z_i = g \) will lead to positive updating (hence, this is why we refer to these as “bad” and “good” news).

Exactly how this news is incorporated into the posterior will depend on the degree of market transparency, \( \xi \), and the trading strategy of the seller in the other market, \( \sigma_j \). It is useful to define first the probability of news \( z \) arriving to market \( i \) conditional on the type \( \theta_i \) of seller in market \( i \), which we denote by \( \rho^i_\theta(z) \). Specifically, the probability of observing the event \( z_i = b \), given the seller in market \( i \) is of type \( \theta \) is:

\[
\rho^i_\theta(b) \equiv \mathbb{P}(z_i = b| \theta_i = \theta) = \xi \cdot \sigma_j \cdot \mathbb{P}(\theta_j = L| \theta_i = \theta). \quad (4)
\]

Using equations (3) and (4), we can express the posterior probability of seller \( i \) being high type after news \( z \) arrives from market \( j \) as

\[
\pi_i(z; \sigma_i, \sigma_j) \equiv \mathbb{P}(\theta_i = H| \text{reject at } t = 1, z_i = z) = \frac{\pi_{\sigma_i} \cdot \rho^i_H(z)}{\pi_{\sigma_i} \cdot \rho^i_H(z) + (1 - \pi_{\sigma_i}) \cdot \rho^i_L(z)}. \quad (5)
\]

To conserve on notation, we often suppress arguments of \( \pi_i \). Notice that \( \pi_i(z) \) has the expected property that \( \pi_i(b) \leq \pi_{\sigma_i} \leq \pi_i(g) \)\(^{13}\). A few additional properties are worth noting. First, \( \pi_i(b) \) is increasing in \( \sigma_i \) and is independent of \( \sigma_j \). The latter follows because only a low-type seller \( j \) trades in the first period and therefore upon observing \( z_i = b \), buyers in market \( i \) know that \( \theta_j = L \) regardless of how aggressively seller \( j \) trades. On the other hand, \( \pi_i(g) \) is increasing in both \( \sigma_i \) and \( \sigma_j \), since a more aggressive trading strategy for seller \( j \) implies a lower likelihood of \( z_i = g \). Finally, \( \pi_i(g) \) is more sensitive to changes in \( \sigma_i \) than \( \sigma_j \) since seller \( i \)'s own trading strategy is always (weakly) more informative about her type than is seller \( j \)'s\(^{14}\).

### 3 Equilibrium

From Lemmas 1 and 3 as well as the updating summarized by equations (3)-(5), an equilibrium can be characterized by the first-period trading intensity of the low type in each market and the buyer mixing probabilities conditional on \( \pi_i(z) = \bar{\pi} \). Let \( \gamma = \{\sigma_A, \sigma_B, \phi_A, \phi_B\} \) denote an arbitrary candidate equilibrium. In this section, we derive the set of \( \gamma \) that constitute equilibria

\(^{13}\)When \( \sigma_j = 0 \) or \( \xi = 0 \), we have \( \rho_{i,L}(b) = \rho_{i,H}(b) = 0 \). To ensure that the posterior is well-defined in this case, we adopt the convention \( \pi_i(b) = \frac{\pi_{\sigma_i} \cdot \mathbb{P}(\theta_j = L| \theta_i = H)}{\pi_{\sigma_i} \cdot \mathbb{P}(\theta_j = L| \theta_i = H) + (1 - \pi_{\sigma_i}) \cdot \mathbb{P}(\theta_j = L| \theta_i = L)} \).

\(^{14}\)The effects of \( \sigma_i \) and \( \sigma_j \) on \( \pi_i(g) \) coincide when both there is perfect correlation (\( \lambda = 1 \)) and the market is fully transparent (\( \xi = 1 \)).
and therefore the set of all PBE.

Let us briefly outline how we will proceed. We start by taking the behavior in market \( j \) as given and analyze the “partial equilibrium” in market \( i \). We show that, for each \((\sigma_j, \phi_j)\), there is a unique \((\sigma_i, \phi_i)\) that is consistent with an equilibrium in market \( i \), which may involve \( \sigma_i = 0 \) (Proposition 1). An equilibrium is then simply a fixed point, i.e., \((\sigma_i, \phi_i)\) is consistent with an equilibrium in market \( i \) given \((\sigma_j, \phi_j)\) and vice versa. We argue that any fixed point must be symmetric and involves strictly positive probability of trade in the first period: \( \sigma_i = \sigma_j > 0 \) (Proposition 2). We then characterize the set of (symmetric) fixed points and show that multiple equilibria arise when information spillovers due to correlation and transparency are sufficiently strong (Theorem 1).

### 3.1 Partial Equilibrium

As mentioned above, we start by taking the behavior in market \( j \) as given and define a partial equilibrium as follows.

**Definition 1** We say that \((\sigma_i, \phi_i)\) is a partial equilibrium in market \( i \) given \((\sigma_j, \phi_j)\) if buyers’ beliefs in market \( i \) are updated according to (5) and the strategies induced by \((\sigma_i, \phi_i)\) satisfy buyer and seller optimality in market \( i \).

Note that this definition does not require play in market \( j \) to satisfy equilibrium conditions given \((\sigma_i, \phi_i)\), hence the “partial” moniker. To characterize partial equilibria, it will be useful to write the continuation value of a seller \( i \) of type \( \theta \) explicitly as it depends on the equilibrium strategies:

\[
Q^i_{\theta}(\sigma_i, \sigma_j, \phi_i) \equiv (1 - \delta)c_\theta + \delta \sum_{z \in \{b,g\}} \rho^i_{\theta}(z)F_\theta(\pi_i(z), \phi_i).
\]

(6)

Notice that seller \( i \)'s expected continuation value is independent of \( \phi_j \), but it depends crucially on \( \sigma_j \) because seller \( j \)'s trading strategy determines the distribution of news in market \( i \) and hence the distribution over \( \pi_j \).

**Lemma 4** Fix an arbitrary \((\sigma_j, \phi_j) \in [0, 1]^2 \). Then \((\sigma_i, \phi_i) \in [0, 1]^2 \) is a partial equilibrium in market \( i \) if and only if \( Q^i_L(\sigma_i, \sigma_j, \phi_i) \geq v_L \), where the inequality must hold with equality if \( \sigma_i > 0 \).

To understand the necessity of the inequality, suppose that \( Q^i_L < v_L \). In this case, a low-type seller \( i \) would strictly prefer to accept the bid in the first period and therefore seller optimality requires \( \sigma_i = 1 \), which violates Lemma 3.
Proposition 1 (Unique Partial Equilibrium) Fix an arbitrary \((\sigma_j, \phi_j) \in [0, 1]^2\). There exists a unique partial equilibrium in market \(i\), which may involve \(\sigma_i = 0\), in which case seller \(i\) simply “waits for news” (i.e., trades with probability zero).

The existence and uniqueness of a partial equilibrium follow from Lemma 4 and the facts that \(Q^i_L\) is strictly increasing in \(\sigma_i\) and \(Q^i_L(1, \sigma_j, \phi_i) = (1 - \delta)c_L + \delta v_H > v_L\) by Assumption 2. That a partial equilibrium may involve \(\sigma_i = 0\) is closely related to Daley and Green (2012), in which news is generated by an exogenous process. In their continuous-time setting with exogenous news, it is in fact necessary that equilibria involve periods of no trade. In our setting, news is endogenously generated by trade in other markets, which, as we will see, eliminates the possibility of a period with no trade once we solve simultaneously for an equilibrium in both markets.

Before doing so, consider the effect of \(\sigma_j\) on \(Q^i_L\). As \(\sigma_j\) increases, there are two forces to consider. First, higher \(\sigma_j\) makes good news more valuable; conditional on good news arriving in market \(i\), buyers’ posterior about the seller is more favorable and hence the expected price is higher. Note that there is no analogous effect following bad news; conditional on \(z_i = b\), buyers know that \(\theta_j = L\) but their belief about seller \(i\) (and hence the expected price) is independent of \(\sigma_j\). The second effect is that higher \(\sigma_j\) makes bad news more likely from the perspective of a low-type seller \(i\). These two forces push in opposite directions and either one can dominate. Hence, \(Q^i_L\) may increase or decrease with \(\sigma_j\). For \(\pi_i(\cdot) \neq \bar{\pi}\) this can be expressed as:

\[
\delta^{-1} \frac{\partial Q^i_L}{\partial \sigma_j} = \frac{\partial \rho^i_L(b)}{\partial \sigma_j} (F_L(\pi_i(b), \phi_i) - F_L(\pi_i(g), \phi_i)) + (1 - \rho^i_L(b)) \frac{\partial F_L(\pi_i(g), \phi_i)}{\partial \sigma_j}.
\]

The upshot is that as seller \(j\) trades more aggressively, the partial equilibrium in market \(i\) may involve seller \(i\) trading more aggressively (if the bad news effect dominates) or less aggressively (if the good news effect dominates).

To illustrate these two effects graphically, we plot \(Q^i_L\) as a function of \(\sigma_i\) for four different levels of \(\sigma_j\) in the left panel of Figure 2. Notice that moving from \(\sigma_j = 0\) to \(\sigma_j = 0.3\), seller \(i\) must trade less aggressively in order to maintain indifference (i.e., \(Q^i_L = v_L\)). Further, when \(\sigma_j = 0.6\), \(Q^i_L\) lies above \(v_L\) everywhere and hence seller \(i\) strictly prefers to wait. Finally, for \(\sigma_j = 0.9\), the bad news effect dominates and seller \(i\) trades aggressively.

Next, let us define the mapping from seller \(j\)’s trading strategy into the corresponding partial equilibrium trading strategy of seller \(i\) by \(S(\cdot)\), where \(S(\sigma_j) = 0\) if \(Q^j_L(0, \sigma_j, 0) \geq v_L\) and \(S\) satisfies \(Q^i_L(S(\sigma_j), \sigma_i, \phi_i) = v_L\) for some \(\phi_i \in [0, 1]\) otherwise. The right panel of Figure 2 illustrates a plot of \(S\), which can be decomposed into three regions.\(^{15}\) For small \(\sigma_j\), the good

\(^{15}\)The following parameters remain fixed throughout all figures: \(c_L = 0, c_H = 0.2, v_L = 0.1, v_H = 0.25\).
news effect dominates and $S$ is decreasing. For intermediate $\sigma_j$, the partial equilibrium in market $i$ involves the seller waiting for news. For large $\sigma_j$, the bad news effect dominates and $S$ is increasing in $\sigma_j$. It is worth noting that the non-monotonicity in $S$ obtains only when both asset correlation and transparency are sufficiently large. If either of these conditions fails, then information spillovers across markets have relatively little influence over seller’s behavior.

Figure 2: **Partial Equilibria and Strategic Interactions.** The left panel illustrates how the continuation value of a low-type seller $i$ depends on both $\sigma_i$ and $\sigma_j$. The right panel illustrates the set of partial equilibrium trading strategies in market $i$ given a fixed trading strategy in market $j$. Parameters used: $\delta = 0.7$, $\lambda = 0.9$, $\xi = 1$.

### 3.2 Full Equilibria

Since markets are identical, moving from a partial equilibrium in market $i$ to an equilibrium in both markets requires that the trading strategies also satisfy $\sigma_j = S(\sigma_i)$. The following result shows that all equilibria are symmetric and involve strictly positive probability of trade.

**Proposition 2 (Symmetry and News)** *In any equilibrium, $\sigma_A = \sigma_B > 0$.***

The first equality follows from noting that if $\sigma_i > \sigma_j \geq 0$ then $Q^i_L > Q^j_L$. Because $Q^j_L$ must be weakly bigger than $v_L$ (Lemma 4), the low-type seller $i$ must strictly prefers to wait, which contradicts $\sigma_i > 0$ satisfying *Seller Optimality*. The strict inequality in Proposition 2 then follows immediately: if $\sigma_A = \sigma_B = 0$, then no news arrives in either market and buyers’ beliefs in the second period are exactly the same as in the first period, which would imply that $Q^A_L = Q^B_L < v_L$, violating Lemma 4. Notice the contrast of this result to the partial equilibrium
(i.e., the model with exogenous news). When news is endogenously generated, it cannot be an equilibrium for either market to simply wait for news.

Having established that any equilibrium must be symmetric, we now drop the subscripts and superscripts labeling the specific market and denote an equilibrium by the pair \((\sigma, \phi)\). Furthermore, having established that any equilibrium involves \(\sigma \in (0, 1)\), the low type must be indifferent between accepting \(v_L\) in the first period and waiting until the second period. Hence, any pair is an equilibrium if and only if

\[ Q_L(\sigma, \sigma, \phi) = v_L. \]  

We have thus narrowed the search for equilibria to the solutions to equation (7). It is useful to note that potential equilibria can be classified into three different types depending on the posterior beliefs: \(\pi_i(g) = \bar{\pi} > \pi_i(b)\), \(\pi_i(g) > \bar{\pi} > \pi_i(b)\), and \(\pi_i(g) > \bar{\pi} = \pi_i(b)\). Since the posterior beliefs are monotonic in the amount of trade in the first period, we label the three possible types of equilibria as low trade, medium trade and high trade respectively, and denote the equilibrium trading intensity in the first period in the three equilibria by \(\sigma^q\) with \(q \in \{\text{low, med, high}\}\), where \(\sigma^\text{low} < \sigma^\text{med} < \sigma^\text{high}\). Clearly, there can be at most one low trade equilibrium and one high trade equilibrium, whereas, in principle, there can be many medium trade equilibria.

**Theorem 1 (Characterization and Multiplicity)** An equilibrium always exists and there are at most three. The equilibria fall into the following categories:

1. **Low trade**: There exists a \(\bar{\delta} < 1\), such that this equilibrium exists if \(\delta > \bar{\delta}\).

2. **High trade**: Given \(\delta\), there exist \(\bar{\lambda}_\delta, \bar{\xi}_\delta < 1\) such that this equilibrium exists if \(\lambda > \bar{\lambda}_\delta\) and \(\xi > \bar{\xi}_\delta\).

3. **Medium trade**: There are at most two equilibria in which \(\pi_i(g) > \bar{\pi} > \pi_i(b)\). Exactly one such equilibrium exists if \(\delta > \bar{\delta}\), \(\lambda > \bar{\lambda}_\delta\), and \(\xi > \bar{\xi}_\delta\).

The three types of equilibria coexist when \(\delta > \bar{\delta}\), \(\lambda > \bar{\lambda}_\delta\), and \(\xi > \bar{\xi}_\delta\).

The key insights of the theorem are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 considers two different sets of parameter values. In the left panel, transparency and correlation are relatively low. Hence, the spillover effects across markets are modest, which leads to a unique equilibrium with low trade. In the right panel, both correlation and transparency are relatively high,

\[ 16 \text{The other two possible orderings of the posteriors } \pi_i(g) > \pi_i(b) > \bar{\pi} \text{ and } \bar{\pi} > \pi_i(g) > \pi_i(b) \text{ are ruled out by Lemma 1 and Assumption 2 respectively.} \]
leading to strong spillover effects and three equilibria. Thus, the importance of information spillovers hinges on two factors: market transparency and asset correlation. When both are sufficiently high, strategic interactions lead to multiple equilibria that are ranked in terms of trade. Otherwise, as we show in the next proposition, the equilibrium is unique.

**Proposition 3 (Unique Equilibrium when Correlation or Transparency are Small)**

The equilibrium is generically unique if either the correlation between asset values is sufficiently close to zero ($\lambda$ near $1 - \pi$) or the market is sufficiently opaque ($\xi$ near zero). Furthermore, as $\lambda \to 1 - \pi$ or $\xi \to 0$, the equilibrium trading probability converges to $\bar{\sigma}$ such that $\pi_{\bar{\sigma}} = \bar{\pi}$.

Figure 4 illustrates more explicitly that it takes sufficiently high levels of both correlation and transparency for the medium and high trade equilibria to exist. It also illustrates how trade in the first period can react differently to increases in transparency or correlation depending on which equilibria we consider. For example, $\sigma$ increases with both $\lambda$ and $\xi$ in the high trade equilibrium, while it decreases in both parameters in the medium and low trade equilibria. As we will see in Section 4, these findings will have important welfare implications.

## 4 Welfare

In this section, we study how the degree of market transparency and the level of correlation among assets affect the welfare of market participants. First note that because buyers are
identical and compete via Bertrand competition, they make zero expected profits (Section 6 analyzes the model with non-identical buyers). Next, note that in any equilibrium the low-type sellers are indifferent between trading in the first period at a price of $v_L$ or waiting and trading in the second period. Hence, their ex-ante equilibrium payoff is $v_L$ regardless of market transparency or correlation. In order to study the welfare implications of transparency and correlation, it is therefore sufficient to consider the equilibrium payoff of a high-type seller, which we denote by $Q^q_H$, where $q \in \{\text{low, med, high}\}$ denotes the equilibrium. Furthermore, any welfare improvement for the high type is a Pareto improvement.

**Proposition 4 (Welfare)** Welfare in transparent markets is weakly greater than in opaque markets. Whenever the three types of equilibria coexist, we have $Q^\text{low}_H < Q^\text{med}_H < Q^\text{high}_H$. Moreover,

- $Q^\text{high}_H$ is increasing in both $\xi$ and $\lambda$.
- $Q^\text{med}_H$ is decreasing in $\xi$ and may be decreasing in $\lambda$.
- $Q^\text{low}_H = c_H$ for all $\xi$ and $\lambda$.

In the low trade equilibrium, buyers mix between $c_H$ and $v_L$ after good news, and they offer $v_L$ after bad news. In this equilibrium, following both good and bad news, the high-type seller’s equilibrium payoff is $c_H$. In both the medium and high trade equilibria, after good news the buyers’ beliefs satisfy $\pi_i(g) > \bar{\pi}$. Hence, after good news the price offered is strictly above $c_H$.
and after bad news the high type is no worse off. This immediately implies that in both of these equilibria, the high-type seller is strictly better off than in the low trade equilibrium.

We illustrate these results graphically in Figure 5. In the left panel, when transparency is low, there is a unique equilibrium, which involves low trade. In this equilibrium, the high type is indifferent whether to trade or not following good news and any increase in transparency results in a decrease in $\sigma$ keeping total welfare unchanged. When transparency becomes sufficiently large, multiplicity kicks in. Welfare in the low-trade equilibrium remains independent of the degree of transparency. Welfare is strictly higher in both the medium and high trade equilibria and depends on the degree of transparency. Welfare is strictly higher in both the medium and high trade equilibria and depends on the degree of transparency.

As we can see from Figure 5, both transparency and correlation reduce welfare along the medium trade equilibrium. This is because the good news effect dominates and the low type trades less aggressively as $\xi$ and $\lambda$ increase (see Figure 4), leading to less efficient trade at $t = 1$, more adverse selection at $t = 2$ and lower high-type welfare. On the other hand, in the high trade equilibrium, the bad news effect is dominant and the low type trades more aggressively as $\xi$ and $\lambda$ increase, leading to less adverse selection at $t = 2$ and higher welfare.

5 Many Assets and Market Informativeness

In this section, we extend our analysis to an economy with an arbitrary number of assets. This is an important exercise not only to capture a broader set of economic environments and demonstrate robustness, but because it allows us to study the implications for information
aggregation. In particular, we model correlation by supposing that each asset is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state of nature, and we ask whether market participants learn this aggregate state as the number of assets in the economy grows to infinity.

We show that indeed our results pertaining to multiplicity are robust by characterizing three types of equilibria that coexist under analogous parametric restrictions. We then use the characterization to show that as \( N \to \infty \), information about the underlying state may or may not be aggregated. More specifically, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which information is not aggregated along any sequence of equilibria as \( N \to \infty \). Thus, although the number of sources of information becomes arbitrarily large, the informativeness of each source can decline fast enough so as to limit the market’s ability to aggregate information.

As in the case with two assets, some degree of transparency and correlation is necessary for information spillovers to lead to interesting strategic interactions. In order to simplify the exposition of this section, we focus on the case in which markets are perfectly transparent (\( \xi = 1 \)). This specification strengthens our results pertaining to the impossibility of information aggregation: market participants do not necessarily learn the underlying state even if the market is fully transparent.

### 5.1 Equilibrium

The economy has \( N + 1 \) sellers, where \( N \geq 1 \), and seller \( i \) is endowed with an asset of type \( \theta_i \in \{L, H\} \) that, as before, has payoffs \( c_{\theta_i} \) to the seller and \( v_{\theta_i} \) to the buyers and where \( \mathbb{P}(\theta_i = H) = \pi \in (0, 1) \) for \( i = 1, 2, ..., N + 1 \). As before, the type of asset \( i \) is private information of seller \( i \). The correlation among asset values arises due to correlation with an unobservable underlying aggregate state \( \omega \) that takes values in \( \{l, h\} \). Asset types are mutually independent conditional on the realization of state \( \omega \), and their conditional distributions are given by \( \mathbb{P}(\theta_i = L|\omega = l) = \lambda \in (1 - \pi, 1) \). To allow for arbitrarily high level of correlation, we set \( \mathbb{P}(\omega = h) = \pi \). Notice that as a result of the correlation structure, a seller has private information about the underlying state but does not observe the state or know it with certainty. Finally, we maintain Assumptions 1 and 2 throughout and, as mentioned earlier, assume that the market is perfectly transparent (\( \xi = 1 \)).

It is straightforward to show that generalized versions of Lemmas [1][3] and Proposition 2 hold with arbitrary number of assets. Thus, the equilibrium continues to feature low-type sellers trading with symmetric probability \( \sigma_N \in (0, 1) \) at \( t = 1 \) and the analogue of equation (7) must hold. The key difference between this economy and the setting with only two assets is the information that arrives to each market prior to the second trading period. In any equilibrium, this information can be summarized by how many trades occurred at \( t = 1 \) among the \( N \) other...
assets. We thus denote by $z_k$ the event that exactly $k$ trades (at a price of $v_L$) occurred at $t = 1$.

Let $X_i$ be the indicator for a trade having occurred in market $i$ at $t = 1$. Conditional on the state, $\omega$, we have

$$X_1, \ldots, X_N|\omega \sim^{iid} \text{Bernoulli}(p_\omega),$$

where, by conditional independence, $p_\omega = \sigma_N \cdot \mathbb{P}(\theta_i = L|\omega)$. Thus, we can summarize the distribution of news from the perspective of a type-$\theta$ seller in market $N + 1$ as

$$\rho_\theta(z_k) \equiv \mathbb{P}
\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} X_i = k | \theta_{N+1} = \theta \right) = \sum_{\omega \in \{l,h\}} \binom{N}{k} \cdot (p_\omega)^k \cdot (1 - p_\omega)^{N-k} \cdot \mathbb{P}(\omega | \theta_{N+1} = \theta). \quad (8)$$

By symmetry, equation (8) also characterizes the distribution of news in markets $i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$. Buyers’ posterior belief in an arbitrary market following event $z_k$ is in turn given by

$$\pi_i(z_k) = \frac{\pi_\sigma N \cdot \rho_H(z_k)}{\pi_\sigma N \cdot \rho_H(z_k) + (1 - \pi_\sigma N) \cdot \rho_L(z_k)}, \quad (9)$$

where $\pi_\sigma N = \frac{\pi}{\pi + (1-\pi)(1-\sigma_N)}$ is the interim belief about the seller before the arrival of news.

As in Section 3, we will subdivide the set of equilibria into three categories, which we again call the low, medium, and high trade equilibria. The low trade equilibria are now defined by the ordering of posteriors $\pi_i(z_0) = \bar{\pi} > \pi_i(z_k)$ for $k > 0$. That is, in the second period a high type trades only following the best possible news in a low trade equilibrium. At the other extreme, the high trade equilibrium is defined by the ordering of posteriors $\pi_i(z_k) > \bar{\pi} = \pi_\sigma N (z_N)$ for $k < N$, i.e., in the second period a high type trades following any news realization. Finally, the remaining equilibria, all of which will feature posterior ordering $\pi_i(z_0) > \bar{\pi} > \pi_\sigma N (z_N)$, we term medium trade equilibria. In contrast to the two-asset setting, there can now be many medium trade equilibria. As the number of assets grows, the number of potential equilibria grows as well. For expositional simplicity, we will not distinguish between them.

The following proposition extends our main result in Theorem 1 to the setting with an arbitrary number of assets:

**Proposition 5** Fix $N \geq 1$. An equilibrium always exists. The equilibria fall into the following categories:

1. **Low trade**: There is at most one equilibrium in which $\pi_i(z_0) = \bar{\pi} > \pi_i(z_k)$ for $k > 0$. Given $\lambda$, there exists a $\tilde{\delta}_{\lambda,N}$ which can be uniformly bounded above by $\tilde{\delta}_N < 1$ such that this equilibrium exists iff $\delta \geq \tilde{\delta}_{\lambda,N}$.
2. **High trade**: There is at most one equilibrium in which \( \pi_i(z_k) > \bar{\pi} = \pi_i(z_N) \) for \( k < N \). Given \( \delta \), there exist \( \lambda_{\delta,N} < 1 \) such that this equilibrium exists if \( \lambda > \lambda_{\delta,N} \).

3. **Medium trade**: There can be many equilibria in which \( \pi_i(z_0) > \bar{\pi} > \pi_i(z_N) \). If \( \delta > \delta_N \) and \( \lambda > \lambda_{\delta,N} \), then at least one such equilibrium exists.

The three types of equilibria coexist when \( \delta > \delta_N \) and \( \lambda > \lambda_{\delta,N} \) and are Pareto ranked with \( Q_{low}^H < Q_{med}^H < Q_{high}^H \).

Having characterized the set of equilibria, we now use the model to ask questions about the informational efficiency of markets, as they become large. Though we do not model them explicitly, one can imagine a variety of reasons why information aggregation is valuable (e.g., better allocation of capital).

### 5.2 Does Information Aggregate?

Let \( \pi^{state}(z) \equiv P(\omega = h|z) \) denote buyers’ posterior belief about the state following the realization \( z \) of news arriving from other markets (i.e., how many other sellers have traded); by symmetry, buyers have the posteriors belief in all markets. Notice that as in the two-asset setting, buyers’ posterior beliefs about the state are imperfect. However, if the news becomes sufficiently informative in the limit, then the noise in posteriors should disappear. In this case, we say that there is information aggregation about the state. To formalize this notion, consider a sequence of trading probabilities \( \{\sigma_N\}_{N=1}^\infty \) where, for each \( N \), \( \sigma_N \) is an equilibrium trading probability in the economy with \( N + 1 \) assets.

**Definition 2** Take any sequence of equilibrium trading probabilities, \( \{\sigma_N\}_{N=1}^\infty \). We say that there is information aggregation about the state if \( \pi^{state} \to^p 1_{\{\omega = h\}} \) as \( N \to \infty \).

Clearly, if the information content of each individual market is fixed and non-trivial, (e.g., if \( \{\sigma_N\}_{N=1}^\infty \) is uniformly bounded above zero), then information aggregation obtains. The reason, of course, is that by the law of large numbers the fraction of trades that buyers would observe would concentrate around its population mean \( \sigma_N P(\theta_i = L|\omega = \bar{\omega}) \), which would be greater in the low state than in the high state since \( P(\theta_i = L|\omega = l) > P(\theta_i = L|\omega = h) \).

However, because the information contained in trading behavior is endogenous, it is possible that the trading behavior becomes less informative as the number of assets grows (i.e., \( \sigma_N \to 0 \)). In this case, the rate of convergence determines whether aggregation obtains. To see this possibility, it is useful to consider the ‘fictitious’ limiting economy where buyers learn the state of nature in the second period w.p.1. In this fictitious economy, buyers have exogenous
information in the second period. As shown in Proposition 1 with exogenous news, it is in fact possible for trade to completely collapse in the first period. Indeed, under the following two conditions the low type seller in this limiting economy would strictly prefer to delay trade to the second period.

**Condition 1.** 
$$1 - \frac{(1-\lambda)(1-\pi)}{\pi} > \bar{\pi}.$$

**Condition 2.** 
$$v_L < (1 - \delta) \cdot c_L + \delta \cdot \left( \lambda \cdot v_L + (1 - \lambda) \cdot V \left( 1 - \frac{(1-\lambda)(1-\pi)}{\pi} \right) \right).$$

Condition (1) guarantees that the price conditional on good news would be above $c_H$, while Condition (2) requires that the expected continuation value of the low type be strictly above $v_L$. This implies that an offer of $v_L$ in the first period would be rejected w.p.1. The following proposition utilizes these two conditions to state the main result of this section.

**Proposition 6 (Information Aggregation)** If conditions (1) and (2) hold, then there does not exist a sequence of equilibria along which information aggregates. Conversely, if either (1) or (2) is reversed, there exists a sequence of equilibria along which information aggregates.

The proof uses the fact that information aggregation implies that for $N$ large enough, the payoffs of the sellers in the economy with finitely many assets can be bounded below by the payoff in the limiting economy, thus making delay also optimal when there are a large but finite number of assets. But this contradicts the fact that trade w.p.0 cannot be part of an equilibrium with finitely many assets.

Conversely, when the limiting economy has an equilibrium with positive trade, which is the case when either (1) or (2) is reversed, we can always construct a sequence of equilibria that converge to an equilibrium with that trading probability, and information is clearly aggregated along such a sequence. However, as demonstrated in the next proposition, a violation of Condition (1) or (2) is not sufficient to ensure aggregation along every sequence of equilibria.

**Proposition 7** Suppose that $\lambda = 1$, then for $\delta$ sufficiently high the following two equilibria coexist for any $N \geq 1$:

- **High trade**: an equilibrium in which low-type sellers trade at $t = 1$ w.p.1.

- **Low trade**: an equilibrium in which low-type sellers trade with probability $\sigma \in (0,1)$ consistent with posterior ordering $\pi_i(z_k) < \pi_i(z_0) = \bar{\pi}$ for all $k > 0$.

Importantly, information fails to aggregate along the low trade equilibria, while information aggregation obtains along the high trade equilibria.
These results suggest yet another reason why it is important to understand how information is generated in markets, as the information content of “signals” can depend on the behavior and expectations of market participants. For example, by introducing a (public) benchmark that is based on an equilibrium price, one should expect its information content to change.

6 Transparency with Asymmetric Buyers

Pro-transparency policies are sometimes motivated as a way to “level the playing field” between traders with heterogeneous access to information. In this section we evaluate the effects of such policies. In order to do so, we extend the model to allow for buyers with differential access to transaction data. This is meant to capture the fact that some traders (e.g., broker-dealers) are active in many markets, which may give them an informational advantage over investors who participate in fewer markets.

Let us return to the model with two sellers and suppose that there are $M > 2$ buyers for each seller in each period, and that one of the buyers in each market is able to observe what occurs in the other market regardless of whether there is transparency. We refer to this buyer as a “dealer.” The remaining buyers, whom we refer to as “investors” only learn about trades if there is transparency. In this section, we assume that in each period the seller holds a second price auction with a secret reserve price. For simplicity, we focus on a setting with only two assets and compare the case of fully opaque ($\xi = 0$) vs fully transparent ($\xi = 1$) markets.

Corollary 1 (Fully Transparent) When the market is fully transparent, investors and dealers have identical information and the set of equilibrium is the same as in the fully transparent case of Theorem 1. Therefore, with full transparency, both investors and dealers make zero (expected) trading profits.

When the market is fully opaque, investors’ degree of sophistication is an important determinant of whether they benefit from transparency. Below, we consider two different specifications regarding the degree of sophistication of investors. They can be either “naive” or “sophisticated” regarding the fact that they are facing competition from a trader with access to better information. One can think of naive investors as utility maximizing agents with an incorrect

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17 Our results extend to the case in which the dealer is present with probability $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$.

18 Adopting this trading mechanism (rather than Bertrand competition) is primarily to simplify the equilibrium analysis and intuition. When buyers are symmetric (or the market is fully transparent), both trading mechanisms lead to exactly the same equilibrium outcomes. In an opaque market with asymmetric buyers and Bertrand competition, the equilibrium construction is more complex because the optimal bidding strategy depends on the distribution of other bids, which can require that buyers mix over a continuum of offers. Nevertheless, the key insights in Propositions and 9 are robust to Bertrand competition (formal results available upon request).
prior belief about the probability that a dealer is present (i.e., the true probability is one but naive investors believe it is zero). Sophisticated investors are fully rational agents. In either case, several familiar features arise in equilibrium. The bid in the first period is $v_L$. The high-type seller sets a secret reserve price above $c_H$ and the low-type seller mimics this reserve price with some probability $1 - \sigma_i$. Thus, the first period bid is rejected by the high-type seller w.p.1 and accepted with probability $\sigma_i$ by the low-type seller. We characterize equilibrium behavior in the second period separately for each case (naive/sophisticated investors) below.

**Naive Investors.** If the market is fully opaque then, in the second period, naive investors bid according to Lemma 1, where their posteriors are conditioned only on $\sigma_i$. A dealer bids the expected value if its posterior is above $\bar{\pi}$ and $v_L$ otherwise. Naive investors fall prey to a winner’s curse. They win the auction only when the dealer receives bad news from the other market. Conditional on a trade in the other market, naive investors’ bid underestimates the probability of the asset being low value and hence, on average, they experience trading losses. On the other hand, when the other market does not trade, then naive investors are always outbid by the dealer who is thus able to capture information rents. Also, since the second highest bid always originates from investors, the seller faces exactly the distribution of bids as if he were facing only naive investors. This implies that any rents made by the dealer are exactly offset by the losses of the investors. Thus, in addition to the potential for multiple equilibria and welfare gains for the seller, transparency has a *redistributive* effect from the dealer to the naive investors.

**Proposition 8 (Naive Investors)** If investors are naive and markets are fully opaque, there exists a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium generates the same total surplus as the low-trade equilibrium in Theorem 4. However, dealers make positive trading profits while naive investors experience trading losses. Therefore, introducing transparency reduces dealer’s trading profits and increases the welfare of naive investors.

**Sophisticated Investors.** When investors understand that they are competing against a dealer, they are aware of the winner’s curse. Therefore, when the market is opaque, sophisticated investors bid in the second period as if a trade occurred in the other market. Note that a bid of $v_L$ w.p.1 in the second period cannot be part of an equilibrium. Therefore, it must be that $\pi_i(b) = \bar{\pi}$. This requires a higher equilibrium $\sigma$ than if all buyers are symmetric. This increased probability of trade in the first period enhances efficiency relative to the symmetric buyer case. Yet, all the additional surplus goes to the dealer and not the seller who still faces the same distribution of offers in the second period. On the other hand, when markets become fully transparent, the dealer now faces competition from the sophisticated investors and thus
loses his rents. Unlike with naive buyers, the reduction in the dealer’s rents is not purely redistributive.

**Proposition 9 (Sophisticated Investors)** When investors are sophisticated and markets are fully opaque, there exists a unique equilibrium that Pareto dominates the low-trade equilibrium in Theorem 1. The additional surplus is captured entirely by dealers. Therefore, introducing transparency reduces dealer profits without affecting sophisticated investors’ welfare but may decrease overall trading surplus.

Importantly, in both cases, dealers prefer the opacity. This may help explain why insiders in financial markets lobby strongly against making transaction data freely available to all market participants. It also shows that although enhancing transparency might help protect naive investors it runs the risk of actually reducing welfare if applied in an environment where investors are sophisticated. Thus, in the complex derivatives markets where most participants are highly sophisticated, transparency has the potential to reduce overall welfare. It is worth noting here the contrast with respect to our base model with symmetric buyers, in which transparency cannot yield lower welfare than opacity (see Proposition 4). The difference in the results stems from the fact that when traders are asymmetric and markets are opaque, there is effectively less competition in the second period due to the informational advantage of the dealer. This makes the seller more pessimistic about the future and thus increases her willingness to trade early. Thereby, opacity has the potential to mitigate the adverse selection problem and increase welfare provided that investors are sophisticated.

7 Conclusions

Since the seminal work of Hayek (1945), the role of markets in aggregating information has been well understood. In this paper, we have highlighted feedback effects between the information content in markets and the incentive to trade in a dynamic setting. Our model delivers several novel theoretical insights, which have implications for both policy and empirical work.

Our main theoretical insights are as follows. First, contrary to an economy with exogenously revealed information, when the information revealed is endogenously determined by trading behavior, there cannot be periods of no trade. Second, the endogenous nature of information introduces interdependence in the trading behavior across markets. In particular, when correlation and transparency are sufficiently high, this interdependence can be sufficiently strong so as to lead to multiplicity of equilibria that differ in their trading volume, prices, information content, and welfare. Perhaps surprisingly, we also find that markets can fail to aggregate
information as the number of participants becomes large, even if information is made available to market participants (i.e. even if the market is fully transparent).

The fact that multiplicity of equilibria can arise once markets are made transparent has important implications for how we interpret and conduct empirical work. Our results suggest that a change in transparency can lead to either little change in market behavior (if the market remains in the low trade equilibrium) or the market behavior can change dramatically (if the market has switched to the high trade equilibrium). This can help explain why Bessembinder et al. (2006) and Edwards et al. (2007) find that market participants gain from the introduction of TRACE, while Goldstein et al. (2007) see no effect within a subclass of securities, and Asquith et al. (2013) find significantly different results for bonds that were part of the different phases of the TRACE program.

The existence of multiple, welfare-ranked equilibria is also important from a policy perspective. In order to actually achieve the welfare gains associated with increased transparency, it is important to steer market participants to coordinate on the high-trade equilibrium. When market participants have differential access to transaction data, transparency indeed “levels the playing field” if investors are naive; it reduces both dealers’ trading profits and investors’ trading losses. However, transparency does not benefit sophisticated investors and can potentially reduce total surplus. Therefore, it is important to take into account the type of market participants (e.g., retail or institutional) when considering policies aimed at transparency.
References


A Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1 For (i) and (ii), see the proof of Lemma 1 in Daley and Green (2015). Moreover, by their Lemma A.3, the bid price must earn zero expected profit. To demonstrate (iii), we will show that the bid price must be either $v_L$ or $c_H$ when $\pi_i = \bar{\pi}$ by ruling out all other bids.

Clearly, at $t = 2$, the reservation price of the low-type seller is $c_L$ and the reservation price of the high-type seller is $c_H$. Hence, if the bid is strictly above $c_H$, both types will accept w.p.1 and the winning buyer earns negative expected profit. Next, suppose there is positive probability that the bid is strictly less than $v_L$. Then, for $\epsilon > 0$ small enough, a buyer could earn strictly positive expected profit by deviating and offering $v_L - \epsilon$. Finally, if the bid is strictly between $v_L$ and $c_H$, the high type will reject, the low type will accept and the winning buyer makes negative profit. Thus, we have shown that the equilibrium bid price at $t = 2$ when $\pi_i = \bar{\pi}$ must be either $v_L$ or $c_H$. ■

Proof of Lemma 2 Since $c_H > c_L$ and $F_H \geq F_L$, we have that

$$Q'_L = (1 - \delta) \cdot c_L + \delta \cdot E_L\{F_L(\pi_i, \phi_i)\}$$

$$< (1 - \delta) \cdot c_H + \delta \cdot E_L\{F_L(\pi_i, \phi_i)\}$$

$$\leq (1 - \delta) \cdot c_H + \delta \cdot E_L\{F_H(\pi_i, \phi_i)\}.$$ Therefore, it is sufficient to show that $E_H\{F_H(\pi_i, \phi_i)\} \geq E_L\{F_H(\pi_i, \phi_i)\}$. Recall that $F_H$ is increasing in $\pi_i$ and independent of $\phi_i$. Hence, the desired inequality is implied by proving that conditional on $\theta_i = H$, the random variable $\pi_i$ (weakly) first-order stochastically dominates $\pi_i$ conditional on $\theta_i = L$.

Note that the distribution of $\pi_i$ in the second period is a function of the trading probabilities by both types of both sellers and the realization of news from market $j$, $z_i \in \{\text{trade, no trade}\}$. For $\theta \in \{L, H\}$ and $z \in \{\text{trade, no trade}\}$, define $\rho_{\theta}(z) \equiv \mathbb{P}(z_i = z|\theta_i = \theta)$. Fix the interim belief $\pi_{\sigma_i}$, and for $z', z'' \in \{\text{trade, no trade}\}$ with $z' \neq z''$, say that $z_i = z'$ is “good news" if the posterior $\pi_i$ satisfies $\pi_i(z') \geq \pi_i(z'')$, and it is “bad news" otherwise. Without loss of generality, suppose that $z'$ is good news and $z''$ is bad news. But note that this implies:

$$\frac{\pi_{\sigma_i} \cdot \rho_H(z')}{\pi_{\sigma_i} \cdot \rho_H(z') + (1 - \pi_{\sigma_i}) \cdot \rho_L(z')} = \pi_i(z') \geq \pi_i(z'') = \frac{\pi_{\sigma_i} \cdot \rho_H(z'')}{\pi_{\sigma_i} \cdot \rho_H(z'') + (1 - \pi_{\sigma_i}) \cdot \rho_L(z'')}$$

with $\pi_i(z) \equiv \pi_{\sigma_i}$ if $\rho_H(z) = \rho_L(z) = 0$. Combining with the fact that $\rho_{\theta}(z'') = 1 - \rho_{\theta}(z')$ for

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19 Conditional on reaching the second trading period and the buyer’s belief, $\pi_i$, the strategic setting in market $i$ is identical to theirs.
\(\theta = L, H,\) we have that \(\rho_H(z') \geq \rho_L(z'),\) which establishes the result. ■

**Proof of Lemma 3.** (i) From Lemma 2 the strict ranking of seller continuation values implies that, in any equilibrium, if the high type is willing to accept an offer with positive probability then the low type must accept w.p.1. Thus, given Assumption 1, any bid at or above \(c_H\) would lead to negative expected profit. Any bid in \((v_L, c_H)\) also leads to losses since it is only accepted by the low type. If the bid was strictly less than \(v_L,\) a buyer can make strictly positive profits by offering \(v_L - \epsilon,\) for \(\epsilon > 0\) small enough. Thus, any deterministic offer strictly below \(v_L\) can be ruled out. The only deterministic bid possible is \(v_L,\) at this point there is no profitable deviation for the other buyer than offering \(v_L\) as well. The same arguments rule out any mixed strategy equilibrium that has a mass point anywhere other than \(v_L.\) Finally, mixing continuously over some interval of offers cannot be an equilibrium. We show this by contradiction. If one of the buyers mixes over some interval \([b, \bar{b}]\) with \(\bar{b} = v_L\) then the other buyer must be offering \(v_L\) with probability 1 because otherwise he would never want to offer \(v_L,\) which leads to zero profits w.p.1. If instead \(\bar{b} < v_L,\) the other buyer’s best response can never have \(\bar{b}\) (or anything below) as part of its support. This bid will lose with probability 1 and thus earn zero profits, while bidding \(\frac{v_L + v_L}{2}\) would lead to strictly positive profits.

(ii) Clearly the high type would reject \(v_L,\) since \(v_L < c_H.\) To see that the low type must accept with probability less than one, note that if in equilibrium the low type accepted w.p.1, then the posterior belief would assign probability 1 to the type being high in the next period. The offer in the second period (as argued in Lemma 1) would then be \(v_H\) but, given Assumption 2, the low type seller would then want to deviate and trade in period 2 at \(v_H\) rather than at \(v_L\) in period 1. ■

**Proof of Lemma 4.** See text for the proof of necessity. Sufficiency follows from Lemmas 1 through 3. ■

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Fix any \((\sigma_j, \phi_j) \in [0, 1]^2.\) If \(Q_L(0, \sigma_j, \phi_i) \geq v_L,\) then \(\sigma_i = 0\) satisfies the partial equilibrium as established in Lemma 4. Furthermore, there is no other candidate value for \(\sigma_i\) because \(Q^i_L\) is strictly increasing in \(\sigma_i,\) which implies that \(Q^i_L(\sigma_i, \sigma_j, \phi_i) > v_L\) for all \(\sigma_i > 0,\) violating Lemma 4. If \(Q^i_L(0, \sigma_j, \phi_i) < v_L,\) strict monotonicity of \(Q^i_L\) with respect to \(\sigma_i\) and the fact that \(Q^i_L(1, \sigma_j, \phi_i) > v_L\) (by Assumption 2) imply that there exists a unique \(\sigma_i\) such that \(Q^i_L(\sigma_i, \sigma_j, \phi_i) = v_L.\) If \((\sigma_i, \sigma_j)\) is such that \(\pi_i(z) = \bar{\pi}\) for some \(z,\) then \(Q^i_L\) is also strictly increasing in \(\phi_i,\) implying that it too is uniquely determined.\footnote{If \(\pi_i(z) \neq \bar{\pi}\) for all \(z \in \{b, g\},\) then \(\phi_i\) is irrelevant for the partial equilibrium.}

**Proof of Proposition 2.** The proof that all equilibria involve strictly positive probability of trade at \(t = 1\) is in the text. We show here that all equilibria must be symmetric. In search
of a contradiction, assume there exists an equilibrium in which \( \sigma_A > \sigma_B \geq 0 \). Then notice the following:

(i) The probability of bad news arriving to market \( B \) is higher than that of bad news arriving to market \( A \).

(ii) Conditional on bad news, beliefs must satisfy \( \pi_A(b) > \pi_B(b) \) since the posterior

\[
\pi_i(b) = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\mathbb{P}(\theta_j=L|\theta_i=L)}{\mathbb{P}(\theta_j=L|\theta_i=H)} \cdot \frac{1-\pi_i}{\pi_i}}
\]

is increasing in \( \sigma_i \) and is independent of \( \sigma_j \).

(iii) Conditional on good news, beliefs must satisfy \( \pi_A(g) > \pi_B(g) \) since the posterior

\[
\pi_i(g) = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{1-\xi \sigma_j \mathbb{P}(\theta_j=L|\theta_i=L)}{1-\xi \sigma_j \mathbb{P}(\theta_j=L|\theta_i=H)} \cdot \frac{1-\pi_i}{\pi_i}}
\]

is increasing faster in \( \sigma_i \) than in \( \sigma_j \).

Note that (i)–(iii) imply that \( Q^A_L > Q^B_L \). Moreover, if \( \sigma_A \in (0,1) \), it must be that \( Q^A_L = v_L \) (by Lemma 4), which then implies that \( Q^B_L < v_L \). This contradicts a necessary condition for an equilibrium in market \( B \) (also by Lemma 4).

**Proof of Theorem 1.** To prove existence of an equilibrium, it suffices to show there exists a \( (\sigma, \phi) \in [0,1]^2 \) such that equation (7) holds (i.e., \( Q_L(\sigma, \sigma, \phi) = v_L \)). Note that by varying \( \sigma \) from 0 to 1, \( Q_L \) ranges from \([ (1-\delta) c_L + \delta v_L, (1-\delta) c_L + \delta v_H ] \). By continuity of \( Q_L \) and Assumption 2, the intermediate value theorem gives the result.

That equilibria fall within the stated three categories follows from the fact that we can rule out the other two potential posterior orderings \( \pi_i(g) > \pi_i(b) > \bar{\pi} \) and \( \pi > \pi_i(g) > \pi_i(b) \). In the latter case, the equilibrium offer in the second period would be \( v_L \) w.p.1, which violates Lemma 4. In the former case, the expected offers in the second period are strictly greater than \( c_H \), which, by Assumption 2, would imply \( Q_L > v_L \) also violating Lemma 4. Hence, the three categories in Theorem 1 are the only remaining possible orderings of posteriors.

**Low trade.** That there is at most one low trade equilibrium follows from the fact that the trading intensity \( \sigma \) in this category is fully pinned down by the requirement that \( \pi_i(z_0) = \bar{\pi} \). Let \( x \) be such that \( \pi_i(g;x,x) = \bar{\pi} \). As \( \phi \) varies from 0 and 1, \( Q_L(x,x,\phi) \) varies continuously from \((1-\delta)c_L + \delta v_L \) to \((1-\delta)c_L + \delta (\lambda \xi x \cdot v_L + (1-\lambda \xi) c_H) \). Hence, there exists a \( \tilde{\delta}_{\xi,\lambda} < 1 \), such that \( Q_L(x,x,1) = v_L \). Clearly, a low trade equilibrium exists if and only if \( \delta > \tilde{\delta}_{\xi,\lambda} \). Moreover, it can be shown that \( \sup \xi,\lambda \lambda \xi x < 1 \). Hence \( \tilde{\delta} \equiv \sup \xi,\lambda \tilde{\delta}_{\xi,\lambda} < 1 \).
High trade. That there is at most one high trade equilibrium follows from the fact that the trading intensity $\sigma$ in this category is fully pinned down by the requirement that $\pi_i(z_0) = \bar{\pi}$. Let $y$ be such that $\pi_i(g; y, y) = \bar{\pi}$. As $\phi_i$ varies from 0 to 1, $Q_L$ varies continuously from $\lambda \xi L + (1 - \lambda \xi L) \cdot V(\pi_i(g))$ to $\lambda \xi L \cdot c_H + (1 - \lambda \xi L) \cdot V(\pi_i(g))$. Hence, because for $y$ satisfying $\pi_i(b; y, y) = \bar{\pi}$ we have $\lim_{\lambda \xi L \rightarrow 1} \lambda \xi L = 1$, it follows that the range of $Q_L$ converges to the interval $((1 - \delta) c_L + \delta v_L, (1 - \delta) c_L + \delta c_H)$ as $\lambda$ and $\xi$ go to 1. By Assumption 2, $v_L$ is inside this interval. This establishes the existence of thresholds $\bar{\lambda}_\delta$ and $\bar{\xi}_\delta$ such that the high trade equilibrium exists whenever $\lambda > \bar{\lambda}_\delta$ and $\xi > \bar{\xi}_\delta$.

Notice that we can already conclude that the low and the high trade equilibria coexist whenever $\delta > \bar{\delta}$, $\lambda > \bar{\lambda}_\delta$, and $\xi > \bar{\xi}_\delta$. We are thus left to show that there are at most two medium trade equilibria, and that there is only medium trade equilibrium when these parametric conditions hold.

Medium trade. We first show that there can be at most two medium trade equilibria. For $r$ such that $\pi(b; r, r) < \bar{\pi} < \pi(g; r, r)$, we have:

$$Q_L(r, r, \cdot) = (1 - \delta) c_L + \delta [f(r) v_H + (1 - f(r)) v_L],$$

where

$$f(r) = \left(\frac{1}{1 - \rho_L(b)} + \frac{1 - r}{1 - \rho_H(b)} \cdot \frac{1 - \bar{\pi}}{\bar{\pi}}\right)^{-1}$$

and $\rho_\theta(b) = \xi r \mathbb{P}(\theta_j = L|\theta_i = \theta)$ for $\theta = L, H$. It can be easily shown that the equation $f'(r) = 0$ has at most one solution for $r \in (0, 1)$, which implies that $Q_L$ is equal to $v_L$ for at most two values of $r$ whenever $\pi(b; r, r) < \bar{\pi} < \pi(g; r, r)$. This establishes that there can be at most two medium trade equilibria.

For existence and uniqueness, let $x, y, r$ be defined by

$$\pi_i(b; r, r) < \pi_i(b; y, y) = \bar{\pi} = \pi_i(g; x, x) < \pi_i(g; r, r)$$

and suppose that $\delta > \bar{\delta}$, $\lambda > \bar{\lambda}_\delta$, and $\xi > \bar{\xi}_\delta$. From the monotonicity of posteriors in the trading probability, we have $r \in (x, y)$. Then, from above arguments, the low and the high trade equilibria coexist and there exist $\phi', \phi'' \in (0, 1)$ such that $Q_L(x, x, \phi') = Q_L(y, y, \phi'') = v_L$. Now, note that $\lim_{r \downarrow x} Q_L(r, r, \cdot) = Q_L(x, x, 1)$ and $\lim_{r \uparrow y} Q_L(r, r, \cdot) = Q_L(y, y, 0)$. But then, because $Q_L(x, x, 1) > Q_L(x, x, \phi') = Q_L(y, y, \phi'') > Q_L(y, y, 0)$, the intermediate value theorem implies that there must exist an $r'$ such that $Q_L(r', r', \cdot) = v_L$. Suppose for contradiction that there also exists an $r''$ such that $r'' > r'$ and $Q_L(r'', r'', \cdot) = v_L$. Recall that $Q_L$ intersects $v_L$ for at most two values of $r$, namely $r'$ and $r''$, whenever $\pi(b; r, r) < \bar{\pi} < \pi(g; r, r)$. Then either (i) $Q_L(r, r, \cdot) < v_L$ for all $r \in (x, r') \cup (r'', y)$ or (ii) $Q_L(r, r, \cdot) > v_L$ for all $r \in (x, r') \cup (r'', y).$
But recall that \( \lim_{r \downarrow x} Q_L(r, r, \cdot) = Q_L(x, x, 1) > Q_L(x, x, \phi') = v_L \) which contradicts (i), and \( \lim_{r \downarrow x} Q_L(r, r, \cdot) = Q_L(x, x, 1) > Q_L(x, x, \phi') = v_L \) which contradicts (ii). Thus, there exists a unique medium trade equilibrium when \( \delta > \bar{\delta}, \lambda > \bar{\lambda}_\delta, \) and \( \xi > \bar{\xi}_\delta. \) \( \blacksquare \)

**Proof of Proposition 3.** The convergence of the trading probability to \( \bar{\sigma} \) such that \( \pi_{\bar{\sigma}} = \bar{\pi} \) follows from right continuity of low type’s continuation value in \((\lambda, \xi)\) at \((\lambda, \xi) = (1 - \pi, 0)\), and from Assumption 2, which guarantees that the bid a low type can expect in the second period must be below \( c_H \) in order to satisfy equation (7). Let us now consider the uniqueness argument.

(i) We start with uniqueness for small \( \xi \). To this end, it suffices to show that \( Q_L(r, r, \cdot) \) is monotonically increasing in \( r \) whenever \( \pi(b; r, r) < \bar{\pi} < \pi(g; r, r) \). Recall that

\[
Q_L(r, r, \cdot) = (1 - \delta) c_L + \delta (\lambda \xi r \cdot v_L + (1 - \lambda \xi r) \cdot V(\pi_i(g))).
\]

Differentiation with respect to \( r \) in this open set yields:

\[
\delta^{-1} \frac{dQ_L}{dr} = \lambda \xi \cdot (v_L - V(\pi_i(g))) + (1 - \lambda \xi r) \cdot \frac{dV(\pi_i(g))}{dr}.
\]

The first term can be made arbitrarily small by making \( \xi \) small, while the second term is bounded below by a positive number. Hence, we conclude that \( Q_L \) is monotonically increasing in this region and, thus, we have uniqueness for small \( \xi \).

(ii) We now show uniqueness for \( \lambda \) close to \( 1 - \pi \). As before, let \( \bar{\sigma} \) be such that \( \pi_{\bar{\sigma}} = \bar{\pi} \), and consider \( \delta_0 \in (0, 1) \) defined by

\[
v_L = (1 - \delta_0) c_L + \delta_0 [\pi \xi \bar{\sigma} \cdot v_L + (1 - \pi \xi \bar{\sigma}) \cdot c_H].
\]

We show that a sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be unique for \( \lambda \) close to \( 1 - \pi \) is that \( \delta \neq \delta_0 \) (thus, we have our qualifier that the equilibrium is generically unique). As \( \lambda \) approaches \( 1 - \pi \), the posteriors in the second period converge as well: \( \lim_{\lambda \uparrow 1-\pi} \pi_i(b) = \lim_{\lambda \uparrow 1-\pi} \pi_i(g) = \bar{\pi} \).

In particular, we have that for \( r \) satisfying \( \pi(b; r, r) < \bar{\pi} < \pi(g; r, r) \):

\[
\lim_{\lambda \uparrow 1-\pi} Q_L(r, r, \cdot) = (1 - \delta) c_L + \delta [\pi \xi \bar{\sigma} \cdot v_L + (1 - \pi \xi \bar{\sigma}) \cdot c_H].
\]

But if \( \delta \neq \delta_0 \), then for \( \lambda \) close to \( 1 - \pi \), a medium trade equilibrium cannot exist, because otherwise we cannot have \( Q_L = v_L \) as required by (7). Thus, we have ruled out the medium trade equilibrium. But then from the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1, we know that the low and the high trade equilibrium cannot coexist when the medium trade equilibrium does
not exist. This establishes uniqueness for $\lambda$ close to $1 - \pi$. ■

**Proof of Proposition 4.** The welfare of the high type in the low trade equilibrium is $c_H$, which is also the case with opaque markets. Also, note that in the medium and high trade equilibria, we have that the posterior following good news satisfies $\pi_i(g) > \bar{\pi}$, which implies that in those equilibria the high type’s welfare is strictly above $c_H$. Thus, welfare in transparent markets is weakly greater than welfare in opaque markets, and strictly so in the high or medium trade equilibria. Since we know that in high and medium trade equilibria, the welfare of the high type is higher than in the low trade equilibrium, we are left to rank the welfare in the medium and high trade equilibria and demonstrate the comparative statics in the first two bullets of the Proposition.

For the welfare ranking, we know that the high-type seller $i$’s welfare is increasing in own trading probability $\sigma_i$, so we just need to show that it is non-decreasing in $\sigma_j$. Since higher equilibrium $\sigma$ means that both are higher, the welfare ranking will follow. It is convenient to define $\rho_{unc}(b) = \xi \sigma_j (1 - \pi)$ as the unconditional probability of bad news arrival. Consider the following expression:

$$
\rho_H(b) \cdot V(\pi_i(b)) + (1 - \rho_H(b)) \cdot V(\pi_i(g)) = \rho_{unc}(b) \cdot V(\pi_i(b)) + (1 - \rho_{unc}(b)) \cdot V(\pi_i(g)) \tag{1}
$$

$$
\text{unconditional expected value} + (\rho_H(b) - \rho_{unc}(b)) \cdot (V(\pi_i(b)) - V(\pi_i(g)))
$$

and note that it is increasing in $\sigma_j$. To see this, note that by iterated expectations the unconditional expected value is independent of the probability $\rho_{unc}(b)$; the second term, which is the difference between conditional and unconditional payoffs, is positive and increasing in $\sigma_j$. Now, note that whenever $\pi_i(b) \geq \bar{\pi}$, we have that $V(\pi_i(b)) \geq c_H$ and thus the high type’s continuation value is:

$$
Q_H = (1 - \delta)c_H + \delta(\rho_H(b) \cdot V(\pi_i(b)) + (1 - \rho_H(b)) \cdot V(\pi_i(g)))
$$

Because posterior $\pi_i(b)$ is independent of $\sigma_j$, we can use the above argument to show that the RHS is decreasing in $\sigma_j$. Letting $\sigma^{med}, \sigma^{high}$ denote the trading probabilities in the medium and high trade equilibrium respectively, we thus know that $Q_L$ decreases as $\sigma_j$ decreases from $\sigma^{high}$ to $\sigma^{med}$. Furthermore, recall that $Q_L$ decreases as own trading probability $\sigma_i$ decreases; in particular, it decreases as $\sigma_i$ decreases from $\sigma^{high}$ to $\sigma^{med}$. This establishes the welfare ranking.

We now prove the comparative statics results. Since in the low trade equilibrium $\pi_i(g) = \bar{\pi}$, we have that $Q_H^{low} = c_H$ independently of $\xi$ and $\lambda$, provided that the low trade equilibrium exists.
for these values of $\xi$ and $\lambda$. We now show that $Q_{H}^{high}$ is increasing in $\lambda$ and $\xi$. First, because an increase in $\xi$ leaves $\sigma^{high}$ unchanged (recall that $\pi_i(b)$ is independent of $\xi$) and because an increase in $\xi$ has the same effect as an increase in the trading probability of the other market (see argument above), the equilibrium continuation value $Q_{H}^{high}$ must be increasing in $\xi$. Second, note that $\pi_i(b) = \bar{\pi}$ implies that the equilibrium trading intensity $\sigma^{high}$ is increasing in $\lambda$. Thus, if we first increase $\sigma$ to its new equilibrium value (holding $\lambda$ fixed at its initial value), by our earlier argument $Q_{H}$ must be higher. But note that then $\pi_i(b) > \bar{\pi}$ since $\pi_i(b)$ is increasing in $\sigma$; hence, this cannot be an equilibrium. Increasing $\lambda$ until $\pi_i(b) = \bar{\pi}$ (as required by the high trade equilibrium) also implies that $Q_{H}$ is increasing because for all values of $\lambda$ between the initial equilibrium value and the value that sets $\pi_i(b) = \bar{\pi}$, we again have that:

$$Q_{H} = (1 - \delta)c_{H} + \delta(\rho_{H}(b) \cdot V(\pi_i(b)) + (1 - \rho_{H}(b)) \cdot V(\pi_i(g)))$$

which, by an argument analogous to the case of $\xi$, is increasing in $\lambda$.

Finally, that the medium trade equilibrium continuation value of the high type $Q_{H}^{med}$ can be decreasing in $\lambda$ is illustrated in Figure 5. To see that $Q_{H}^{med}$ is decreasing in $\xi$, consider the continuation values of the low and the high types for values of $\sigma$ such that $\pi_i(b) < \bar{\pi} < \pi_i(g)$:

$$Q_{L} = (1 - \delta)c_{L} + \delta[\rho_{L}(b) \cdot v_{L} + (1 - \rho_{L}(b)) \cdot V(\pi_i(g))]$$

$$= (1 - \delta)c_{L} + \delta[v_{L} + (1 - \rho_{L}(b)) \cdot (V(\pi_i(g)) - v_{L})]$$

and

$$Q_{H} = (1 - \delta)c_{H} + \delta[\rho_{H}(b) \cdot c_{H} + (1 - \rho_{H}(b)) \cdot V(\pi_i(g))]$$

$$= c_{H} + \delta(1 - \rho_{H}(b)) \cdot (V(\pi_i(g)) - c_{H})$$

where recall that $\rho_{L}(b) = \xi\sigma\lambda$ and $\rho_{H}(b) = \rho_{L}(b) \cdot \frac{(1 - \lambda)(1 - \pi)}{\lambda\pi} < \rho_{L}(b)$. The following are useful to keep in mind. First, recall that there is a unique medium trade equilibrium when the low and the high trade equilibria coexist (see proof of Theorem 1). Second, when the three equilibria coexist, $Q_{L}$ must be decreasing in $\sigma$ in an open neighborhood of $\sigma^{med}$. Finally, it is straight-forward to show that $Q_{H}$ is increasing in $\sigma$ whenever $\pi_i(b) < \bar{\pi} < \pi_i(g)$.

Thus, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that, as $\xi$ increases, $\sigma$ decreases so that $\rho_{H}(b)$ and $\rho_{L}(b)$ remain fixed. This implies that $\pi_i(g)$ decreases, because:

$$\pi_i(g) = \frac{\pi_{\sigma} \frac{1 - \rho_{H}(b)}{1 - \rho_{L}(b)}}{\pi_{\sigma} \frac{1 - \rho_{H}(b)}{1 - \rho_{L}(b)} + 1 - \pi_{\sigma}}$$
and \( \pi_\sigma \) is increasing in \( \sigma \). Thus, we conclude that if \( \rho_H(b) \) were to remain fixed, then \( Q_L \) and \( Q_H \) would be decreasing in \( \xi \). Since \( Q_L \) is decreasing in \( \sigma \), in order to reestablish \( v_L = Q_L \) as is required in a medium trade equilibrium, \( \sigma \) must decrease by more than what is needed to keep \( \rho_H(b) \) and \( \rho_L(b) \) fixed. But this implies a further decline in \( Q_H \). Hence, we conclude that the equilibrium continuation value \( Q_H^{med} \) is decreasing in \( \xi \). ■

**Proof of Proposition 5.** The characterization and multiplicity proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1.

**Low trade.** That there is at most one low trade equilibrium follows from the fact that the trading intensity \( \sigma \) in this category is fully pinned down by the requirement that \( \pi_i(z_0) = \bar{\pi} \). Let \( x \) be the value of \( \sigma \) such that \( \pi_i(z_0; x) = \bar{\pi} \) (\( x \) denotes the trading probability in all \( N + 1 \) markets). As \( \phi_i \) varies from 0 and 1, \( Q_L \) varies continuously from \( (1 - \delta)c_L + \delta v_L \) to \( (1 - \delta)c_L + \delta (\rho_{i,L}(z_0)v_L + (1 - \rho_{i,L}(z_0))c_H) \) where \( \rho_{i,L}(z_0) > 0 \). Hence, there exists a \( \tilde{\delta}_{\lambda,N} < 1 \), such that \( Q_L(x, 1) = v_L \). Clearly, a low trade equilibrium exists if and only if \( \delta > \tilde{\delta}_{\lambda,N} \). Moreover, it can be shown that \( \sup_\lambda \rho_{i,L}(z_0) < 1 \). Hence \( \delta \equiv \sup_\lambda \tilde{\delta}_{\lambda,N} < 1 \).

**High trade.** That there is at most one high trade equilibrium follows because \( \sigma \) is pinned down by the requirement that \( \pi_i(z_N) = \bar{\pi} \). Let \( y \) be the value of \( \sigma \) such that \( \pi_i(z_N; y) = \bar{\pi} \). As \( \phi_i \) varies from 0 to 1, \( Q_L \) varies continuously from \( (1 - \delta)c_L + \delta (\rho_{i,L}(z_N)v_L + \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \rho_{i,L}(z_k)V(\pi_i(z_k; y))) \) to \( (1 - \delta)c_L + \delta (\rho_{i,L}(z_N)c_H + \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \rho_{i,L}(z_k)V(\pi_i(z_k; y))) \). Hence, because for \( y \) satisfying \( \pi_i(z_N; y) = \bar{\pi} \) we have \( \lim_{\lambda \to 1} \rho_{i,L}(z_k) = 1 \), it follows that the range of \( Q_L \) converges to the interval \( ((1 - \delta)c_L + \delta v_L, (1 - \delta)c_L + \delta c_H) \) as \( \lambda \) goes to 1. By Assumption 2, \( v_L \) is inside this interval. This establishes the existence of the threshold \( \bar{\lambda}_{\delta,N} \) such that the high trade equilibrium exists whenever \( \lambda > \bar{\lambda}_{\delta,N} \).

**Medium trade.** There can potentially be many medium trade equilibria. The existence of a medium trade equilibrium when the low and the high trade equilibrium coexist is analogous to that in Theorem 1 i.e., a medium trade equilibrium exists if \( \delta > \tilde{\delta}_N \) and \( \lambda > \bar{\lambda}_{\delta,N} \).

Finally, the proof of the welfare ranking across the three types of equilibria is analogous to that of Proposition 4. ■

For the proof of Proposition 6 it will be useful to reference the following lemma, which is straightforward to verify so the proof is omitted. Let \( \pi_i(\omega; \sigma_N) \) denote buyers’ posteriors about seller \( i \), conditional on buyers knowing that the state is \( \omega \) and that the low type seller’s trading probability is \( \sigma \). Then, for \( \hat{\omega} \in \{l, h\} \), we have:

\[
\pi_i(\hat{\omega}, \sigma) = \frac{P(\omega = \hat{\omega} | \theta_i = H) \cdot \pi_\sigma}{P(\omega = \hat{\omega} | \theta_i = H) \cdot \pi_\sigma + P(\omega = \hat{\omega} | \theta_i = L) \cdot (1 - \pi_\sigma)},
\]

where as before \( \pi_\sigma \) is the interim belief and \( P(\omega = l | \theta_i = L) > P(\omega = l | \theta_i = H) \).

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Lemma 5  Given a sequence \( \{\sigma_N\}_{N=1}^{\infty} \) along which information aggregates, we also have convergence of posteriors: \( \pi_i(z; \sigma_N) \rightarrow^p \pi_i(\omega; \sigma_N) \) as \( N \rightarrow \infty \).

Proof of Proposition 6. It is useful to consider a “fictitious” economy in which buyers know the state of nature in the second period. In a symmetric equilibrium of the fictitious economy, the trading probability \( \sigma \) must be such that

\[
v_L \leq Q_L^{fict}(\sigma) \equiv (1 - \delta) c_L + \delta \mathbb{E}_L \left\{ F_L (\pi_i(\omega; \sigma)) \right\}
\]

where

\[
\mathbb{E}_L \left\{ F_L (\pi_i(\omega; \sigma)) \right\} = \sum_{\widehat{\omega} = l, h} \mathbb{P} (\omega = \widehat{\omega} | \theta_i = L) \cdot [\phi (\widehat{\omega}) \cdot V (\pi_i(\widehat{\omega}; \sigma)) + (1 - \phi (\widehat{\omega})) \cdot v_L],
\]

and the first equality in (10) must hold with equality if \( \sigma > 0 \), and where

\[
\phi (\widehat{\omega}) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } \pi_i(\widehat{\omega}; \sigma) > \bar{\pi} \\
[0, 1] & \text{if } \pi_i(\widehat{\omega}; \sigma) = \bar{\pi} \\
0 & \text{if } \pi_i(\widehat{\omega}; \sigma) < \bar{\pi}.
\end{cases}
\]

Note that Assumption 2 rules out the possibility of an equilibrium in the fictitious economy with \( \sigma = 1 \). However, \( \sigma = 0 \) remains a possibility. In fact, Conditions (1) and (2) ensure that the unique equilibrium in the fictitious economy has \( \sigma = 0 \), since

\[
v_L < Q_L^{fict}(0) = (1 - \delta) c_L + \delta \mathbb{E}_L \left\{ F_L (\pi_i(\omega; 0)) \right\}
\]

\[
= (1 - \delta) \cdot c_L + \delta \cdot \left( \lambda \cdot v_L + (1 - \lambda) \cdot V \left( 1 - \frac{(1 - \lambda) (1 - \pi)}{\pi} \right) \right)
\]

Now, let us return to the actual model where buyers do not know the state, but they observe news from finitely many \( N \) other markets. By the same argument as the case with only two assets, there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium with \( \sigma_N = 0 \). Hence, the equilibrium trading probability \( \sigma_N \), when there are \( N + 1 \) markets, must be such that

\[
v_L = Q_L^N (\sigma_N) \equiv (1 - \delta) c_L + \delta \mathbb{E}_L \left\{ F_L (\pi_i(z; \sigma_N)) \right\},
\]

where

\[
\mathbb{E}_L \left\{ F_L (\pi_i(z; \sigma_N)) \right\} = \sum_{\widehat{\omega} \in \{l, h\}} \mathbb{P} (\omega = \widehat{\omega} | \theta_i = L) \sum_{z \in \Omega^N} \mathbb{P} (z | \omega = \widehat{\omega}) [\phi (z) V (\pi_i(z; \sigma_N)) + (1 - \phi (z)) v_L]
\]
and, for all $N$,

$$φ(z) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } π_i(z; σ_N) > \bar{π} \\ [0, 1] & \text{if } π_i(z; σ_N) = \bar{π} \\ 0 & \text{if } π_i(z; σ_N) < \bar{π}. \end{cases}$$

**Non-Aggregation Result.** We now prove our non-aggregation result. In particular, we show that if information aggregates along an equilibrium sequence $\{σ_N\}_{N=1}^{∞}$, then for large enough $N$ we must have $v_L < Q_N^L(σ_N)$, which is a contradiction. Assume that Conditions (1) and (2) hold, and take a sequence $\{σ_N\}_{N=1}^{∞}$ of equilibria along which information aggregates. Take any $ε > 0$, from Lemma [5] there exists $N^*$ such that for $N > N^*$, we have:

$$E_L \{F_L (π_i(z; σ_N)) \} \geq \sum_{ω ∈ \{l,h\}} P(ω = ˆω|θ_i = L) \sum_{z ∈ Ω^N} [P(z|ω = ˆω) φ(z) V(π_i(ˆω, σ_N)) + (1 - P(z|ω = ˆω)) φ(z)] v_L] - \frac{ε}{2} \geq \lambda · v_L + (1 - λ) · V \left(1 - \frac{(1 - λ)(1 - π)}{π} \right) - ε.$$

The first inequality follows from equation (12) and the fact that $V(π_i(z; σ_N)) \to V(π_i(ω; σ_N))$. The second inequality follows from the fact that Condition (1) implies that $π_i(h, σ_N) ≥ π_i(h, 0) = 1 - \frac{(1 - λ)(1 - π)}{π} > \bar{π}$ for any $σ_N$, and that thus $P(φ(z) < 1|ω = h) → 0$. We have thus established that, for arbitrary $ε > 0$, if $N$ is large enough, then:

$$E_L \{F_L (π_i(z; σ_N)) \} > \lambda · v_L + (1 - λ) · V \left(1 - \frac{(1 - λ)(1 - π)}{π} \right) - ε.$$

Combined with Condition (2), this implies that for $N$ large enough $v_L < Q_N^L(σ_N)$, contradicting equation (11) which must hold in any equilibrium with $N + 1$ assets. Thus, we cannot have information aggregation if Conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied.

**Aggregation Result.** We now establish our aggregation result. Suppose that Condition (1) or (2) are reversed. In that case, clearly any symmetric equilibrium of the fictitious economy must have positive trading probability in the first period, denote this by $σ^*$. In fact, $σ^*$ is unique since $Q_{fict}^L(σ)$ is increasing in $σ$. We now find a sequence of equilibria $\{σ_N\}_{N=1}^{∞}$ that is bounded below by a positive number. Along any such sequence, information clearly aggregates.

To this end, first consider a sequence $\{σ_N\}_{N=1}^{∞}$, not necessarily an equilibrium one, such that $ˆσ_N = ˆσ ∈ (0, σ^*)$, i.e., this is a sequence of constant trading probabilities that are positive but below $σ^*$. Along such a sequence, clearly information aggregation is obtained. Thus, we have
that $\pi_i(z; \tilde{\sigma}_N) \rightarrow^p \pi_i(\omega; \tilde{\sigma}_N) < \pi_i(\omega; \sigma^*)$ and there is $N^*$ such that for $N > N^*$, we have:

$$
\mathbb{E}_L \{ F_L (\pi_i(z; \tilde{\sigma}_N)) \} < \mathbb{E}_L \{ F_L (\pi_i(\omega; \sigma^*)) \} = \frac{v_L - (1 - \delta) \cdot c_L}{\delta}
$$

where the last equality is equivalent to $v_L = Q^fict(N)$. Now, the payoff $\mathbb{E}_L \{ F_L (\pi_i(z; \sigma)) \}$ is upper hemicontinuous in $\sigma$ for all $N$, with a maximum value of $v_H$ which is greater than $\mathbb{E}_L \{ F_L (\pi_i(\omega; \sigma^*)) \}$. Hence, we know that for each $N > N^*$, there exists a $\sigma_N$ such that both $\sigma_N \geq \tilde{\sigma} > 0$ and $\mathbb{E}_L \{ F_L (\pi_i(z; \sigma_N)) \} = \frac{v_L - (1 - \delta) \cdot c_L}{\delta}$, which is equivalent to $v_L = Q^N_L(\sigma_N)$. This yields the desired sequence $\{\sigma_N\}^\infty_{N=1}$.

**Proof of Proposition 7** First, note that information aggregation holds in any equilibrium where low type seller trades immediately. This is an equilibrium since in that case we have:

$$
\mathbb{E}_L \{ F_L (\pi_i, \varphi_i) \} = v_L < \frac{v_L - (1 - \delta) \cdot c_L}{\delta}.
$$

This establishes the existence of information aggregating equilibria.

We now show that there is an equilibrium sequence $\{\sigma_N\}^\infty_{N=1}$ along which information does not aggregate. Let $\sigma_N$ denote an equilibrium with $N + 1$ assets and note that $\rho_{i,L}(z_0) = (1 - \sigma_N)^N$ and $\rho_{i,H}(z_0) = 1$, which are the beliefs of the low and the high type respectively about the likelihood of event $z_0$, i.e., that no trade occurs in any other asset. Let us construct a low trade equilibrium, which requires that the trading intensity $\sigma_N$ satisfy the following restriction:

$$
\pi_i(z_0) = \frac{\pi_{\sigma_N} \cdot \rho_{i,H}(z_0)}{(1 - \pi_{\sigma_N}) \cdot \rho_{i,L}(z_0)} = \dot{\pi},
$$

which implies that

$$(1 - \sigma_N)^N = \rho_{i,L}(z_0) = \frac{1}{1 - \sigma_N} \cdot \left( \frac{\pi}{1 - \pi} \right)^{N+1}.$$

First, notice that a sequence $\{\sigma_N\}^\infty_{N=1}$ (not necessarily an equilibrium one) satisfying the above equality always exists. Second, note that if these trading probabilities also constitute an equilibrium, then we must have $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \sigma_N = 0$ and $\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \rho_{i,L}(z_0) = \frac{\pi}{1 - \pi} \cdot \frac{1 - \pi}{\pi} > 0$. Hence, because $\rho_{i,L}(z_0)$ is uniformly bounded below by a positive number, if $\delta$ is large enough, the low trade equilibrium must exist independently of $N$. The failure of information aggregation along such a sequence of equilibria can be seen from the fact that buyers’ posterior about the state has a non-degenerate distribution in the limit:

$$
\pi^{state}(z_0) = \frac{\pi}{\pi + (1 - \sigma_N)^{N+1}(1 - \pi)} = \pi \in (0, 1).
$$
and, as shown, the probability of event \( \{ z_0 \} \) is bounded away from zero in the limit. 

**Proof of Proposition 8 (Naive).** If investors are naive, they are unaware there is an additional informed buyer in the market and thus they bid as if they were in an environment with no transparency. Since there are many naive investors and just one dealer, the second highest bid is always determined by the naive investors and thus it coincides with the distribution of the bid in the case with symmetric buyers and no transparency. Therefore, the equilibrium \( \sigma \) at \( t = 1 \) must coincide with the one in Proposition 3 for \( \xi \to 0 \). Thus, both the trading probability in the first period and the distribution of bids in the second period coincide with the symmetric-buyer, fully-opaque setting, which means that the welfare of the seller and the total welfare also coincide. From Proposition 4 these payoffs and total surplus are the same as in the low trade equilibrium.

For the dealer, it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid his expected value when it is above \( c_H \) and \( v_L \) otherwise. When there is good news his expected value is strictly above \( c_H \). When there is bad news his expected value is below \( c_H \), and thus he will bid at most \( v_L \).

Given the equilibrium bidding and trading strategies described above, the informed buyer always wins the auction when he observes good news and makes zero profit following bad news. Hence, the informed buyer makes rents since the fact he observed good news raises his posterior expected value above the price he pays (either \( v_L \) or \( c_H \)). When the naive investors win the auction, it must have been that the dealer observed bad news. They fall prey to the winner’s curse. The true expected value of the asset is below \( c_H \) and thus they make losses in expectation. Since total surplus and the sellers’ welfare is identical to the low trade equilibrium, it immediately follows that the rents made by the informed are exactly offset by the losses of the uninformed. 

**Proof of Proposition 9 (Sophisticated).** As in the case with naive investors, it is a dominant strategy for the dealer to offer his expected value of the asset (i.e., \( V(\pi_i(z)) \)) if it is above \( c_H \) and \( v_L \) otherwise. In a fully opaque market, sophisticated investors do not observe news, but they are aware that if they bid solely based on their interim posterior, they would only win when the informed buyer observes bad news (as detailed in the proof of Proposition 8). The only way to avoid these losses is by bidding as if they observed bad news. This way they never overbid for the asset. If \( \pi_i(b) > \bar{\pi} \), then the bid in the second period would always be above \( c_H \) and the low type would not be willing to trade in the first period. Hence, \( \pi_i(b) \leq \bar{\pi} \) and sophisticated investors can only bid \( c_H \) or something weakly less than \( v_L \). Since there is only one dealer, the price will again be set by the investors.

Given the bidding behavior described above, our condition for equilibrium becomes

\[
v_L = (1 - \delta) c_L + \delta F_L(\{(\pi_i(b), \phi_i)\}).
\]
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the only possible solution must involve $\pi_i(b) = \bar{\pi}$. Hence, there is a unique equilibrium $\sigma$, which is such that $\pi_i(b; \sigma, \sigma) = \bar{\pi}$. Notice that this equilibrium involves a higher $\sigma$ than in the low trade equilibrium (or when buyers are symmetric and the market is fully opaque) since $\pi_i(b) < \pi_{\sigma_1}$.

Clearly, both the low type and the sophisticated investors have the same payoffs as in the low trade equilibrium of Theorem 1 (i.e., $v_L$ and 0). The high types’s payoff is also the same as in the low-trade equilibrium since he gets $c_H$ at $t = 2$ regardless of the realization of news. The dealer, however, makes positive expected profits since after observing good news he buys the asset for $c_H$ but when the expected value is $V(\pi_i(g)) > c_H$. ■

Proposition 10 (Perfect Correlation) The set of equilibria with perfect correlation are equivalent, in terms of welfare and trading probability $\sigma$, to the limit equilibria with imperfect correlation as $\lambda \to 1$.

Proof. When correlation is perfect, we also need to specify buyers’ off-equilibrium beliefs. Suppose that the equilibrium specifies that low type trades w.p.1 in the first period, but that one of the low type sellers deviates. In this case, buyers can put any probability $\pi^{\text{off}} \in [0, 1]$ to the remaining seller being low type. Then the expected price that the low type seller receives upon rejection in the first period is as before given by $\mathbb{E}_L\{F_L(\pi_i, \phi_i)\}$, but if $\sigma = 1$ then $\pi_i(b) = \pi^{\text{off}}$. There are two sets of equilibria to consider depending on whether the low type plays a pure strategy of trading immediately or a mixed trading strategy. By the same reasoning as before, an equilibrium with no trade is not possible.

First, as with $\lambda < 1$, we can have equilibria where the low type mixes between trade at $t = 1$ and $t = 2$. In such equilibria, the low type must be indifferent whether to trade in the first or second period. Importantly, notice that the payoffs $\mathbb{E}_\theta\{F_\theta(\pi_i, \phi_i)\}$ are left continuous at $\lambda = 1$. Hence, it follows that these equilibria are the limit of the low and medium trade equilibria as $\lambda$ goes to 1.

Second, in contrast to imperfect correlation, we can have an equilibrium in which the low type seller trades w.p.1 in the first period. In that case, the low type receives a payoff $v_L$ and the high type receives a payoff $(1 - \delta)c_H + \delta v_H$, and a sufficient condition for this equilibrium to exist is that with the most pessimistic off-equilibrium belief $\pi^{\text{off}} = 0$, we have

$$v_L \geq (1 - \delta)c_L + \delta \mathbb{E}_L\{F_L(\pi_i, \phi_i)\}|_{\sigma = 1}$$

Intuitively, if the low type expects the other low type to trade and reveal their common type, then there is no incentive to delay trade to $t = 2$. Now, despite being in pure strategies, these equilibria are the limits of the high trade equilibria with imperfect correlation. To see this, note
that the latter requires that the belief following trade in the other market is:

\[
\pi_i(b) = \frac{\rho_{i,H}(b) \cdot \pi_\sigma}{\rho_{i,H}(b) \cdot \pi_\sigma + \rho_{i,L}(b) \cdot (1 - \pi_\sigma)} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\pi_j=L|\theta_i=L}{\pi_j=L|\theta_i=H} \cdot \frac{1 - \pi_\sigma}{\pi_\sigma}} = \bar{\pi}
\]

which implies that \(\lim_{\lambda \to 1} \sigma = 1\). Thus, the low type’s payoff is \(v_L\) and the high type’s payoff converges to \((1 - \delta)c_H + \delta v_H\), which are exactly the payoffs in the equilibrium with immediate trade in the first period when correlation is perfect. ■