PER Distinguished Lecture Series: Johannes Hörner

PER Distinguished Lecture Series: Johannes Hörner
"Learning, Experimentation and Information Design"
Part I
Friday, February 24, 2017
1101 International Affairs Building
Part II
Tuesday, February 28, 2017
1102 International Affairs Building
The two lectures will cover recent models of dynamic information design. In an agency context, how should information be selectively disclosed to provide incentives to the agent(s)? In the first lecture, the conflict of interest involves patience: a patient but uninformed principal must rely on myopic agents to carry out experimentation. To do so, the principal decides what information regarding the outcome of past experiment to disclose.
In the second lecture, the principal observes some Markov process, and decides what information to disclose in each period, so to as influence the action of myopic agents. The lectures will emphasize the open questions in the literature.
Johannes Hörner is the Alfred Cowles Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, and Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University. He has received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pennsylvania in 2000, and has held previous positions at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University (2000–2008).
His academic interests range from game theory to the theory of industrial organization. His research has focused on repeated games, dynamic games, and auctions.